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In recent years, the psychotherapeutic world has become increasingly interested in the 
characteristics of the relationship between client and therapist.  Two key influences on this 
relationship are the therapist’s ability to mentalize and the therapist’s attachment style (or the 
degree to which they are securely or insecurely attached).  The main aim of this study was to 
evaluate mentalizing abilities and attachment orientation in therapists, but in particular to explore 
the relationship between the two.  A group of 20 therapists and a matched group of 21 non-
therapists undertook a battery of self-report, behavioural and eye-tracking mentalising tasks, and a 
self-report attachment questionnaire.  Mentalizing tasks were designed to measure various aspects 
of mentalizing including not only mental state comprehension but also the proclivity to use 
mentalizing skills.   In terms of group differences, therapists showed a greater proclivity to use 
elaborative mental state language and a greater focus on social cues when visually scanning the 
same situations.  Therapists also demonstrated a self-reported higher level of affective and cognitive 
empathic ability than non-therapists.  However, in behavioural terms, therapists did not evidence a 
significantly enhanced ability in traditional Theory of Mind tasks, emotion understanding, or visual 
perspective taking tasks.  Thus, therapists generally exhibited a greater tendency to process some 
but not all aspects of social and emotional information more thoroughly.  The influence of 
attachment orientation on the mentalizing skills of both the therapist and the non-therapist group 
was complex.  Non-therapists tended to behave according to the expectations of previous 
attachment related research. For example, attachment anxiety was associated with poorer 
perspective taking and a preoccupation with the use of mental state words.  Avoidant attachment 
correlated with a significant reduction in the first-fix looking time at social information.  In the 
therapist group however, only two significant associations between attachment and mentalization 
were seen: avoidance and the proclivity to use mentalization skills as measured by the use of 
elaborative mental state language, and avoidance and self-reported empathy.  No other significant 
influences of attachment on therapist mentalization appeared to exist.  Thus, therapists who 
reported an insecure attachment orientation still generally managed to behave as though they were 
more secure.  Some suggestions are made as to the underlying reasons for this phenomenon, and 
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1.1. The main aims of this research 
 
This study aims to contribute towards existing knowledge concerning two aspects of 
therapist relational characteristics, namely attachment orientation and mentalizing abilities.  
The main point of interest was the relationship between the two, and how this relationship 
might differ in comparison to the general population.  This is considered highly relevant at a 
time when the psychotherapeutic world has become increasingly interested in the relationship 
between client and therapist (e.g. Norcross, 2002; Wachtel, 2008) and which therapist 
attributes might contribute towards its quality.  A key influence on this relationship is the 
therapist’s ability to mentalize, that is, to make inferences about the client’s desires, beliefs and 
attitudes in order to understand his or her mental state and make sense of related behaviour 
(Astington, Harris & Olson, 1988; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist & Target, 2002; 
Frith & Frith, 2003; Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  A second key influence is the therapist’s own 
attachment style or the degree to which they are securely or insecurely attached (Bowlby, 
1969/82, 1973, 1980).   
 
Whilst there has been a small amount of existing research that has considered the 
mentalizing abilities of therapists (e.g. Hassenstab, Dziobek, Rogers, Wolf and Convit, 2007; 
Hall, Davis & Connelly, 2000) and an equally modest amount which has explored the therapist’s 
own attachment style (for example, with respect to the relationship with therapists’ experience 
of personal therapy, Rizq, 2011; Rizq & Target, 2010a, 2010b), no study to date has explicitly 
contemplated how attachment might directly affect therapists’ mentalizing abilities (which 
clearly has specific consequences for the therapeutic relationship).  Therapists represent an 
unusual group; they are highly experienced in mentalizing, and arguably may be more secure in 
their attachment behaviours due to personal reflection and training. The study therefore aims 
to evaluate the relationship between mentalizing abilities and attachment orientation in 
therapists and a well-matched non-therapist control group.  By comparing the pattern of 
attachment and mentalizing in these two groups the effect of attachment on mentalizing might 
be better understood and conceptualised.  
 
1.2. Why is attachment and mentalizing important to therapists? 
 
The quality of the therapeutic relationship is of enormous importance and continues to 
be seen by many as more important than theoretical modality or technique (Asay & Lambert, 
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1999) and research evidence supports its significance (Beutler & Harwood, 2002).  For example, 
it is known that the quality of therapeutic relationship as rated by clients is significantly 
associated with therapeutic improvements (Krupnick, Sotsky, Simmens, Moyer, Elkin, Watkins, 
et al., 1996), that clients consistently report that the relationship with their therapist is more 
helpful than specific techniques employed (Keijsers, Schaap & Hoogduin, 2000), and that 
relational factors such as therapist empathy are considered by clients as particularly effective 
(Bohart, Elliott, Greenberg & Watson, 2002).    
 
In acknowledgment of the nature and importance of this relationship, “the relational” as 
a concept first emerged in the psychotherapeutic literature in the eighties (e.g. Greenberg & 
Mitchell, 1983; Mitchell, 1988) although there continues to be much debate over how it is 
characterised (Loewenthal, 2010).  Some have described an encounter that depends on how 
the therapist and client see and hear each other subjectively, that is “mutually constructed 
between two active participants, with the subjectivities of both patient and analyst 
contributing”, (Lyons-Ruth, 1999, p. 576).  Thus, in most therapeutic modalities, significant 
emphasis is placed on how this client/therapist relationship is negotiated in the therapeutic 
space, and it has been recognised that its effectiveness relies very much on certain of the 
therapist’s relational characteristics.  Indeed, client perception of therapists’ characteristics are 
more significant influences on both process and outcome than many other therapeutic 
variables such as theoretical model (Beutler, Crago & Arizmendi, 1986), particularly clients’ 
perceptions that counsellors understand their internal experiences (Greenberg, Watson, Elliott 
& Bohart, 2001). 
 
One of the major influences on the ability of the therapist to relate to his or her client is 
likely to be the therapist’s ability to mentalize, that is to make inferences about the client’s 
desires, beliefs and attitudes in order to understand their mental state and make sense of their 
behaviour (Astington et al., 1988; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Fonagy et al., 2002; Frith & Frith, 2003; 
Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  This mentalizing ability of the therapist is a key area of interest 
for this study, and whilst it is not considered in relation to therapeutic outcome or therapist 
effectiveness per se, it is proposed that mentalizing is directly relevant to the consideration of 
“the relational” in psychotherapy and is fundamental to a therapist’s ability to connect to and 
understand his or her client.   
 
It is important for therapists to understand their own individual mentalizing processes 
and attachment dynamics.  These are individuals who generally consider themselves as 
relatively capable in aspects of relating and empathy (Hassenstab et al., 2007), and sufficiently 
aware of their own emotionally related behaviours, but this conclusion is often arrived at 
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through the use of self-report measures rather than experimental design (e.g. Hall et al., 2000).  
To address this, this study uses both self-report measures and experimental tasks.  Further it 
considers many different dimensions of mentalizing, for example lower level socio-perceptual 
and higher level social-cognitive aspects.  It also considers comprehension (understanding 
mental states) as well as production of mental state language (the proclivity to use mentalizing 
skills).  Furthermore, it also explores potentially more subtle levels of mentalizing, for example 
social orientation as measure of mentalizing using eye-tracking technology.  The use of an 
extremely comprehensive range of mentalizing measures represents a highly novel approach 
that has not been undertaken before. 
 
As well as the need to consider therapist mentalizing per se as a potential influence on 
the ability of the therapist to relate to his or her clients in a responsive and available way, it is 
also unclear from the current literature whether, in turn, mentalizing is affected by other 
characteristics of the therapist such as the therapist’s attachment style (Bowlby 1969/82, 1973, 
1980).  Original attachment theory envisages the therapeutic relationship acting in a very 
similar manner to that of a parent-child dyad, requiring the therapist to act as the “secure 
base” for exploration (Bowlby, 1988).  Attachment research makes some suggestions as to how 
therapist attachment style might play out in the therapeutic work (e.g. Dozier, Cue & Barnett, 
1994; Dunkle & Friedlander, 1996; Ligiero & Gelso, 2002; Sauer, Lopez & Gormley 2003).  
However, whilst studies have considered the attachment of therapists in isolation and it has 
been noted that the therapist’s attachment style could be central to the therapeutic process 
(Slade, 2000), no one has so far considered role of therapist attachment style on affecting their 
ability to mentalize and this is the key main aim of the study, i.e. to explore and compare self-
report attachment orientation and performance on a full range of mentalizing tasks in both 
therapists and a non-therapy group. 
 
Research into the association between attachment and mental state understanding has 
so far focused extensively on children and their relationships with carers (e.g. Meins, 
Fernyhough, Wainwright, Das Gupta, Fradley & Tuckey, 2002; Ontai & Thompson, 2002, 2008) 
rather than focusing on adulthood.  Moreover, although there have been some research 
paradigms incorporating aspects of both adult attachment and mentalizing (e.g. Allen, 2006; 
Fonagy et al., 2002; Fonagy, Gergely & Target, 2008; Slade, 2005), none has been directed 
specifically at a particular group of individuals for whom these two areas are highly important 
in their everyday lives, namely those involved in psychotherapeutic work.  Whilst both adult 
attachment theory and the capacity for mentalizing are beginning to be recognised as genuine 
contributors to psychotherapeutic theory and clinical interventions (e.g. Allen 2006; Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2004; Fonagy, 2006), very little has been published concerning the relationship 
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between therapists’ attachment and mentalizing capabilities.  Rizq and Target (2010a) 
attempted to address this research vacuum by exploring both mentalizing and attachment in a 
small group of Counselling Psychologists using qualitative analysis, but made no claim as to 
generalizability and focussed primarily on personal therapy experiences. Thus certain questions 
remain pertinent for therapists concerned with the quality of their relational skills and their 
ability to connect with their clients: does attachment affect mentalizing in therapists in the 
same way as those without this background and training?   
 
Importantly, because therapists undertake extensive training in emotional and mental 
state understanding generally including personal therapy, it is probable that their attachment 
behaviours may have changed, representing a movement towards earned security (Pearson, 
Cohn, Cowan, & Pape Cowan, 1994).   In addition, they have often focussed significantly on the 
inhibition of aspects of themselves which might compromise their role as “mentalizer” and 
“secure base” for the client. Consequently, an informed view of the relationship between 
attachment and mentalizing in therapists can only really be explored by comparing therapists’ 
patterns to those typically expected in the general population.  Thus, to reach a more robust 
conclusion about the potential link between attachment and mentalizing, a matched control 
group was specifically used for comparison.  In summary, the first main aim was to look at 
mentalizing in therapists by employing a broad range of measures.  Second, of interest was 
whether and how attachment might affect this ability to mentalize.  The study was therefore 
not interested in solely comparing the levels of attachment between two groups, but more 
specifically in the link between attachment and mentalizing within the two groups. 
 
1.3. Empirical evidence of attachment and mentalizing in the general population 
 
Attachment styles are generally predictive of functioning in adult life and in close 
relationships.  For example, securely attached individuals seem consistently to hold more 
optimistic views about their ability to cope (e.g. Berant, Mikulincer & Florian, 2001; Mikulincer 
& Florian, 1995), to acknowledge and display emotions (e.g. Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995), to 
disclose personal information openly (e.g. Collins & Read, 1990; Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991) 
and to seek support for regulating emotions (e.g. Ognibene & Collins, 1998).  Secure individuals 
do not tend to worry about work or allow it to interfere too much with friendships or health 
(Hazan & Shaver, 1990).  
Conversely for insecure attachment, anxiously attached individuals tend to ruminate on 
negative thoughts (Mikulincer & Florian, 1995), experience a greater degree of worry 
(Mikulincer, Florian, Birnbaum & Malishkewitz, 2002), are prone to overwhelming anger 
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(Mikulincer, 1998), and to self-devaluation (Mikulincer, Orbach & Iavnieli, 1998).  Those high in 
avoidance tend to distance themselves from emotional bonds with others (Fraley & Davis, 
1997) and from distress (Mikulincer & Florian, 1995), are less likely to turn to others for support 
and care (Simpson, Rholes & Nelligan, 1992), and exhibit high levels of distress and 
maladjustment in stressful situations (Mikulincer & Florian, 1998).  
Hyperactivation/deactivation models suggest that cognitive processes play a role in 
appraising and monitoring the environment for cues regarding the proximity and accessibility 
of significant others (Fraley & Shaver, 2000; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005).  Avoidant individuals 
attempt to deactivate the attachment system’s needs for proximity and protection by ignoring 
or dismissing significant events such as rejection or criticism and by suppressing emotion that 
would otherwise activate the system.  Conversely, anxiously attached individuals employ hyper-
activating strategies, often generating and intensifying negative emotional states which 
maintain the attachment system in a chronically activated state.  Clearly, attachment style 
appears to have a direct effect on the ability of individuals to maintain relationships and on 
their feelings about themselves.  It is no surprise therefore that many clients attending therapy 
do so because of maladaptive attachment-related behaviours and are potentially looking for a 
reparative relational (often parental) experience with their therapist (Fairbairn, 1958, cited in 
Wachtel, 2008; Frank, 1999). 
Studies of adult mentalizing (see section 3) have become more prevalent following the 
development of particular mentalizing measures and tasks designed specifically for this age 
group.  Whilst it had been thought that a capacity to mentalize was an all or nothing capability 
acquired at around four to five years old in the typical population (Wellman, 1990), it is now 
recognised that even typically developed adults do not perform at ceiling levels and clear 
individual differences exist.   
Mentalization is seen by many as intricately linked to attachment.  In typically 
developed adults, there is an expectation that secure attachment is associated with better 
mentalizing capacity, and the distortion of mentalizing ability is often seen as fundamental to 
instances of attachment disorders and psychopathology (Fonagy, et al., 2002; Fonagy & 
Bateman, 2008).  Fonagy et al. (2002) consider mentalization as a basic human capacity linked 
to affect regulation and productive social relationships. The more a person is able to envision 
mental states in the self and others, the more they are likely to engage in productive and 
intimate social relationships and to feel connected but autonomous, in other words to possess 
a secure attachment. 
A range of tasks has been developed to measure aspects of mentalizing which, for the 
most part, tap mental state comprehension (e.g. the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test, 
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Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore & Robertson, 1997).  However, an exciting and recent 
progression in measurement technique has been the development of tasks that address the 
proclivity to use mentalizing abilities.  A novel example of this is the analysis of mental state 
talk (e.g. Ruffman, Slade & Crowe, 2002).  The use of mental state talk is thought to represent 
the proclivity to use mentalizing capacity (Meins, Fernyhough, Johnson & Lidstone, 2006) which 
may be different to mental state comprehension demonstrated in an experimental task (for 
example, a classic false belief task).  Thus, possession of a mentalizing capacity may be 
conceptualised as different from using it.  This is consistent with perspective-taking research 
where evidence suggests that the proclivity to use one’s mentalization capacity is as 
fundamental in reasoning about mental states as understanding them (e.g. Keysar, Barr, Balin & 
Brauner, 2000; Samson & Apperly, 2010).  Indeed, assessing the “production” of mental state 
language may be a more sensitive measure of mentalizing than traditional measures.   
  Mental state talk in mothers and children has been found to be significantly related to 
and predictive of attachment security in children (Meins, Fernyhough, Fradley & Tuckey, 2001). 
Thus, as well as providing a sensitive measure of mentalizing per se, it was felt in this study that 
the analysis of mental state talk in therapists may provide a major insight into the interaction 
between attachment and mentalizing.  As part of the battery of mentalizing measures, 
therefore, a novel mental state talk exercise was undertaken by both groups of participants in 
order to explore what differences may or may not exist between therapists and non-therapists 
in the way attachment might influence mental state talk production. 
1.4. Empirical evidence of attachment and mentalizing in therapists 
The key point of interest for this study is the effect of attachment on mentalizing.  
Empirical evidence specifically to do with therapists in this area, and indeed in related 
individuals, is extremely sparse.  In terms of therapist attachment orientations per se, 
therapists might be expected to exhibit relatively secure attachment, since attachment 
insecurity in the therapist could interfere with the therapeutic process (Rubino, Barker, Roth & 
Fearon, 2000).  Empirical evidence is on this issue is light, however.  One study (Leiper & 
Casares, 2000) found 70% of Clinical Psychologists to be securely attached providing partial but 
inconclusive corroboration because (i) it does not relate specifically to psychotherapists, (ii) it 
mirrors the proportion of securely attached individuals in the general population, usually 
expected at 60-65% (e.g. van Ijzendoorn & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 1996), and (iii) it makes no 
comment or suggestion on the potential for “earned security” (Pearson et al., 1994) on the part 
of therapists during training.  Whilst it might be expected that levels of security and insecurity 
are roughly comparable between therapists and non-therapists, what is interesting is to 
explore how levels of attachment insecurity relate to an aspect of the therapists’ relational 
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abilities i.e. mentalizing, and by inference to their ability to act as the “secure base”, and relate 
to and connect with clients.   
Empirical evidence suggests therapists are more accurate than controls at detecting 
emotional information (e.g. Machado, et al., 1999), that therapists score more highly on 
cognitive empathy (e.g. Hassenstab, et al., 2007) but often self-report less personal distress in 
response to the distress of others (Hall et al., 2000).  The inference is that therapists may 
represent a group with advanced empathic abilities, but are better able to control their own 
emotions in emotional situations, possibly because of frequent exposure to affectively charged 
interactions and an ability to moderate distress.  Whilst this tells us something about empathy 
in therapists, there are fewer research findings applicable to either the assessment of more 
complex mentalizing abilities or the tendency to use such abilities.  Only two findings relating to 
alternative but possibly relevant groups currently exist: psychics (Dziobek, Rogers, Fleck, 
Hassenstab, Gold, Wolf et al., 2005) and childcare personnel (Degotardi & Sweller, 2011).  In 
the former, no enhanced mentalization skills were observed, and in the latter an enhanced 
mental state understanding was displayed through mental state talk in more sensitive 
practitioners.  
 
To date there is no research published relating to how therapist attachment styles may 
influence mentalizing.  It is known in children that mentalizing abilities and attachment styles 
are significantly related, the more securely attached a child is, the more likely he or she is to be 
able to pass false belief tasks (e.g. Fonagy, Redfern & Charman, 1997; Meins et al., 2001).  In 
adulthood less is known, but it seems that a greater mentalizing capability is correlated with 
more secure attachment-related behaviours and lack of mentalizing ability is associated with 
various maladaptive insecure behaviours (e.g. Fonagy et al., 2002; Fonagy et al., 2008). Thus, a 
control group of typically developed adults might be expected to exhibit the types of 
relationships associated with the general adult population for both mentalizing and emotion.   
 
What is less clear is whether therapists will do the same, particularly given that they 
spend significant time habitually inhibiting their own emotional perspective in order to serve 
their clients well.  There is some evidence that secure therapists can more easily put aside their 
own attachment representations in order to respond to client presentations appropriately 
without the risk of significant countertransference issues marring the relationship (Dozier, et 
al., 1994; Tyrell, Dozier, Teague & Fallot, 1999).  Further, those that are more secure in 
attachment organisation make more flexible adjustments towards clients, modulating their 
responses so as to relate effectively to the individual client (Daly & Mallinckrodt, 2009).  This 
tells us that secure attachment in therapists may be beneficial.  It tells us less about therapists 
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with insecure attachment styles or whether therapists who have trained professionally (and 
undertaken their own therapy) experience a modification to the effect of attachment styles.  It 
may be entirely plausible that, due to earned security on the part of the therapist, a different 
pattern might be expected e.g. the effect of attachment is diminished. 
 




Participants were in two groups; first a group of 20 Counselling Psychologists, 
psychotherapists or counsellors (termed “therapists”).  This group included practitioners 
professionally educated to Doctoral, Masters or equivalent level, all of whom had 
experience of at least 500 client hours, some significantly more.  Therapists practised in 
various therapeutic models and were members or affiliated with one of the major 
psychotherapeutic professional bodies e.g. British Psychological Society (BPS), British 
Association for Counselling & Psychotherapy (BACP) or equivalent.  The demographic 
characteristics and background of the therapists are detailed further in the Methods 
Section and in detail in Appendix 1. 
 
The second group, the control group, comprised an equivalent number of non-
therapists, educated also to postgraduate level, working in a variety of non-counselling 
related careers.  Occupations were highly varied and included both helping professions 
such as teachers as well as more commercial careers such as accountants. The groups 
were designed to be matched for gender, age, socio-demographic characteristics, and 
general social and non-social abilities.  It is considered that the control group in this study 
was constructed particularly rigorously so that the results with respect to mentalizing, 
attachment, and the relationship between the two represent real group differences rather 




To measure adult attachment, an extensively used self-report questionnaire, the 
Experience in Close Relationships (ECR; Brennan, Clark & Shaver, 1998) was used.  A 
battery of measures was also chosen to tap mentalizing including self-report scales, 
behavioural measures and eye-tracking tasks. They are described throughout the text and 
are designed to assess several different aspects of mentalizing, e.g. social-perceptual, 
social-cognitive and empathic understanding.  Overarching this was the intention to 
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measure the two more fundamental facets of mentalizing, namely mental state 
comprehension and the production of (or proclivity to use) mentalization capabilities. 
 
The self-report measures for empathic understanding comprised the Empathy Quotient 
(Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) and Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980). The 
behavioural tasks included a perspective taking task in which accuracy and reaction times 
were recorded (Keysar, et al., 2000), an emotion recognition task (Ekman & Friesen, 1971), 
and a complex mental state understanding task (the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” task, 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001).  More novel assessments of the 
proclivity to use mental state understanding through analysis of mental state talk were 
also utilised.  These included a “pictures description” task (Ruffman, et al., 2002) and the 
Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, & Zeitlin, 1990).  
Finally, eye-tracking data was collected to record where and for how long participants 
looked at socially or non-socially relevant stimuli.  In summary, a comprehensive range of 
mentalizing measures was used, tapping both mental state comprehension and the 
proclivity to use it, as well as more subtle aspects of social orientation as measured by the 
eye-tracking, to give as full a picture as possible of how mentalizing ability may relate to 
and interact with attachment orientation. 
 
1.5.3. Research Questions 
 
1.5.3.1. Are levels of security and insecurity comparable between therapists and non-
therapists?   
 
Despite the fact that therapists are required to act as the “secure base” 
in the therapeutic relationship, previous research suggests that the percentage 
of securely attached therapists in any group should be similar to the general 
population at 60-70% (Leiper & Casares, 2000; van Ijzendoorn & Bakermans-
Kranenburg, 1996).  Whilst differences in levels of attachment security between 
therapists and control group members were not the major focus of this study, 
attachment orientation of both were measured in order to explore the effect of 
attachment on mentalizing.  However, it was not expected that therapists as a 







1.5.3.2. Will therapists self-report greater mentalizing abilities than non-therapists? 
 
Previous research suggests that therapists are better at some aspects of 
mentalizing than other people, for example, in emotion understanding, and in 
empathic ability (e.g. Hassenstab, et al., 2007) although this view is often 
arrived at via self-report measures (e.g. Hall, et al., 2000).  The expectation was 
that the therapists would replicate previous studies and exhibit some aspects of 
self-reported mentalizing, such as empathic understanding, that were more 
advanced than the control group.   
 
1.5.3.3. Will therapists show greater abilities in behavioural and experimental measures 
of mentalizing? 
 
Existing literature does not allow an informed assessment of what to 
expect in other areas of mentalizing, for example, complex mental state 
understanding, perspective taking or in the production of mental state talk.  This 
represents one of the key areas of research in this study.  Given enhanced self-
reported abilities in some areas of mentalizing, and the extent of the training 
that therapists have undergone in the understanding of emotional states 
presented by their clients, a superior performance by therapists might be 
expected  in all or at least some of the more complex and subtle aspects of 
mental state comprehension and the proclivity to use mentalizing ability.  The 
battery of behavioural tasks aimed at tapping both these aspects of mentalizing 
should allow a more considered exploration of these issues. 
 
1.5.3.4. Will the relationship between attachment and mentalizing abilities be 
comparable in therapists and non-therapists? 
 
There is some evidence that a greater mentalizing capability is 
correlated with secure attachment-related socially beneficial behaviours and 
that a lack of mentalizing ability is correlated significantly with various 
maladaptive insecure behaviours (e.g. Fraley & Shaver, 2000; Fonagy et al., 
2002; Fonagy et al., 2008; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007).  Therefore, the control 
group of typically developed adults might be expected to exhibit the behaviours 
normally associated with attachment styles, for  example, avoidantly attached 
individuals might retreat from emotional stimuli and be poorer at processing 
mental state information generally, and anxiously attached individuals might 
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exaggerate attachment-related information.  What is less clear is that therapists 
will exhibit the same patterns, given their experience and training.  It might be 
that therapists display a slightly different profile due to their experience in 
overcoming their own perspectives and immersion in the emotional experience 
of their clients.  One possibility is that the effect of therapists’ attachment 





In order to give a comprehensive background to attachment theory and the relevant concepts, 
the attachment literature is reviewed below, beginning with early infant and child attachment 
theory and research, before moving into the main area of concern for this study which is adult 
attachment theory and measurement. 
 




Bowlby’s (1969/82, 1973, 1980) attachment theory has become the leading theoretical 
framework in understanding the importance and development of attachment bonds and 
close social relationships in infancy, childhood and adulthood.  Bowlby’s theory is deeply 
rooted in several influential areas of theory and research, e.g. in primate ethology, 
developmental psychology, social psychology and psychotherapy.  According to 
attachment theory, infants are born with an attachment system that allows the developing 
child to maintain proximity to and seek support from primary carers in times of stress and 
potential separation (Bowlby, 1969/82). If a child perceives an attachment figure to be 
available, safe and responsive in times of need, the child’s attachment system functions 
optimally (Bowlby, 1973) and he or she will experience an inner sense of safety or “felt” 
security (Sroufe & Waters, 1977).  This results in a perception that the world is a benign 
place, that others are sensitive and that the environment may be safely explored.  
However, if the child perceives a threat to the relationship in the form of inconsistency of 
care, or senses an absence of care entirely or even hostility on the part of the carer, the 
sense of security is undermined and he or she feels anxious or threatened (Bowlby, 
1969/82).  In such cases, secondary systems are developed by the child to manage the 
effects of the felt insecurity (Main, 1990; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002a) and to try to 




2.1.2. Internal working models 
 
According to Bowlby (1969/82, 1973), repeated interactions between the infant and 
parent lead the infant to develop expectations about the caregiving that he or she receives 
from the parent.  These are organised into internal working models of the caregiver, the 
self and the relationship between the two (Bowlby 1973). Responsive and sensitive 
caregiving leads to the development of internal working models of the caregiver as 
trustworthy and supportive and to positive models of the self as worthy of support and 
safety.  Conversely insensitive and unpredictable caregiving, goes hand in hand with 
models of caregivers as untrustworthy and unavailable, and of negative models of the self 
as not worthy of support and care.  Negative models will also include self-doubt in close 
relationships and compensating maladaptive emotional responses as part of anxious or 
avoidant strategies for dealing with the associated psychological pain (Bowlby, 1969/82).   
 
Thus, a child’s early experience of the relationship between itself and the primary carer 
helps shape his or her general mental representations of the self and others which then 
remain relevant into later life.  This influence occurs through the expectations that have 
been built up of others’ emotional availability and beliefs about finding a secure personal 
base (Bowlby, 1979).  In summary, a securely attached individual will expect others to be 
receptive and supportive, and an insecure individual will expect others to be indifferent or 
rejecting (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002a). 
 
2.1.3. Maternal influence 
 
Many developmental psychologists (e.g. Ainsworth, Bell & Stayton, 1974; Meins, et al., 
2001; Fonagy & Target, 1997) and psychotherapeutic theorists (e.g. Bion, 1962; Kohut, 
1977; Winnicott, 1965) have recognised that the sensitivity provided by the main caregiver 
is fundamental in the development of the child’s sense of security. 
 
2.1.3.1. Maternal sensitivity  
 
The pivotal work of Mary Ainsworth and colleagues in the Strange 
Situation paradigm (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall, 1978) provided the first 
empirical evidence to support Bowlby’s concept that differences in maternal 
sensitivity may be related to differences in infant-mother attachment security 
(Ainsworth, Bell & Stayton, 1971, Ainsworth et al., 1974). Infants classified as 
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secure in the Strange Situation typically react to separation from their mothers 
with observable signs of distress, but they recover quickly when back with their 
mothers whom they greet with joy and affection, soon returning to explore 
their environment.  Insecurely attached infants, dependant on their 
classification, either show little distress at separation and an avoidant reunion, 
or cry and protest angrily at separation and are hyper-aroused at reunion 
(Ainsworth et al. 1978).   
 
Ainsworth et al., (1971, 1974) found that higher maternal sensitivity 
scores were related to more accessibility between mother and child, greater 
acceptance and cooperation, and to secure attachment relationships at 12 
months.  Conversely, consistent rejection of infants or inconsistent care was 
related to an insecure pattern of attachment.  Subsequent research has 
supported this, although recent commentators conclude that it is arguably too 
simplistic to consider sensitivity as the only or most significant factor in the 
development of a secure attachment orientation (e.g. Meins et al., 2001).   
 
2.1.3.2. Maternal responsiveness and appropriateness 
 
Importantly, the concept of parental sensitivity has been explored and 
developed further.  Parental sensitivity seems not just about responsiveness per 
se but also about appropriateness, requiring parents to be able to read the cues 
of their infants (Meins, et al., 2001).  Such an ability necessitates parents 
treating their infants as individuals with minds (Meins, 1997), a capability that 
has been linked to various characteristics in pre-schoolers.  For example, a 
mother’s tendency to focus on mental states rather than behavioural or physical 
states when describing her child, in particular her proclivity to use appropriate 
mind-related comments towards her infant, predicts better mentalizing 
capabilities in the child (Meins, Fernyhough, Russell & Clark-Carter, 1998) and 
security of attachment at 12 months (Meins et al. 2001).  It appears therefore 
that mothers of securely attached children possess better mentalizing 
capabilities.  Further studies corroborate that maternal sensitivity, attachment 
and maternal use of mind-related comments are all inter-related and suggest 






Thus, responsiveness and appropriateness of a mother’s mind-related 
talk may be seen as a refinement of and much closer to Ainsworth et al.’s (1971, 
1974) original construct of maternal sensitivity.  Moreover, Meins (1999), using 
the internal working model approach, also suggests that mothers’ 
representations of and discourse about their infants’ mental and emotional 
states may provide a mechanism for the link between parental security of 
attachment and a secure infant-parent relationship.   
 
2.1.3.3. Maternal Reflective Function 
Fonagy and colleagues (Fonagy, Steele, Moran, Steele & Higgitt, 1991; 
Fonagy & Target, 1997) have attempted to explore further what allows mothers 
to show responsive and appropriate caregiving.  They introduced the concept of 
“Reflective Function” defined as the mental function which organises the 
experience of one’s own and others’ behaviour in terms of mental state 
constructs and represents the knowledge of the nature of experiences that give 
rise to certain beliefs and emotions (Fonagy, et al., 2002).  It is suggested that 
reflective function is an important determinant of individual differences in self-
organisation and the continuity of self-experience which in turn is the 
underpinning of a coherent self-structure.   
Maternal reflective function allows the child to begin to interrogate 
what he feels about the mental states he encounters.  A process of 
representational mapping facilitates the development of reflective abilities 
(Target & Fonagy, 1996).  When the mother reflects or mirrors an emotion using 
her own reflective functioning, it is represented by the child and mapped onto 
the representation of his self-state.  Any discrepancy providing not too close to 
or too remote from the child’s self-representation is used as a tool for self-
organisation and affect regulation.  Thus, a mother uses her own mentalizing 
capability to enhance the child’s and the attachment system is intimately 
connected with both representational mapping and the development of the 
reflective function in the child.   
In many respects, the mirroring and reflection of emotion termed by 
Fonagy as reflective functioning is very similar to earlier psychodynamic 
constructs of the relationship between mother and child (Fonagy, 2001).  An 
example might be Bion’s notion of a mother’s capacity to contain and reflect 
back a more tolerable version of unmanageable feelings (Bion, 1962).  Similarly 
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Winnicott (1965), envisaged the ideal mother as being sensitive to both her own 
and her baby’s feelings.  Her accurate responses to her baby were particularly 
important both in terms of soothing and containing his distress and in 
facilitating a separateness (Winnicott, 1962).  This would lead to a genuine 
relationship and contribute to the strength of the child’s sense of self which was 
seen by Winnicott therefore as directly determined by the reflective function of 
the mother. 
Slade (2005) sees parental reflective functioning as an overt 
manifestation, in narrative, of mentalizing capacity and also found a strong 
association between infant attachment and the quality of the parent’s reflective 
functioning using an autobiographical memory based interview about the child 
(Slade, Grienenberger, Bernbach, Levy & Locker, 2005).  High scorers on this 
interview were aware of their infant’s mental functioning and grasped the 
relationship between their own mental states and their children’s experience.  
Low scorers were more likely to evidence atypical maternal behaviour, infant 
disorganised attachment and unresolved maternal attachment issues.  
Reflective functioning mediated some of the effect of adult attachment on 
infant attachment.   
Taken together these results suggest that the mentalizing style of the parent may 
facilitate the development of mentalization (e.g. Target & Fonagy, 1996) and also security 
of attachment in the child (e.g. Meins et al., 2001).  Drawing a parallel between infant-
mother attachment dynamics and those of the client-therapist dyad (Bowlby, 1988) it 
seems that the responsiveness and sensitivity of the therapist as an attachment figure is 
particularly important.  Moreover, the therapist’s ability to use his or her mentalizing 
capacity in order to act as the “secure base” for the client seems especially important.  
However, there are elements of the therapist/client association that do not parallel the 
mother/child relationship.  In particular the mother’s attachment orientation might be 
expected to have a direct and relatively clear effect on her ability to mentalize and to offer 
responsive and appropriate care.  For example, an avoidant mother may struggle with 
emotional intimacy with her child, or an anxiously attached mother might display 
exaggerated emotional responses to a threatening situation.  However, in therapists, the 
effect of attachment style may be more complicated and potentially altered by the 
influences of training and experience.  In particular one might anticipate seeing this in the 
proclivity to use mentalization capacity. One of the aims of this study, therefore, was to 
analyse therapists’ mental state talk, an exercise which was designed to assess the 
proclivity to use mentalization capacity, and is particularly analogous to the measures used 
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in the above studies concerning mothers’ mental state talk (e.g. Laranjo et al., 2008; Meins 
et al., 2001). 
2.1.4. Attachment outcomes in childhood 
 
According to Bowlby, there is a strong causal relationship between a child’s parental 
attachment experiences and those later constructed with other individuals (Bowlby, 1979), 
for example, siblings, friends and partners.  This link, according to Bowlby, is due to the 
child’s relatively stable internal working models (Bowlby, 1969/82, 1973).  Early 
interactions between child and parent provide the template not only for forecasting a 
caregiver’s responsiveness but also from which the child learns the fundamental rules and 
expectations of relating to others such as reciprocity and communication (Weinfield, 
Sroufe, Egeland & Carlson, 2008).  Intra-personal qualities such as confidence, self-esteem 
and social skills that foster satisfaction in interpersonal relationships are also influenced 
(Sroufe, Egeland, Carlson & Collins, 2005). 
 
In support of this, empirical studies have shown that attachment styles are predictively 
associated with many inter-personal and social behaviours in childhood.  For example, 
securely attached children have more constructive patterns of communication and 
problem-solving with parents (e.g. Frankel & Bates, 1990; Slade, 1987) and peers (Raikes & 
Thompson, 2008), possess more extensive and supportive social networks, both actual and 
perceived (Anan & Barnett, 1999; Bost, Vaughn, Washington, Cielinski & Bradbard, 1998), 
experience greater levels of self-esteem and self-confidence (Sroufe et al., 2005) and less 
loneliness (Raikes & Thompson, 2008).  They are stronger in emotion regulation 
(Thompson & Meyer, 2007), rely more on constructive methods of managing distress 
(Gilliom, Shaw, Beck, Schonberg & Lukon, 2002) and cope more effectively with stress 
(Contreras, Kerns, Weimer, Gentzler, & Tomich, 2000). 
Further, in terms of emotion understanding, it has been shown that securely attached 
children possess an enhanced ability in understanding emotion (Laible & Thompson, 1998; 
Ontai & Thompson, 2002; Raikes & Thompson, 2006), possess a more advanced 
understanding of the mental states of their mothers (Repacholi & Trapolini, 2004) and 
exhibit a better memory for attachment-related emotional information (Kirsh & Cassidy, 
1997).  In sum, securely attached children appear to possess a higher degree of social skills 
including social-cognitive abilities, leading to the development and maintenance of 
comparatively successful close relationships (see Thompson, 2008 for a review of 
theoretical and empirical research findings).  
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2.1.5. Stability and change in attachment through childhood 
 
Empirical studies using the Ainsworth Strange Situation paradigm (Ainsworth et al., 
1971, 1978) have suggested the relative stability of attachment classifications between the 
ages of 12 and 18 months (e.g. Vaughn, Egeland, Sroufe, & Waters, 1979; Waters, Merrick, 
Treboux, Crowell & Albersheim, 2000).  However, Bowlby’s theory arguably predicts both 
stability and change (Vaughn et al., 1979). The relative stability of internal working models 
was noted by Bowlby (1969/82), but he stressed that a continuous secure attachment 
required the child’s internal working model to be updated with developing communicative 
and cognitive competencies and in line with the relevant changes in interactions with 
parents and other carers (Bowlby, 1980, 1988).  Major changes in the child’s environment 
or experiences such as trauma and loss directly influence the quality of child-parent 
relationships and require the alteration and reformulation of internal working models.  
These might include death or severe illness of a parent, divorce, drug or alcohol abuse in 
the parent or abuse of the child (Bowlby 1953).  Longitudinal studies of attachment 
through childhood show that, where changes in attachment classification occur, such 
experiences may play a key role (Crowell, Treboux, & Waters, 2002; Vaughn, et al., 1979; 
Waters, 1978; Waters et al., 2000). For example in one study, where mothers reported 
none of the life events identified by Bowlby, attachment classifications into young 
adulthood changed in only 15% of cases, but where one or more events were reported, 
the likelihood of a secure infant becoming insecure was 66.6% (Waters et al.,2000).   
 
In summary, there seems to be evidence that attachment styles based on internal 
working models are relatively stable.  However, exploring the circumstances of change and 
potential for modification in internal working models is important for understanding the 
extent to which early attachments influence other relationships and the limits of this 
influence (Berlin, Cassidy, & Appleyard, 2008).  This seems particularly important for those 
engaged in therapy, both therapist and client.  Skilful therapists build a therapeutic 
relationship providing a secure base and safe haven for clients.  This begins to provide a 
corrective emotional experience through which the client can rely on more secure 
strategies to manage emotion, develop social skills, and to form satisfying attachments 
with others (Mallinckrodt, 2001).  The potential for change in internal working models of 
attachment and attachment-related behaviours is therefore clearly linked to the ability of 
the therapist to provide a corrective emotional experience (Bowlby, 1988).  It is suggested 
here that this is closely related to the both the therapist’s ability to mentalize which in 




2.2. Attachment in adulthood 
 
2.2.1. Linking child and adult attachment theoretically.  
 
Predicated on the concept of the relative stability of the internal working model, Bowlby 
believed attachment relationships continue to play a powerful role in adulthood through 
the formation, maintenance and disruption of attachment bonds (Bowlby, 1980).  
Ainsworth (1991) also highlighted the function of the attachment behavioural system in 
adult relationships, particularly emphasising the secure base phenomenon as the critical 
element.  These concepts began to be developed further into an alternative theoretical 
approach by social scientists interested in the idea of individual differences in attachment 
and how these were manifested in adult close relationships (Hazan & Shaver 1987; Shaver 
& Hazan, 1988; Shaver, Hazan & Bradshaw, 1988).  This matured into a conceptualisation 
of adult bonding in close relationships as an attachment process, following the same 
sequence of steps as infant-carer attachment, i.e. proximity seeking, safe haven and finally 
as secure base (Hazan & Shaver, 1994; Heffernan, Fraley, Vicary & Brumbaugh, 2012).   
 
The secure attachment relationship in adulthood thus continues to be characterised by 
the use of the attachment figure as a secure base from which to explore the world and a 
safe haven in times of distress (Ainsworth, 1989, 1991; Bowlby, 1969/82).  Research has 
also demonstrated the experience of anxiety, loneliness and restlessness when separated 
(Weiss, 1973, 1991), a feeling of security when attachment figures are accessible (Shaver 
et al., 1988; Weiss, 1991), and engaging in a special spoken communication, specific to 
that relationship (Shaver et al., 1988).  This develops still further as romantic partners 
begin to serve as a base from which to explore newer environments and activities such as 
career paths and leisure pursuits (Hazan & Zeifman, 1999).  Thus, in terms of both 
theoretical link and empirical evidence, adult attachment bonds may be conceptualised in 
very similar ways to infant and childhood attachment. 
 
2.2.2. Measuring attachment in adulthood. 
 
The study of adult attachment has focussed largely on individual differences rather than 
on normative developmental aspects of the attachment system.  A wealth of adult 
attachment measures have been developed since Bowlby’s original work which, for the 
most part, conceptualise attachment patterns in terms of classifications of individuals into 
categories of secure or insecure attachment.  Some originated from the developmental or 
clinical school of attachment research, for example, the Adult Attachment Interview 
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(George, Kaplan & Main, 1985, 1996; Main, Kaplan & Cassidy, 1985), and some were 
developed by those more interested in individual differences and social psychology, for 
example, the Adult Romantic Attachment measure (Hazan & Shaver, 1987), the Adult 
Attachment Scale (Collins & Read, 1990), the Relationship Scales Questionnaire 
(Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991) and the Experiences in Close Relationships (Brennan et 
al., 1998).  
 
2.2.2.1. The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) 
 
The AAI (George et al., 1985, 1996; Main, et al., 1985) is a semi-
structured interview in which adults are asked to narrate or describe their early 
experiences with attachment figures.  It classifies individuals into categories: 
adults in the secure (referred to as autonomous) category give coherent and 
fluent narratives of their childhood experiences, showing both reflection and 
resolution of difficulties.  Conversely, adults who are highly avoidant  
(dismissing) tend to belittle their childhood by denigrating or denying the 
importance of childhood memories, and highly anxiously attached 
(preoccupied) adults tend to still be overwhelmed or over-involved with 
experiences.  However, individuals are assigned to a category of attachment 
based not on the content of what is said but on the basis of the coherence of 
the individual’s discourse which is taken to indicate his or her defensive 
attachment strategies.  Main et al. (1985) reported that mothers who are 
classified autonomous on the AAI are more likely to have secure attachment 
relationships with their infants, a pattern replicated in fathers by Steele, Steele 
and Fonagy (1996) and confirmed by van IJzendoorn’s (1995) meta-analysis.    
 
Although the AAI has been a widely used instrument, some concerns with it do 
exist.  It yields a global measure of attachment security or classification of 
coherence, which seems to lose some of the complexity of the narrative and it 
does not discriminate between the internal working model of the self with 
parent, and the model of self with child, an important nuance. Moreover, the 
manual for scoring is highly complicated and unpublished, requiring extensive 







2.2.2.2. The Experiences in Close Relationships (ECR) 
 
Whilst the AAI focusses on attachment categories, more recent research 
has focused on patterns of interpersonal behaviour relating to two dimensions: 
avoidance and anxiety (Brennan et al., 1998), these appearing sufficient to 
describe adequately all presentations of adult attachment (Crittenden, 1997; 
Fraley & Waller, 1998; Mikulincer, Shaver & Pereg, 2003).  As reflected in 
original attachment theory, avoidance describes a distrust of a partners’ 
availability and responsiveness, habitual self-reliance through fear of 
dependency or intimacy, and an inclination towards emotional distance from 
others.  Conversely, attachment anxiety is defined by a lack of felt security that 
a partner will be available if needed, a strong requirement for closeness, 
significant worries about intimate relationships and an acute fear of rejection or 
abandonment.  If both avoidance and anxious dimensions are low, a secure 
attachment orientation exists (Brennan et al., 1998; Lopez & Brennan, 2000; 
Mallinckrodt, 2000).  The dimensions of avoidance and anxiety can be 
conceptualised also in terms of the secondary maladaptive attachment 
strategies designed to defend against the frustration and pain of inconsistent or 
absent care (Main, 1990; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002a). 
 
The attachment measure used in this study was the Experiences in Close 
Relationships (ECR, Brennan, at al., 1998), one of the most commonly used self-
report measures of adult attachment (Crowell, Fraley & Shaver, 2008).  Based 
on the two relatively orthogonal factors of avoidance and anxiety, the ECR is 
designed to focus on adult relationships and assesses trait-like (or global) 
patterns of adult attachment as independently as possible from idiosyncratic 
influences of respondents’ current circumstances.  The instructions include the 
words, “We are interested in how you generally experience relationships, not 
just in what is happening in a current relationship”.  Results of Item Response 
Theory analysis have shown that a good degree of measurement precision is 
afforded by the ECR in comparison with other self-report inventories (Fraley, 
Waller & Brennan, 2000).  The ECR produces coefficients for both avoidance and 
anxious dimensions and although categories of attachment can be also be 
generated, recent research prefers the dimensional approach, a view also taken 





2.2.2.3. Comparison and debate: the AAI vs. the ECR 
 
Despite the theoretical link between infant and adult attachment, there 
has been much debate about the appropriateness and relative qualities of 
current adult attachment measures.  In a review, Shaver and Mikulincer 
(2002a,b) note the lack of communication and cross-fertilisation between two 
paradigms of attachment research: a developmental and clinical framework 
utilising observational and interview techniques such as the AAI (e.g. Ainsworth 
et al., 1978; Main et al., 1985) versus a social research conceptualisation 
applying Bowlby’s original theory to adult close relationships using self-report 
measures (e.g. Hazan & Shaver, 1987), such as the ECR.  Whilst the former 
instruments are designed to measure working models of and responses to early 
childhood experience, the latter are designed to access attachment-related 
feelings and behaviours in adult relationships.  Proponents for the AAI suggest 
that it provides a window into attachment-related unconscious processes which 
self-report measures do not.  Conversely, those who use self-report measures 
view them as assessments of cognitions, emotions and behaviours which are 
themselves indicators of the deeper unconscious. 
 
Although both paradigms conceptualise attachment in terms of 
Bowlby’s original theory, researchers have found only modest associations 
between the two (Shaver, Belsky & Brennan, 2000).  Self-report measures differ 
in a number of ways from the AAI (George et al., 1985) and the outcomes can 
diverge quite significantly.  In a reply to Shaver and Mikulincer (2002a), Waters, 
Crowell, Elliott, Corcoran and Treboux (2002) undertook a comparison of a 
number of measures.  They found several correlations between the AAI and 
structured narrative tasks or naturalistic observations, but few significant 
correlations between the AAI and self-report measures. For Shaver and 
Mikulincer (2002b) however, a lack of relationship between AAI and self- report 
measures does not mean that self-report measures do not have construct 
validity and they recommend that, “If the focus is on relationship-related 
emotions….especially as experienced and reported by the person him- or 
herself…” then the use of self-report measures, for example the ECR, is 






2.2.3. Stability and change in attachment though adulthood 
 
Another debate is concerned with the stability of attachment orientations and the 
conceptualisation of attachment as a style or a trait.  Original attachment theory would 
suggest that the attachment system continues to influence behaviour through thoughts 
and feelings in adulthood, somewhat regardless of general experience or the specifics of 
intimate relationships (Hazan & Zeifman, 1999; although note Bowlby’s assertions on the 
potential for change in internal working models through trauma and loss, Bowlby, 1953, 
1980, 1988).  
  
Mikulincer and Shaver (2005) suggest that modes of coping with attachment-related 
threats are associated with unique personal goals.  For example, securely attached 
individuals focus on the development of appropriate closeness in their relationships, 
anxiously attached individuals strive to achieve enhanced intimacy, and avoidantly 
attached individuals try to maintain personal autonomy and control.  Such strategies may 
logically suggest that attachment styles early in life will be maintained and reinforced 
largely unchanged into later life, particularly for secure individuals.  Researchers have 
suggested a framework of relational schemas, models or scripts, which are held and 
accessed in situations of attachment relevance.  For example, the “secure based script” 
(Waters & Waters, 2006) includes a number of components, namely (i) if a challenge 
brings distress, a partner can be approached for help, (ii) the partner will be available and 
supportive when asked for help, and (iii) proximity to the partner brings relief and 
comfort.  According to Mikulincer and Shaver (2007b), regular activation of the secure-
based script guides a broaden-and-build cycle of attachment security, making it less 
necessary to rely on psychological defences that distort perception and limit coping.  This 
ensures emotional closeness, intimacy, optimism and relationship satisfaction. 
 
However, Waters et al. (2002) have also warned of a tendency to lapse into broad 
characterisations of individuals as secure, anxious, or avoidant.  Individuals may maintain 
multiple working models of attachment which run concurrently and hierarchically through 
different kinds of attachment relationship (e.g. infant-parent, romantic, friendship) 
towards generic representations (Bretherton & Munholland, 1999). Neither the AAI nor 
self-report measures have adequately distinguished between relationship-specific or more 
generalised profiles of behaviour, although the ECR, for example, encourages participants 
to consider how they behave generally in relationships.  In addition, self-report measures 
reliably give significant theory-consistent findings, suggesting that some kind of generic 




There is evidence for profound relationships between infant attachment, quality of 
adolescent relationships and adult security (e.g. Simpson, Collins, Tran & Haydon, 2007).   
Nevertheless, the profile progression is not necessarily straightforward and attachment 
representations may be modified continuously during successive attachment relationships 
(Carlson, Sroufe & Egeland, 2004). For example, non-familial relationships, e.g. with 
teachers or peers, have been found to mediate a correlation between attachment in early 
and later life.  Such mediation has been partial, however, with the impact of early 
attachment styles remaining a significant predictor of later behaviour (Sroufe et al., 2005). 
A number of other longitudinal studies of associations between early attachment 
experiences and adult attachment orientations have been inconclusive, and suggest a 
modest relationship at best (Crowell, Fraley & Shaver, 1999; Levy, Blatt & Shaver, 1998; 
Steele, Waters, Crowell & Treboux, 1998).   
 
In adulthood, the continuity of attachment styles is partially supported by longitudinal 
studies using self-report measures.  For example, Kirkpatrick and Hazan (1994) found 70% 
continuity in attachment styles over four years in adults and Davila, Burge and Hammen 
(1997) noted a similar degree of continuity in adolescents.  In an extension of the latter 
study, however, Lopez and Gormley (2002) used the ECR to study stability of attachment 
orientations and found 57% attachment stability in first year college students during a 
time of emotional and practical change, which the authors describe as, ‘…only moderately 
stable…’ (p361).  Research on this issue is therefore equivocal and linked to circumstances 
under which internal working models change (Berlin et al., 2008) including the effect of 
corrective attachment-like relationships (Bowlby, 1988). 
 
 




Adult attachment style has been found to be predictive of general 
functioning and relationship experiences, and self-report measures have been 
instrumental in the analysis of this.  Bowlby suggested (Bowlby, 1969/82, 1973) 
that adults with a secure attachment history will have found that maintaining 
proximity to attachment figures results in protection, support and relief of 
distress, and that they will likely follow a “secure based script”: expression and 
acknowledgement of distress, participation in problem solving, and ability to 
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engage in support seeking (Waters, Rodrigues & Ridgeway, 1998; Waters & 
Waters, 2006).  Secure individuals tend to describe their relationships as happy, 
trusting and friendly (Hazan & Shaver, 1990). Furthermore, they consistently 
hold more optimistic views about their ability to cope with stressful events (e.g. 
Berant et al., 2001; Mikulincer & Florian, 1995), acknowledge and display 
emotions (e.g. Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995), disclose personal information 
openly (e.g. Collins & Read, 1990; Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991) and are 
inclined to seek support in regulating affect in distressing situations (e.g. 
Ognibene & Collins, 1998).  They do not tend to worry about work or allow it to 
interfere with friendships or health (Hazan & Shaver, 1990).  
 
Conversely, anxiously attached individuals tend to focus on their own 
distress and ruminate on negative thoughts (Mikulincer & Florian, 1995), 
experience a greater degree of worry, including death anxiety (Mikulincer, et al., 
2002), are prone to anger (Mikulincer, 1998), and to self-devaluation 
(Mikulincer, et al., 1998).  Those high in avoidance distance themselves from 
emotional bonds with others (Fraley & Davis, 1997) and from distress 
(Mikulincer & Florian, 1995), are less likely to turn to others for support and 
care (Simpson et al., 1992), avoid accessing distressing memories (Mikulincer & 
Orbach, 1995), and tend to experience paranoia and hostile attitudes 
(Mikulincer, 1998), including the defensive projection onto others of their own 
unwanted traits (Mikulincer & Horesh, 1999). Avoidant individuals also exhibit 
high levels of distress and maladjustment in persistently stressful situations 
(Mikulincer & Florian, 1998). 
 
2.2.4.2. Social emotional information processing 
 
2.2.4.2.1. Theoretical framework 
 
Internal working models of attachment are thought to influence 
not only the way people behave but also the way in which they 
perceive, attend to and process information of emotional significance 
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, 2007).  Self-report questionnaires have 
been extensively used in studies concerning the defensive attachment 
strategies of hyperactivation and deactivation (Cassidy & Kobak, 1988; 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002a).  A central 
assumption of the hyperactivation/deactivation affect regulation model 
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(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003) is that cognitive processes play a role in 
appraising and monitoring the environment for cues regarding the 
proximity and accessibility of significant others (Fraley & Shaver, 2000).   
 
When, due to threat, the attachment system is activated, 
historical attachment expectations come in to play.  If individuals expect 
others to be available and responsive, they use secure-based strategies 
to seek comfort, proximity and support.  Conversely, if individuals 
expect an environment lacking in response, they become distressed, 
and engage in one of two strategies; avoidant individuals attempt to 
deactivate the attachment system’s needs for proximity and protection 
by ignoring or dismissing significant and stressful attachment-related 
events such as rejection or criticism and by suppressing related 
emotion.  Conversely, anxiously attached individuals employ hyper-
activating strategies, and attempt to maintain proximity at any cost.  
They generate and intensify negative emotional states and distress-
evoking stimuli which maintain the individual’s attachment system in a 
chronically activated state.  Thus, insecure attachment styles are 
associated with biased processing of incoming information to conform 
with the individual’s attachment expectations and is designed to 
increase (in anxiety) or decrease (in avoidance) emotional response.   
 
2.2.4.2.2. Empirical evidence in children 
In pre-school children, secure attachment predicts higher 
emotion understanding (Laible & Thompson, 1998; Ontai & Thompson, 
2002; Steele, Steele, Croft & Fonagy, 1999), the effect being greater in 
older children (aged around 5) rather than in younger children whose 
conceptions of emotions are more limited (Ontai & Thompson, 2002).  
Similarly in longitudinal studies, children’s attachment security at a year 
old has been found to be predictive of an enhanced understanding of 
emotions at six years (Steele, et al., 1999).  In terms of emotion 
processing, Kirsh and Cassidy (1997) found avoidantly attached children 
looked away from mother-child dyad pictures more than other children, 
suggesting an exclusion from awareness and avoidance of processing 
any potentially distressing attachment material, arguably in a strategy  
to minimise the need for care from another. 
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Greater emotion understanding in securely attached children 
applies particularly in the context of maternal use of elaborative 
discourse (Ontai & Thompson, 2002).  An open discourse relating to 
attachment issues in secure mother/child dyads is thought to foster an 
experience of emotion within a safe and supportive environment and 
enables children to understand it more coherently (Bretherton, 1990).  
This in turn positively influences the child’s internal working models 
(Bowlby, 1969/82; Bretherton, 1990a; Bretherton & Munholland, 1999).  
Secure attachment appears to allow negative emotions to be shared, 
explored and comprehended just as openly as positive examples (Laible 
& Thompson, 1998; Ontai & Thompson, 2002).  Conversely, insecure 
attachment relationships are characterised by limited emotional 
sharing, particularly of negative or threatening emotions, which results 
in defensive exclusion of such emotions from conversations 
(Bretherton, 1990b, 1991; Bretherton & Munholland, 1999).  
 
In sum, for children, attachment status and socio-emotional 
processing are clearly associated, and moderated by maternal use of 
mentalizing discourse.  Such discourse in the context of a secure 
relationship provides a productive and effective opportunity for 
developing emotion understanding as representational capacities 
mature (see Thompson, Laible & Ontai, 2003 for a review).  However, 
less is known about these associations in adults.   
 
2.2.4.2.3. Empirical evidence in adults 
 
Avoidant individuals have been found to have difficulty recalling 
attachment-related experiences (Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995).  There is 
an indication that these memory deficits stem from processes occurring 
when information is attended to or encoded because rehearsal and 
elaboration when prompted after encoding seems to be the same for 
avoidant and non-avoidant individuals (Fraley, Garner & Shaver, 2000). 
Avoidance has similarly been associated with lower working memory 
capacity for attachment-related words, but not for neutral words, 
suggesting a selective restriction of attention to attachment-related 




Edelstein and Gillath (2008) went on to find an association 
between avoidance and stroop interference for attachment-related 
words, particularly in individuals currently in a romantic relationship.  
They suggest that a current relationship may trigger the defensive 
strategy of deactivation of the attachment system. They also suggest 
that those in a relationship have more experience and proficiency in 
using defensive strategies to regulate emotion. Because bias was seen 
in situations where the cognitive load was particularly high, Edelstein 
and Gillath suggest that avoidance of stimuli is not automatic and 
cognitive effort is employed.  In other words, avoidant individuals can 
and do inhibit attention to potentially threatening attachment 
information. They appear to quickly identify potential sources of threat 
at a perceptual level which allows them to inhibit attention accordingly.  
Again, the stroop effect was limited to attachment-related words, 
demonstrating the specificity of attachment attentional biases.    
 
Edelstein and Gillath’s findings correspond with Fraley and 
Brumbaugh’s (2007) views on when avoidant individuals’ minimisation 
of attachment-related experiences and corresponding exclusion of 
relevant information takes place. They suggest that the avoidant 
individual is characterised by the defensive pre-emptive exclusion of 
material at encoding rather than at retrieval in an attempt to minimise 
vulnerability as early as possible.  In other words, unwanted affective 
information is not even encoded or represented in the memory system 
so that the attachment system remains inactivated and no potential 
undermining of self-reliance is risked.  This conclusion challenges a 
common view of avoidant individuals as emotionally vulnerable (e.g. 
Dozier & Kobak, 1992), and suggests they may be far less emotionally 
fragile than has been assumed.  It should also be noted that in two 
dimensional models of attachment, the degree to which an individual is 
avoidant is theoretically independent of his or her attachment-related 
anxiety.  Thus, the behavioural patterns of avoidant individuals can be 
complicated by an additional fear of abandonment (fearful avoidance, 
i.e. high in both avoidance and anxiety; Bartholomew, 1990) which may 
contribute to an inability to use attachment defences as successfully as 




Relationships have also been found between adult attachment 
and the automatic processing of facial emotion.  Niedenthal, Brauer, 
Robin and Innes-Ker (2002) found a difference in timing of recognition 
of facial emotion offset dependent upon security of attachment and 
situation.  Extending this from categories to dimensions, Fraley, 
Niedenthal, Marks, Brumbaugh and Vicary (2006) found anxiously 
attached participants judged the onset and offset of both negative and 
positive emotion more quickly than less anxious individuals again 
reflecting a vigilance in processing social cues at a basic perceptual 
level.  This heightened vigilance appears to have complicated effects, 
though; it allows anxious people to be more sensitive to emotional 
changes but in this particular study it also led them to make more 
errors.  More recently, in a study of attentional inhibition, Dewitte 
(2011) found attachment avoidance, but not anxiety, was associated 
with valence specific stimuli; avoidant participants exhibited a stronger 
inhibition of negative emotional material (both angry and sad faces) but 
not positive emotional stimuli.  Dewitte argues for inhibitory processing 
in avoidant individuals as an early attentional mechanism that operates 
before the emotion-response tendencies have become activated.   
 
In sum, it seems that there are clear attachment influences on 
the understanding and processing of emotion, with anxious individuals 
employing hypervigilence in reacting to emotional stimuli, albeit not 
always with accurate results, and avoidantly attached individuals 
inhibiting or excluding affect related information from processing. 
 
2.2.4.2.4. Imaging studies of attachment and emotion understanding  
 
Imaging studies have supported the above findings.  In an 
emotion understanding study, Zilber, Goldstein and Mikulincer (2007) 
found fMRI scans showed anxious individuals evidenced more neural 
activation in regions of the brain associated with emotion processing, 
and less activation in areas of emotion regulation.  Late positive 
potential (LLP) correlates also showed corresponding increased 
vigilance in anxiously attached individuals.  Conversely avoidant 
individuals showed greater activity in areas associated with emotion 
suppression.  More recently this was confirmed in an ERP study (Chavis 
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& Kisley, 2012) in which avoidant individuals displayed stronger neural 
activation in response to negative versus positive emotional images, 
whereas anxious individuals trended in the opposite direction.  Taken 
together, therefore, both behavioural and imaging studies have shown 
a clear pattern of attachment bias in the processing of emotion. 
 
2.2.4.2.5. Attachment and more complex mental state understanding 
 
Given the emotional processing biases detailed above, it might 
be expected that similar attachment-related biases exist in more 
complex mental state processing, but the evidence for this is limited.  
Associations between attachment security and mental state 
understanding in children have been found (e.g. Fonagy et al., 1997; 
Meins et al., 1998; Steele et al., 1999), yet others have failed to find 
independent associations between attachment and scores on 
mentalization measures when other variables such as the quality of 
mother-child discourse is taken into account (e.g. Meins et al., 2002; 
Ontai & Thompson, 2008).  Similar studies in adults have so far not been 
undertaken.  As discussed, therefore, one of the aims of this study was 
to begin to contribute empirical evidence for the associations between 
adult attachment and mentalizing capabilities, both in general terms 
and also in a specialised group.  
 
2.3. Attachment in psychotherapy 
 
2.3.1. Client attachment. 
The perceived importance of attachment in the field of psychotherapy has grown 
significantly in the past 20 years (see, for example, Slade, 2008 for a comprehensive 
review).  Indeed it was Bowlby who developed attachment theory originally for use in the 
diagnosis and treatment of emotionally disturbed patients and families and who first 
conceptualised the role of the therapist as analogous to that of a mother providing her 
child with a secure base from which to explore the world (Bowlby, 1988).  The attachment-
related defence strategies consistent with an insecure attachment orientation may well 
have provided the prospective client with protection from attachment-related threat or 
pain, but ultimately may confound a search for happiness in future relationships, 
ultimately bringing the client to psychotherapy.   
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The dynamics of psychotherapy have therefore often been framed as analogous to a 
repairing of the attachment relationship (e.g. Bowlby, 1988; Eagle, 2003; Fonagy, 2001; 
again, see Slade, 2008 for review of theory and research).  An emotionally intimate 
relationship with a benign and trustworthy attachment figure, i.e. the therapist, can afford 
the chance to explore, reflect and express, free from anxiety and within a new safe, secure 
and healing therapeutic experience (Slade, 2008).   The therapist’s role is that of 
deconstructing the attachment patterns of the past and constructing new ones in the 
present (Wallin, 2007).  Evidence suggests that to the extent that clients experience a 
therapist as an available safe haven and secure base, they are likely to engage more fully 
and successfully in therapy (Parish & Eagle, 2003).  Not surprisingly, therefore, research 
suggests that therapists become very significant to their clients (Slade, 2008) and 
psychotherapy relationships can exhibit all the elements of attachment bonds.  For 
example, some clients regard their therapists as stronger and wiser, seek proximity 
through emotional connection and regular meeting, rely on their therapist as a safe haven 
when threatened, derive a sense of felt security from their therapist, and experience 
separation anxiety when anticipating breaks, or therapy ending (Mallinckrodt, 2010). 
Evidence suggests that secure clients are more comfortable seeking and making use of 
therapy (Dozier 1990; Dozier, Lomax, Tyrell & Lee, 2001; Riggs, Jacobvitz & Hazen, 2002), 
that secure attachment facilitates a more positive working alliance (Kivlighan, Patton & 
Foote, 1998; Mallinckrodt, Coble & Gantt, 1995; Satterfield & Lyddon, 1995) and that for 
insecurely attached clients working alliances differ markedly in their progression 
dependent upon whether the client’s insecurity stems from attachment-related anxiety or 
avoidance (Eames & Roth, 2000; Kanninen, Salo & Punamaki, 2000).  Client attachment 
orientation also appears to predict whether therapists respond with cognitive 
interpretation or affective reflection, the former more usual with avoidant clients, the 
latter more typical with anxious clients, (Hardy, Aldridge, Davidson, Rowe, Reilly & Shapiro, 
1999; Rubino et al., 2000). 
A number of research groups have developed measures to assess the attachment of the 
client to the therapist (Diamond, Stovall-McClough, Clarkin, & Levy, 2003; Mallinckrodt, 
Gantt & Coble, 1995; Parish & Eagle, 2003).  The secure client will develop a secure 
attachment bond, as originally envisaged by Bowlby, using the therapeutic space to 
negotiate and change some insecure working models and to make sense of 
incomprehensible and difficult feelings in an intimate relationship.  By contrast, insecurely 
attached clients appear more likely to form insecure attachments with their therapists, 
often seeing their therapist in an unreliable or untrustworthy light due to pre-existing 
internal models (Diamond at al., 2003; Hamilton, 1987; Slade 2004).   
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To date, only a few studies have considered whether client attachment status can be 
changed through therapy.  The results seem mixed although there is some evidence that 
clients can move towards a secure organisation after treatment.  This has been found in 
research with borderline personality disorder (BPD) patients (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Leigh, 
Kennedy, Mattoon et al, 1995) and in time-limited therapy (Travis, Binder, Bliwise & 
Horne-Moyer, 2001).  However, in the latter case this was true for patients with lower 
levels of symptomology and in the case of borderline patients, less obvious patterns of 
change have been found e.g. insecure to insecure (Diamond, Clarkin, Levine, Levy, Foelsch 
& Yeomans, 1999).   
There is some evidence that avoidant clients are likely to experience a better outcome 
through therapy than anxiously attached clients (Fonagy, Leigh, Steele, Steele, Kennedy, 
Mattoon et al., 1996; McBride, Atkinson, Quilty & Bagby, 2006), possibly because therapy 
exposes avoidant clients to their emotions as a positive change, whereas anxious clients 
are already highly aware of their emotionality (Fonagy et al., 1996).  This raises the 
question as to whether certain modalities of treatment serve certain client attachment 
orientations more successfully.  Mikulincer and Shaver’s (2007) affect hyperactivation 
/deactivation model is of relevance here also and there is conflicting  empirical evidence;  
avoidant clients have been found to respond better to psychodynamic therapy (Fonagy et 
al., 1996) but also to CBT (McBride et al., 2006).  Daniel (2006) suggests a strategy of 
employing a deactivating, more cognitive treatment plan for anxious clients who require 
the containment and organisation of overwhelming feelings, and hyper-activating, 
exploratory treatments for dismissing clients who may require more attuning to emotion 
(see also Holmes, 2000, 2001).   
Although client attachment per se is not the subject of this study it clearly has some 
relevance for the quality of the therapeutic relationship, the attachment dynamics in 
therapy, the behaviour of the therapist and the progress and outcome of therapy, all of 
which remain questions for ongoing study.  In particular the potential for change in client 
attachment status and how this is achieved has clear links to how the therapist uses his or 
her relational skills which, it is argued, is associated with therapist mentalization and the 
influence of therapist attachment. 
 
2.3.2. Therapist attachment.   
 
Whilst the attachment status of the client is important, much less in known about the 
relevance and influence of therapist attachment style despite the acknowledgement by 
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some that it could be central to the therapeutic process (Slade, 2000).  Most 
psychotherapeutic training emphasises that becoming a successful therapist depends on 
being aware of and managing one’s own reactions to clients.  There is therefore 
deliberation about whether the therapist’s own experience of attachment affects his or 
her ability to act as the “secure base” (Bowlby, 1988), that is, to be emotionally available 
and responsive to clients.  Some have suggested that therapists should exhibit relatively 
secure attachment styles, since attachment insecurity in the therapist might interfere with 
the therapeutic process (Slade, 2008).  However, empirical research supports this only in 
part; Leiper and Casares (2000) found 70% of their sample of Clinical Psychologists to be 
securely attached, a percentage similar to the proportion of securely attached individuals 
in the general population, usually expected to be around 60-65% (e.g. van Ijzendoorn & 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, 1996).    In a mixed methods study with just twelve Counselling 
Psychologist participants, Rizq & Target (2010) found six had insecure attachment styles 
and pointed to the need for a larger scale quantitative study to find a representative 
interpretation for therapists as a whole. 
 
Notwithstanding the paucity of attachment research in therapists, the attachment 
orientation of the therapist might also be subject to a number of influences which may 
lead to an even more complex set of relationships between therapist attachment and 
behaviour.  Experienced therapists undergo significant training and accumulate a large 
number of client hours during which attachment representations will have been evoked.  
Due to ethical responsibilities and a wish to relate to clients appropriately, therapists may 
have consciously endeavoured to suppress any inclinations to behave in a way 
commensurate with relationship insecurities.  Therapists will usually also have made 
significant investment in their own personal therapy as part of a comprehensive training 
programme.  This requirement increases the likelihood of the therapist being able to 
contemplate their clients’ experiences and reduces the opportunity for “blindspots” to 
interfere with the therapist’s work (Farrell, 1996).  More extensive therapy is often 
undertaken if trainees self-report an insecure attachment style prior to training (Leiper & 
Casares, 2000) and in a recent mixed methods study, Rizq and Target (2008a, 2008b) 
concluded that therapists valued personal therapy as a means of developing the ability to 
reflect on the self and others in clinical practice.  Interestingly their participants also 
described the relevance of early attachment experiences to the development of a 
reflective capacity.   
 
Thus, therapist attachment orientation per se may not necessarily predict the dynamics 
of the working relationship with clients in a straightforward way and a degree of 
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dissociation might be expected between attachment style and related behaviours.  One 
way of exploring these issues may be to consider the effect that attachment may have on 
one particular therapist attribute, i.e. mentalizing, and how this relationship might be 
different in therapists compared to the general population.   
 
There is evidence that secure therapists can more easily put aside their own attachment 
representations in order to respond to the client’s presentation without the risk of 
significant unhelpful countertransference issues (Dozier et al., 1994; Tyrell et al., 1999).  
Since gentle challenges to the client’s attachment organisation may be an important 
component of therapeutic change (Slade, 2008), the ability to relate to clients in this way 
seems critical, and research to date suggest that this flexibility and an ability to modulate 
responses to relate effectively to any individual client in any session is much more typical 
in therapists who are themselves securely attached (Daly & Mallinckrodt, 2009).  An 
example of this is “therapeutic distance”; the degree of intimacy adjusted throughout 
therapy to create a corrective attachment relationship.  It is gradually increased for clients 
displaying attachment anxiety, who need to manage their anxious response, or gradually 
decreased for avoidant clients who have to overcome their fears of intimacy.  Experienced 
therapists (nominated by peers as particularly effective) tend to manage “therapeutic 
distance” well (Daly & Mallinckrodt, 2009) although not necessarily at a conscious level.   
 
There is equivocal evidence about the relationship between therapist attachment styles 
and the quality of the therapeutic relationship.  It has been shown that the therapist’s 
degree of comfort with closeness in interpersonal relationships predicts the 
client/therapist bond (Dunkle & Friedlander, 1996), and that more secure therapists seem 
better able to respond to the client’s actual needs rather than those presented (Dozier et 
al., 1994).  Similar findings by others have broadly corroborated these conclusions (Black, 
Hardy, Turpin, & Parry, 2005; Rubino et al., 2000).  However, fewer studies have 
contemplated the effect of insecurity in the therapist.   Focussing on this, both Ligiero and 
Gelso (2002) and Sauer et al. (2003) found that therapist attachment anxiety was 
positively related to the therapeutic alliance in early therapy, although it seems that some 
of this effect may be due to anxious therapists working harder, and the relationship did 
not hold over time. 
 
In a study by Levitt, Butler and Hill (2006), grounded theory interviews revealed 
interesting qualitative feedback on what clients dislike about their therapists which could 
arguably be related to therapists’ attachment styles; for example, a relationship becomes 
“dangerous when it….confers dependence upon clients, or allows clients to manipulate 
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therapists” (p319), or “the therapist is experienced as too distant, defensive or unattuned 
to clients’ emotions.  However, caring is too intense if the therapist is experienced as 
jealous, controlling, or pitying” (p320).  The suggestion is, therefore, that insecure 
therapist attachment styles are in danger of negatively influencing the therapeutic 
relationship, or that therapists must try to inhibit the manifestation of their attachment 
styles in order for the therapeutic work to be valuable.  
  
Notwithstanding all the above, Ligiero and Gelso (2002) ultimately found no relationship 
whatsoever between therapist attachment patterns and therapeutic alliance rated by 
either client or therapist.  The implication, therefore, is that the effect of therapist 
attachment orientation is complicated and additional research is clearly required both in 
terms of what the influence of attachment may be and how it may be manifested.   
 
2.3.3. The relationships between therapist attachment, social-emotional processing and more 
complex mental state understanding. 
 
To recap, highly limited research has been conducted focussing on the relationship 
between therapist attachment styles and therapists’ abilities in either emotion 
understanding and processing, or in more complex areas of mentalizing.  Neither have 
previous studies used such a broad range of self-report and behavioural or experimental 
tasks designed to tap both mental state understanding and proclivity to use mentalizing 
skills with a view to understanding how they may be influenced by attachment anxiety or 
attachment avoidance.  Further, the author is not aware of studies that aim specifically to 
explore how therapists may behave differently to others in their use and management of 
mentalizing capacity. 
 
It is not therapists’ attachment styles per se that is the focus of this study, rather the 
way therapists’ attachment influences arguably one of the most important relational skills 
that the therapist may possess, his or her mentalizing capability.  Of similar interest is the 
way the relationship between attachment and mentalizing may differ in therapists 
compared with the general population, since this has the potential to inform us about the 
effects of experience and training in the use of mentalizing capabilities, and about the 
ability to reduce or overcome the effects of attachment orientation on behaviour.  One 
way of exploring the broader effects of attachment, therefore, is to consider mentalizing 







As in the section above on attachment, a full review of the mentalizing literature is given 
below, beginning with an understanding of mentalizing in childhood as a background to the 
concept of adult mentalizing and measurement as the main point of interest. 
 
3.1. Defining mentalizing. 
The typically developed human mind continuously makes inferences about the desires, 
attitudes, intentions and beliefs of others (their mental states) in order to make sense of and 
predict behaviour (Dennett, 1987; Frith & Frith, 2003; Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  The ability 
to do this constitutes a central aspect of social cognition, regarded to be a human-specific skill 
and a vital component of functioning in social groups (Adolphs, 2003; Herrmann, Call, 
Hernandez-Lloreda, Hare & Tomasello, 2007).  Premack and Woodruff’s original paper termed 
this concept “Theory of Mind”, although several other terms such as “intentional stance” 
(Dennett, 1987) have also arisen and are in common use almost synonymously.  The dominant 
approach to the concept of Theory of Mind (ToM) has been to concentrate, perhaps overly so, 
on the notion of belief and desire understanding, or more particularly false belief, which has 
been the focus for extensive research as a way of representing and operationalizing ToM (e.g. 
Perner, 1991).   
 
In contrast, others have construed ToM as a much broader concept, often termed 
mentalizing (Astington et al., 1988; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998; 
Frith, 1989; Frith & Frith, 2003; Frith, Morton & Leslie, 1991) which encompasses a wider range 
of mental state attributions to the self and other including cognitive and emotion states other 
than solely belief and desire (Wellman, 1990). The operationalizing of mentalization has 
therefore begun to include broader tasks that do not strictly test for a representational concept 
of mind as in false belief tasks, but include tasks that might assess the distinction between 
social and non-social stimuli, the attribution of intentionality to human action, or explore talk 
about mental states (e.g. Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Meltzoff, 1995; Woodward, 1998).  
Further, the concept of mentalizing is often used in the psychoanalytic literature and refers to 
reflection and elaboration on affect and mental states, symbolization and aspects of psychic 
reality (Allen, 2003; Fonagy et al., 2002). 
 
In this study, the term mentalizing is used and a broad definition employed, which 
includes elements of perspective taking and wider elements of social cognition.  The tasks and 
45 
 
measures used in the study cover broad and narrower elements of mentalizing, and are 
focussed on the relevant areas of mentalizing commensurate with the study’s aims. 
 
3.2. Why is therapist mentalizing important? 
 
Through mentalizing, typically developed humans routinely endeavour to decipher what 
those around them are thinking and feeling, inferring their intentions and desires and trying to 
construct an understanding of their dispositions (Mitchell, 2009).  This is especially true for 
therapists, who not only need to be relatively adept at this, but also, rather than passively read 
another’s mind, are required to influence what others think, feel and do.  It is known that the 
therapeutic world has become increasingly interested in the client/therapist relationship (e.g. 
Norcross, 2002; Wachtel, 2008) and that it is highly important in client experience and outcome 
(Asay & Lambert, 1999; Beutler & Harwood, 2002; Keijsers, et al., 2000; Krupnick, et al., 1996).   
The creation of this relationship might involve several distinct operations: i) reading the non-
verbal and verbalised thoughts and feelings of the client in order to assess their current 
experience, ii) using one’s own appropriate affective and cognitive responses to formulate an 
empathic response, and, iii) managing, through meta-cognition (Flavell, 1976), one’s own 
mental state responses in order to focus entirely on the client’s experience.  It is contended 
here that the ability to represent and attribute mental states to the self and others, i.e. 
mentalize, is fundamental in these tasks.   
 
As noted above, one aim of this study is to explore in depth whether mentalizing 
abilities in a group of therapists are more advanced than a group of non-therapists.  With the 
benefit of utilising a number of tasks designed to tap into different aspects of mentalizing, it 
might be expected that dissociations between aptitudes in separate aspects might exist.  In 
particular, aspects that may be enhanced by experience as a therapist, for example, the 
proclivity to use one’s mentalizing skill as opposed to simple mental state understanding.  
Overlying all of this is the effect of the therapists’ attachment style on such attributes. 
 
3.3. Mentalizing research 
 
3.3.1. Mentalizing in children: false belief studies 
 
Dennett (1978) proposed that one of the most stringent tests for the presence of a 
mentalizing capability is the prediction of another’s behaviour on the understanding that 
their view of reality can be mistaken, often termed “false belief”.  The most common test 
for mentalizing in children is the “false belief task” and it was Wimmer and Perner (1983) 
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who commenced an extensive false belief research paradigm aimed at understanding 
when children first develop mentalizing abilities.  Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) task 
involves a boy, Maxi, who helps his mother unpack the shopping, putting the chocolate 
into a cupboard with the intention of coming back for it later.  When he has gone to play, 
his mother takes the chocolate out of the cupboard, but returns it to a different cupboard.  
Maxi returns later to the kitchen to search for the chocolate.  The test question concerns 
which cupboard Maxi will look in for his chocolate.  The child passes the test if he or she 
answers according to Maxi’s reality rather than the child’s understanding of what he or 
she knows to be true.  Wimmer and Perner (1983) found that children began to pass the 
test at around four or five years old.  
 
An alternative version of the task was developed by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith 
(1985).  They used two dolls, Sally and Anne.  Sally places her marble into her basket and 
leaves the room.  Anne then takes Sally’s marble out of the basket and places it in her own 
box.  Sally returns and the test question concerns where Sally will look for her marble.  If 
the child points to the basket, they have understood that Sally has a false belief, and they 
pass the task.  Those failing the test are unable to represent that Sally holds a different 
belief to their own.  Control questions ensure that the child has real knowledge and 
accurate memory of the marble’s whereabouts.  Again, it was found that children pass this 
test at around four years old with the transition from success to failure in both tasks being 
fairly rapid (Perner, Leekam & Wimmer, 1987).  These studies and others were 
represented in Wellman, Cross, and Watson’s (2001) seminal meta-analysis of 178 false 
belief studies involving more than 4,000 children in which they concluded that  
performance in explicit false belief tasks rises above chance at around four years of age, 
signifying a conceptual change in mental state understanding at this point.  Cross-cultural 
studies indicate the universality of this developmental stage (Avis & Harris, 1991). 
 
False belief tasks are explicit in nature. They require explicit understanding of the verbal 
descriptions of the tasks and explicit verbal responses.  However, some recent studies 
using alternative tasks have shown that an implicit non-verbal understanding of mental 
states may be present in younger children.  Typically developing children are now known 
to pass implicit versions of false-belief tasks, such as looking or violation-of-expectation 
tasks, some time before passing explicit questions about false belief (Ruffman, 2000; 
Ruffman, Garnham, Import & Connolly, 2001).  For example, Clements and Perner (1994) 
showed that children at around three years old look to a false belief location despite not 
passing the explicit false belief task until around four.  They suggest that younger 
children’s correct looking is based on a different form of knowledge, i.e. implicit 
47 
 
knowledge.  They may be able to represent the other person’s false belief but are as yet 
unable to base verbalized judgments on it, possibly because they do not understand its 
relationship to the real world.   
 
Clements and Perner (1994) arrived at the view that an understanding of false belief 
seemed unlikely in children of less than three years old.  However, more recent findings 
have called this timing into question still further.  Southgate, Senju and Csibra (2007) 
measured whether children actually anticipated outcomes based on false belief before 
they happen.  They clearly showed that 25-month-old children anticipated behaviour 
based on false belief, again suggesting that an implicit representational ToM may precede 
children’s success on explicit false belief tasks by a considerable period.   Furthermore, 
Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) used a violation-of-expectation experiment with 15-month-
old pre-verbal infants and found that they were surprised when a woman reached to a 
location for an object that was unexpected according to her prior knowledge.  Their 
assumption was that 15-month-old infants have some understanding of false belief.  
This begins to challenge the idea of a conceptual change in false belief understanding at 
around four years old (Wellman et al., 2001).  Despite an apparent inability to pass classic 
false belief tasks before this age, infants show some understanding arguably from as early 
as a few months, and certainly from around 18 months to two years (Doherty, 2009; Frith 
& Frith, 2003). This has prompted a debate between two central conceptual approaches to 
early false belief understanding, revolving around the relationship between early implicit 
mentalizing and later explicit mentalizing. 
The “nativist” approach (e.g. Baillargeon, 1987; Leslie, 2005) suggests that evidence 
indicates one false belief understanding ability, present from infancy, and tapped by all the 
above experimental tasks.  The differences in developmental timing are explained simply 
by differences in task demands: explicit or implicit.   Explicit verbal tasks require a direct 
response from the infant and demand additional cognitive resources to those being 
measured.  Belief tasks are failed not because children do not understand the mental state 
concepts but because they do not have sufficient cognitive resources (Leslie & Thaiss, 
1992).  Conversely, looking-time tasks are spontaneous, non-elicited tasks and are implicit.  
In this rich account of belief understanding, whilst the measures are different, the early 
and later understanding is the same.  Evidence for this approach includes work by Low 
(2010) who found that implicit knowledge predicts and therefore underpins explicit verbal 
false-belief understanding.  Leslie (Leslie, 2005; Leslie, Friedman & German, 2004) uses this 
to argue that there is an innate neuro-cognitive module or mechanism of rudimentary 
mental state understanding, maturing in the second year of life. 
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Conversely, “constructivists” such as Perner (Perner, 1991; Perner & Ruffman, 2005), 
Apperly (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, Bodley Scott, 
2010) and Wellman (1990, 1993) favour an alternative account, arguing for the existence 
of a developmental conceptual change necessary to pass false belief tasks.  Early implicit 
knowledge, tapped by the looking paradigm, is non-mentalistic and is to do with how 
infants predict behaviour.  This implicit knowledge becomes subsumed and develops into a 
separate conceptual, explicit understanding which is verbal and accessible.  Apperly 
(Samson & Apperly, 2010) goes further and postulates there are two different systems, 
one an automatic, implicit and rudimentary early system, and one a cognitively reflective, 
effortful and explicit system.  As evidence, it seems that people respond more slowly to 
questions requiring mentalizing use, suggesting that they may be cognitively demanding 
(Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino, & Samson, 2006), and those who are distracted or 
asked to respond quickly seem less likely to use what they know about others to make 
mental state inferences (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven & Gilovich, 2004).  There is also 
evidence that some of these processes are selectively impaired in brain damage (Samson, 
Apperly, Chiavarino & Humphreys, 2004; Samson, Apperly & Humphreys, 2007).   
Whilst this debate is important, and has implications for future research in mentalizing, 
the measures in this study are concerned primarily with explicit and effortful mental state 
understanding.   
 
3.3.2. Mentalizing in children: broad influences 
 
There are some broad cognitive, social and environmental influences on mentalization 
in children which are not addressed directly by this study but which merit a brief outline 
here for the sake of completeness in reviewing the literature. 
 
3.3.2.1. Executive function 
 
Executive function has been found to play a role in the development of 
mentalizing abilities (see Doherty, 2009 for a full review). Many executive 
functions appear to develop at the same time as the ability to represent and 
attribute false beliefs (e.g. Jones, Rothbart & Posner, 2003) but the nature of 
the relationship is far from clear.  There are two competing explanations for the 
association (Moses, 2001). According to the expression account, children who 
fail false-belief tasks do so not because they lack an understanding of false 
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belief, but because of the additional executive demands that these tasks require 
(Mitchell, 1996; Mitchell & Lacohée, 1991). To answer a false-belief question 
correctly, children have to inhibit a tendency to report the truth and instead 
focus on an abstract mental state, simultaneously remembering the events that 
have transpired. As executive skills develop sufficiently to negotiate task 
demands, children become able to express their otherwise latent ToM 
understanding (see, e.g., Carlson, Moses & Hix, 1998).  However, the data from 
Wellman at al.’s (2001) meta-analysis suggests that if the executive demands of 
ToM tasks are reduced significantly, only a moderate improvement in 
performance is seen.  Intrinsically, therefore, expression accounts appear less 
plausible (Doherty, 2009). 
An alternative account is that executive functioning is fundamentally 
necessary for the emergence of children's ToM (e.g. Moses, 2001).  Mental 
states are abstract entities whose relationships to the world are not 
immediately transparent, particularly if they do not correspond with reality (as 
in false-belief tasks). Research suggests that exposure to opportunities for 
reflecting on the discrepancy between mental states and reality is important for 
ToM development (e.g. Brown, Donelan-McCall, & Dunn, 1996). Developmental 
gains in executive functioning may provide children with improved abilities to 
engage in and capitalize on these experiences. This account holds that domain-
general executive skills might be necessary but not sufficient for the emergence 
of ToM concepts; exposure to relevant experiences is also crucial (Moses, 
Carlson, & Sabbagh, 2004). 
3.3.2.2. Language 
 
Happé (1995) originally showed that language ability in children was 
associated with passing false belief tasks.  Astington and Jenkins (1999) 
subsequently found that early language ability at three years of age predicted 
later mentalizing performance. They suggested that syntactic abilities are 
necessary to represent the spatial arrangement of objects both in the real world 
and in another’s mental representation of it, even if those two things conflict.  
Thus, it is syntax rather than general linguistic ability that is important.  These 
findings were extended by Ruffman, Slade, Rowlandson, Rumsey, and Garnham 
(2003) who showed that language at around the age of three years predicted 
belief understanding over the next two and a half years.  However, it was not 
50 
 
syntax that predicted performance, rather semantics and overall language 
ability.  This is substantiated by Milligan, Astington and Dack’s (2007) meta-
analysis of 104 studies which confirms that many aspects of language relate to 
mentalizing, and suggests that false belief understanding develops as a result of 
language in general, but that in turn false belief understanding also promotes 
further language development (though the strength of this relationship is 
weaker than in the other direction). 
 
A key hypothesis relating to how language influences mentalizing is via 
the opportunity to talk about mental states.  The study of deaf children shows 
that late-signing deaf children are significantly delayed in passing false belief 
tasks (e.g. Peterson & Siegal, 1999; Russell, Hosie, Gray, Scott, Hunter, Banks et 
al., 1998; Schick, de Villiers, de Villiers & Hoffmeister, 2007; Woolfe, Want & 
Siegal, 2002).  This is different to native signers (deaf children born into signing 
families) who have early access to language and who perform well on false 
belief tasks (Woolfe et al., 2002).  Explanations for the delay in late signers 
include an absence of conversation and experience relevant to mental states, 
limitations on social interaction, and reduced activities such as pretend play.  On 
balance there seems good reason to believe that conversation plays a key role. 
 
Alternative avenues of research into the relationship between linguistic 
conversation and mentalizing relate to other social cognitive influences such as 
demographic and familial social interactions.  These are discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
3.3.2.3. Demographics and socio-economic status 
 
Twin studies have found a genetic influence in mentalizing abilities 
(Hughes & Cutting, 1999; Hughes & Plomin, 2000).  Despite this, however, 
Hughes, Jaffee, Happé, Taylor, Caspi, and Moffitt (2005) concluded that 
environmental factors rather than genetic influences explained the majority of 
the mentalizing variance in their 1000+ sample. Relevant environmental and 
social factors include influences such as parental occupation, mother’s 
education and social class (Cutting & Dunn, 1999).  Most studies seem to show 
that there are few cross-cultural differences in the age at which children 
develop mentalizing skills (e.g. Avis & Harris, 1991; Callaghan, Rochat, Lillard, 
Claux, Odden, Itakura, et al., 2005; Vinden, 1999), although one exception to 
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this has been a delay in Japanese children (Doherty & Kikuno, 2005; Naito & 




Additional research has focussed more on proximal areas of influence 
such as sibling and parent interactions.  Accelerated false belief understanding 
has been found to have a positive association with larger families (Perner, 
Ruffman and Leekam, 1994) and subsequently with the number of older (but 
not younger) siblings (Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 1998).  These 
effects may be due to everyday interactions stimulating awareness of siblings’ 
thoughts and feelings, through pretend play or language.  However, some have 
found no evidence of a sibling relationship at all (e.g., Cutting & Dunn, 1999; 
Meins et al., 2002).  Whether sibling influences are important therefore is still 
open to question and it may be that the timing of a mentalizing capacity is 




Parents and parenting have also been found to have strong influences 
on the development of children’s mentalization.  The strongest of these appears 
to be through conversation, but other studies have also found links with other 
parenting attributes, for example, discipline style (Ruffman, Perner & Parkin, 
1999), and encouraging interaction within extended families (Lewis, Freeman, 
Kyriakidou, Maridaki-Kassotaki & Berridge, 1996).  The importance of discussing 
feelings between infants and mothers was highlighted by Dunn, Brown and 
Beardsall (1991) who found that emotional understanding in three year olds 
was strongly related to diversity of talk about feelings, often taking place 
around disputes at home.  Further, factual and causal talk between mothers and 
children, in particular the use of mental state language, has been found to 
facilitate both 3-year-old’s language ability and false belief success (Dunn, 
Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla & Youngblade, 1991).  Ruffman, et al., (2002) found a 
causal relationship between mother’s use of mental state utterances and later 
mentalizing ability even after accounting for possible mediators such as earlier 





Given these research findings, it seems clear that a key social correlate 
to the development of children’s mentalizing is mental state talk, in particular 
that experienced through conversation with the child’s primary carer, usually 
the mother.  This important concept and its measurement are explored further 
below in section 3.3.8. 
 
3.3.3. Measuring mentalizing in adults in contrast to standard developmental tasks for children 
 
The popularity of false belief tasks as indicators of a mentalizing capacity in young 
children together with the scarcity of empirical mentalization studies in older children has 
led to a common assumption that the end-point of mentalization development is during 
early school age (Samson & Apperly, 2010).  This may explain why studies of adolescent 
and adult mentalizing are significantly fewer in number than those addressing the 
developmental aspects in children, despite indications that change continues well into 
later childhood and adolescence (Chandler, Boyes, & Ball, 1990; Wellman, 1990).  Another 
reason for the dearth in adult mentalization studies has been because few measures 
existed which adequately tested adult mental state understanding in the normal 
population.  In more recent years, however, researchers have argued that the use of 
parametric testing would avoid measurement hurdles such as ceiling effects or the overly 
simple outcome of a pass/fail criterion on a particular task.  Parametric tests include 
reaction times, error rates and probability estimates, measured over a series of multiple 
trials (Samson & Apperly, 2010).  The evidence emerging from these studies suggests that 
adults are not necessarily performing at ceiling in mentalizing tasks, and adult mentalizing 
should not be conceptualized using a simple have/have not framework (e.g. Birch& Bloom, 
2007; Keysar et al., 2000; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). 
Indeed, whilst the consensus was once that a mentalizing ability was something 
possessed or not, recent studies show that rather than an all or nothing capability, there 
are profound individual differences in both typically and atypically developed individuals 
(Repacholi & Slaughter, 2003; Sprung, 2010).  The mentalizing system appears to be multi-
faceted and general failure is not always manifest, rather some aspects are lacking 
(Astington & Baird, 2005).  Research is often based on many different standard and non-
standard developmental stage-relevant measures, which can show dissociations or 
composite scores rather than task specific analysis (Sprung, 2010).  Unfortunately, these 
are often inappropriate for adults who would not be expected to make errors in first or 
even second order false belief tasks (Apperly, Samson & Humphreys, 2009).  One solution  
is to make tasks more complicated or simultaneously present a competing task (Bull, 
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Phillips & Conway, 2008) but it is difficult to disentangle the roles that other cognitive skills 
play in successful task completion (Apperly et al., 2009).  An alternative approach may be 
to keep belief reasoning tasks as simple as possible but measure processing time rather 
than error rates as these can provide an indication of comprehension but also of proclivity 
to use (e.g. Apperly et al., 2006; Keysar et al., 2003).  For all these reasons, a broad range 
of mentalizing tasks is included in this study, including those using multiple trials, reaction 
times, and parametric tests, all designed to test several different aspects of mentalizing. 
3.3.4. Social-Perceptual  versus Social-Cognitive components 
Several researchers have argued the existence of multiple components of mentalization.  
For example, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) propose two distinct components of 
mentalizing; a social-perceptual and a social-cognitive component. Their main hypothesis 
delineates an important distinction between the online immediate perceptual judgement 
of mental states and the capacity to make more complex cognitive inferences about 
mental states as tapped, for example, by false belief or perspective taking tasks.  Evidence 
for this originates from several sources, in particular from work with children suffering 
from Williams Syndrome.  These individuals appear to have good capabilities in the social-
perceptual component of mentalizing (Tager-Flusberg, Boshart & Baron-Cohen, 1998; 
Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1999) while experiencing difficulties with the social-cognitive 
component (Porter, Coltheart & Langdon, 2008; Santos & Deruelle, 2009; Tager-Flusberg & 
Sullivan, 2000).   Evidence from neural research also suggests that mental state reasoning 
may be fractionated into at least two functionally and anatomically distinct neural circuits 
(e.g. Sabbagh, 2004).  Specifically, the ability to decode mental states from social-
perceptual cues (such as facial expressions) may rely on contributions from the 
orbitofrontal/medial temporal circuit within the right hemisphere. In contrast, the ability 
to reason cognitively about mental states may rely on left medial frontal regions, 
especially the Temporoparietal Junction (TPJ). 
 
Ordinarily, these two aspects of mentalizing combine to produce reliable judgments 
about others’ mental states. However, the distinction between the two processes is 
important because they rely on different social-information processing skills (Sabbagh, 
2004).  Mental state decoding relies principally on social-perceptual information that is 
gleaned in the immediate and observable environment (e.g. facial expression).  
Conversely, cognitive reasoning of mental states requires one to access knowledge and 





3.3.4.1. Social-Perceptual: the importance of the eyes 
Social-perceptual information processing includes distinguishing 
between people and objects, and making online rapid judgements about 
people's mental state from their facial and body expressions (Tager-Flusberg & 
Sullivan, 2000) and other social non-verbal stimuli such as voice tone.  Research 
corroborates that the eyes in particular are hugely important in judging not only 
someone else’s visual perceptual experience, but also when and what another 
person is thinking (Baron-Cohen & Cross, 1992).  Typically developing human 
infants are oriented very early to eyes as providers of information (Butler, 
Caron, & Brooks, 2000; D’Entremont, Hains & Muir, 1997; Moore & Corkum, 
1998; Woodward, 2003) and at around three years, there is evidence that 
children understand gaze as referential, i.e. related to the mental state of the 
looker (Anderson & Doherty, 1997; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Butler et al., 2000; 
Doherty & Anderson, 1999).  Several theorists have therefore proposed that 
gaze understanding is a precursor to understanding belief (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 
1995; Gopnik, Slaughter & Meltzoff, 1994), and that the social-cognitive 
component of mentalizing builds on this earlier social-perceptual knowledge 
(e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1994; Hobson, 1993; Wellman, 1990).  However, while the 
eyes carry reliable and important information about others' mental states (see 
Kleinke, 1986), the information is subtle and difficult to interpret when 
separated from additional contextual information provided by a whole-face 
expression (Ekman & Friesen, 1978). 
 
Most measures of the social-perceptual component of mentalizing also 
involve some additional linguistic and cognitive (e.g. working memory or 
attentional) ingredients, which may overlap with social-cognitive capacities. 
Thus, tasks generally measure both components, involving an integration of 
perceptual and cognitive information processing.  
 
3.3.4.2. Social-Cognitive: Perspective Taking 
According to Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) the social-cognitive 
component of mentalizing incorporates what has traditionally been referred to 
as ToM.  This component entails the conceptual understanding of the mind as a 
representational system and false belief tasks are the prototypical measure.  It 
also involves the ability to understand others’ perspectives (that is, not just 
what someone can see but how they might see something).  Assessing 
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perspective taking is conceptually comparable to belief understanding and is a 
useful alternative for measuring mentalizing in adults. 
 
One group of researchers has explored an innovative experimental 
paradigm in adult perspective taking which has enabled the measurement of 
explicit mental state understanding and permitted a distinction between 
comprehension and proclivity to use mentalization (Keysar et al., 2000; Keysar 
et al., 2003).  The studies provide striking evidence that the end-point of 
mentalizing development is not a faultless or ceiling performance (Samson & 
Apperly, 2010).  The experiments involve the participant moving objects around 
a grid on the instruction of a director who is able to see some objects but not 
others which are hidden from him.  Even though participants know the director 
cannot see some objects, sometimes they still move an object which the 
director could not possibly see given his point of view.   Such an action indicates 
that the participant could not have taken the director’s perspective into account 
and shows a dissociation between an ability to distinguish one’s own beliefs 
from others’, and the routine deployment of this in interpreting the actions of 
others (Keysar et al., 2003).  Eye-tracking data (in particular reaction times) 
show that the participant often fixates first on the object the director cannot 
see before they correct themselves from the egocentric perspective.  In around 
20% of cases this correction did not take place (Keysar et al., 2000).  Hence, 
despite normally developed adults possessing the ability to interpret social 
actions by means of a mentalizing ability, they do not necessarily reliably use or 
apply it automatically.   
Keysar et al. point to a tendency to assume that what is present to one 
person will be salient to another, i.e. that we are naturally egocentric in social 
interactions (Barr & Keysar, 2005) and that the processes required to resist this 
egocentric interference are cognitively costly (see also Birch & Bloom, 2007).  
An ability to use mentalization in a spontaneous, non-reflective way does not 
therefore appear to be incorporated into the routine operation of the social 
interpretation system.  Epley, Morewedge and Keysar (2004) also suggest that 
although the tendency to egocentrism is relevant to both adults and children, 
adults may be better able to subsequently reflectively correct it by relying more 
heavily on their mentalizing ability, using it repeatedly and learning from the 
experience.  Evidence from neuropsychology corroborates this hypothesis by 
showing that the ability to resist interference from one’s own perspective can 
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be selectively and irretrievably impaired (Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan & 
Humphreys, 2005).  
Converse, Lin, Keysar and Epley (2008) went on to argue that using 
mentalization to recognise differences between one’s own and another’s 
perspective is a deliberate process that can also be influenced by mood. They 
hypothesised successfully that, because sadness is associated with more 
systematic and deliberate processing than happiness which is associated more 
with heuristic processing, mentalization would be facilitated more by sadness.  
They argue that happiness may increase reliance on an egocentric default 
whereas sadness may promote the elaboration of information about others’ 
mental states through deliberate mentalization use, making inferences less 
biased.  Interestingly, Savitsky, Keysar, Epley, Carter and Swanson (2011) 
recently showed that individuals make more egocentric perspective-taking 
biases when their interlocutor is a friend.  The authors argue that when 
communicating with a friend, individuals are often less successful at inhibiting 
their own perspective, become more relaxed, and “let down their guard”. 
 
The above tells us that adult mentalizing can be affected by mood and 
social situation, but there appear to be other influences as well.  Wu and Keysar 
(2007) investigated the effect of culture on perspective taking using the same 
paradigm, in an attempt to explore potential differences between collectivistic 
(Chinese) and individualistic (American) cultures.  From eye-gaze data, they 
concluded that Chinese participants were more attuned to another’s 
perspective than Americans and were consistently faster.  Americans could take 
another’s perspective, but only after reflective interpretation and overcoming 
their own perspective.  Chinese participants still reflected but much less so. The 
authors suggest that cultural patterns of interdependence focus attention on 
the other encouraging better perspective taking and interpretation of others’ 
actions.  In Eastern cultures, the self is often defined in relation to others 
arguably inducing a tendency to focus on others’ actions, knowledge and needs.  
This is discussed in terms of cultural differences in the universality of 
endowment of mentalizing (Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006) and the 
use of such ability which appears to be enhanced in Chinese participants.  In 
other words, although the groups displayed similar patterns of accuracy, they 




Using explicit measures of adult mental state understanding, the above 
studies show that social cognition in adults is still prone to egocentric biases, 
and is susceptible to experience and mood.  Processing speed data also shows 
that there is a difference between possessing a mentalization capability and 
using it.  Further, the use of our mentalizing capacity apparently places two 
demands on us: the need to resist effortfully interference from one’s own 
perspective, and the need to determine what incoming information is relevant 
(Samson & Apperly, 2010).    Given this, differences in the accuracy of and 
proclivity to use mentalizing skills might be expected in the two groups of 
individuals, since one group should be trained or skilled in these demands as a 
result of prolonged connection with the mental states of their clients.   This 
study therefore uses the Keysar perspective taking experiment (e.g. Keysar et 
al., 2000) to explore understanding and proclivity to use mentalizing in the two 
groups, and to determine what, if any, influence attachment style has.    
 
3.3.5. Cognitive/Affective empathy 
Another approach to conceptualising mentalizing is to consider the cognitive element of 
it as one part of empathy.  In its broadest sense empathy refers to the reactions of one 
individual to the observed emotions and experiences of another (Davis, 1980; Decety & 
Jackson, 2006), also described as the experience of a connection with someone else’s 
feelings or thoughts (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004).  In addition, it provides an 
insight into another’s intentions, an ability to predict their behaviour (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004; Dennett, 1978) and enables individuals to behave appropriately 
themselves, including using emotional and physical mirroring (Blair, 2005; Preston & de 
Waal, 2002).  Empathy needs to be regulated (Decety & Jackson, 2006); people who show 
too little empathy or who are too sensitive to others’ thoughts and feelings can experience 
difficulties in social adaptation (Decety, 2011).  Like attachment, empathy is 
conceptualised by various theorists as (i) dispositional or innate and relatively stable 
regardless of the interaction or context (Duan & Hill, 1996; Knafo, Zahn-Waxler, van Hulle, 
Robinson & Rhee, 2008;), or (ii) dependant on situational or environmental factors (Duan 
& Hill, 1996; Yamada & Decety, 2009), or interpersonal processes (Egan, 2004; Rogers, 
1968).   
Modern research recognises that empathy encompasses both affective and cognitive 
components of empathic responses (e.g. Batson, 2009; Davis, 1980; Eisenberg & Eggum, 
2009; Goubert, Craig, & Buysse, 2009).  The affective component is often associated with 
bottom up or viscerally-based emotion processing (Decety & Jackson, 2006).  It is often 
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defined in terms of an observer’s emotional response to the affective state of another 
(Hoffman, 1984) and is usually described in emotion terms that are appropriate to the 
situation.  This may be a matched emotion, for example sadness at another’s sadness, or 
an appropriate but differentiated emotion, for example sympathy at someone’s 
desperation.  The overlap between self and other representations is not absolute.  This 
would lead to undue levels of personal distress, hamper the natural ability to switch 
between self and other representations, and lead to confusion of the self-other boundary 
(Decety & Jackson, 2006).   Affective empathy can also be understood as a response to 
non-visual emotional stimuli such as language (Blair, 2005).  Quantifying and measuring 
affective empathy has been pragmatically difficult and has therefore tended to be 
achieved using self-report measures such as the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 
1980) or the Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004). 
Cognitive empathy involves an intellectual understanding of the other’s feelings and 
thoughts (Kohler, 1929, as cited in Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004), also described as 
attending to another’s perspective or responding in a decentred, non-egocentric way 
(Mead, 1934; Piaget, 1932; both cited in Davis, 1983).  The cognitive component of 
empathy has also been more recently described using the concept of ToM or attribution of 
mental states to others using representational abilities (e.g. Astington et al., 1988; Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1987; Wellman, 1990).  There is significant evidence that cognitive 
and affective empathy are overlapping and highly intertwined functionally and 
neurologically (Hynes, Baird & Grafton, 2006; Ruby & Decety, 2004) and developmental 
theories of empathy and emotion understanding, particularly the cognitive component, 
parallel those of general social cognition, including mentalization (Bull et al., 2008). 
Cognitive empathy can been measured using both subjective self-report questionnaires as 
well as objective measures such as ToM, emotion recognition tests, or adult perspective 
taking tasks (e.g. Keysar et al. 2000, 2003).  
An important part of empathy is the perception and recognition of other people’s 
emotions from facial affective displays (Ekman, 1972; Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005; Scherer, 
2007).  This ability is a central component of emotional competence, social interaction and 
interpretation or prediction of a person’s reactions.  However, empathy is not only about 
recognition but also seems linked to a person’s experience of resonating with another.  For 
example, viewing facial expressions of others has been seen to trigger similar expressions 
on one’s own face even in the absence of conscious recognition of the stimulus (Preston & 
de Waal, 2002).  Further, an individual’s ability to perceive accurately negative emotional 
responses in another is greater when the physiological state (e.g. heart-beat, muscle 
activity) of the two is closely matched (Levenson & Ruef, 1992).  fMRI studies confirm 
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these results; when participants observe facial expressions in others, increased neuro-
dynamic activity is seen in brain regions implicated in facial expressions (Carr, Iacoboni, 
Dubeau, Mazziota & Lenzi, 2003).  All this suggests a system that automatically prompts an 
observer to resonate with the emotional state of another both in terms of motor 
representations and associated autonomic and somatic responses (Preston & de Waal, 
2002).   
Given the importance of emotion perception and recognition to empathy, this study 
employed a facial emotion recognition task, based on the universal facial expressions used 
by Ekman and Friesen (1971).  The task focuses on the core skill of recognition of 
prototypical expression patterns for certain emotions that are widely shared on a cultural 
and universal level (Ekman, 1972) as a necessary competence for the interpretation of 
emotion expression generally and inference in face-to-face communication. 
 
3.3.6. Adult studies have so far focussed on group differences 
 
Despite the beginnings of more revolutionary and creative ways of measuring adult 
mentalizing, the bulk of empirical work to date has concentrated on group differences in 
mentalizing, either considering gender, or clinical populations. 
 
3.3.6.1. Gender  
 
Women have been found to show more accurate and faster 
discrimination of facial emotions (Hall & Matsumoto, 2004), and emotion shown 
in the eye region (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  They have lower thresholds than 
men in recognising emotions at increasing intensities (Montagne, Kessels, 
Frigerio, de Haan & Perrett, 2005) and can label emotions more efficiently 
(Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004).  This corresponds with previous research supporting 
a female advantage in decoding non-verbal emotion (Hall, 1978; 1984, both 
cited in Hall & Matsumoto, 2004).  In a later study Hall and colleagues (Hall, 
Hutton & Morgan, 2010) used a facial recognition task and eye-tracking to 
confirm that the female advantage in the decoding of non-verbal emotion 
information was related to greater attention to the eyes.  Furthermore, women 
appear to self-report more empathy than men (Lennon & Eisenberg, 1987; 
Toussaint & Webb, 2005), consistently scoring more highly on several measures, 
for example the EQ (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) and the IRI (Davis, 
60 
 
1983).  Studies concerning adult gender difference in other mentalization skills 
are sparse but, in children, girls appear to possess a slight advantage on false 
belief tasks (e.g. Charman, Ruffman & Clements, 2002; Hughes et al., 2005).  In 
any mentalization study, therefore, there is a requirement to control for gender.  
In this study, whilst gender differences are not a focus, it was necessary to 
consider gender make up of each group and ensure appropriate gender balance.  
 
3.3.6.2. Clinical populations 
 
The most significant volume of research concerning mentalizing in 
clinical populations has been in the area of autism (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Tager-
Flusberg & Cohen, 1993, 2000). To a lesser extent, studies have also focussed on 
BPD (Fonagy, Gergely & Target, 2007; Fonagy, Target, Gergely, Allen, & 
Bateman, 2003) and schizophrenia (Corcoran, 2000, 2001; Langdon, 2005; 
Sprong, Schothorst, Vos, Hox & van Engeland, 2007).   
In BPD, patients experience impaired mentalizing abilities (Fonagy & 
Bateman, 2008; Fonagy & Target, 2000; Gunderson, 2007; Sharp & Fonagy, 
2008; Sharp, Pane, Ha, Venta, Patel, Sturek et al., 2011) usually evidenced by 
impaired accuracy in emotion recognition (Bland, Williams, Scharer & Manning, 
2004; Unoka, Fogd, Füzy & Csukly, 2011; Wagner & Linehan, 1999).  Some 
studies, however, provide evidence of heightened sensitivity to facial and other 
expressions of emotion (Fertuck, Jekal, Song, Wyman, Morris, Wilson, et al., 
2009; Lynch, Rosenthal, Kosson, Cheavens, Lejuez & Blair, 2006; Scott, Levy, 
Adams & Stevenson, 2011) although this has not been replicated by all studies 
using the same measures (Preißler, Dziobek, Ritter, Heerkeren, & Roepke, 
2010). A current hypothesis concerning the aetiology of BPD is the 
mentalization theory (Fonagy & Bateman, 2008; Fonagy & Luyten, 2009) in 
which BPD is considered to be associated with (i) a low activation threshold for 
the attachment system and (ii) a deactivation of controlled mentalization, 
resulting in impairment in the differentiation of self/other mental states, 
leading to hypersensitivity and hypervigilence. In schizophrenia, clinical findings 
strongly suggest that patients are impaired in social interaction, with Frith 
(1992) suggesting that mentalizing is compromised because of a failure to 
monitor patients’ own and other persons' mental states and behaviour. There is 
a dispute as in BPD, however, over whether mentalizing is impaired or 
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exaggerated in some types of schizophrenia or whether it represents a state or 
trait marker of these disorders (Brüne, 2005).   
3.3.6.3. Autism 
Evidence from autism is especially relevant because it involves selective 
impairments in socio-perceptual and social-cognitive aspects of mentalizing 
including specific difficulties with the necessary mental state understanding to 
pass classic false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, 2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 1993; 
Frith, Happé, & Siddons, 1994).  It is also important because not only are 
impairments manifest but it is possible to gain insight into the developmental 
trajectory of these impairments.  Research suggests that sub-threshold autistic 
characteristics are also present in family members of autistic individuals (Bailey, 
Palferman, Heavey, & Le Couteur, 1998), a discovery which has sometimes been 
referred to as evidence of a “broader phenotype” of autism (Piven, 2001; Piven, 
Palmer, Jacobi, Childress & Arndt, 1997).  Similarly, first degree relatives of 
individuals with Asperger’s Syndrome also show deficits in the ability to score 
highly on mentalizing tasks (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997). Such findings 
support the possibility that mentalizing deficiencies may represent a hereditary 
cognitive characteristic. 
Despite the obvious mentalizing impairments in autism, some high-
functioning autistic and Asperger’s individuals pass standard mentalizing tasks 
such as first order false belief tasks, but still demonstrate problems with 
advanced measures (Baron-Cohen, 2000) and real difficulties in everyday social 
situations (Klin, Schultz & Cohen, 2000).  Language, specifically syntactic ability, 
appears to be one of the best predictors of autistic subjects' performance on 
tasks tapping a representational understanding of mind (Tager-Flusberg, 1997, 
2000; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994).  Adults with Asperger syndrome who 
perform well on a range of both basic and higher order ToM tasks, do not 
activate the same regions of the medial frontal cortex when they are engaged in 
ToM tasks as do normal adults (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000).  This suggests 
that they may be relying on different, non-social cognitive and linguistic 
mechanisms such as logical reasoning to process social-cognitive information 
(Happé, Ehlers, Fletcher, Frith, Johansson, Gillberg, et al., 1996; Happé & 
Siddons, 1994; Peterson, Wellman & Liu, 2005). 
The most commonly used stimuli for investigating the processing of 
social-perceptual information in autism are pictures of human faces, although 
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videotapes of social interactions, human voices etc. have also been used 
(reviewed in Boraston & Blakemore, 2007).  Evidence suggests that faces are 
processed differently by individuals with autism (e.g. Langdell, 1978; Schultz, 
Gauthier, Klin, Fulbright, Anderson, Volkmar et al., 2000).  For example, autistic 
individuals are markedly inattentive to faces (Osterling & Dawson, 1994), fixate 
the eye region of the face less (e.g. Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002) 
and make less frequent and abnormally timed eye-contact (Dawson, Osterling, 
Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 2000). 
Individuals with autism or Asperger’s Syndrome seem to experience a 
significant impairment in monitoring gaze direction (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Baldwin 
& Crowson, 1997) and in decoding information contained in eye-gazes (e.g. 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright & Jolliffe, 1997).  In 
particular, Baron-Cohen and colleagues found that whilst these adults are able 
to detect basic mental states in the whole face, they are compromised in 
recognising complex mental states, and distinctly impaired at recognising  
mental states from the eye region alone.  This has been corroborated and 
extended by several researchers (e.g. Klin et al., 2002; Riby, Doherty-Sneddon, & 
Bruce, 2009; Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley & Piven, 2007), although there are also 
findings that are at odds with this (e.g. Back, Ropar & Mitchell, 2007, in 
adolescents), and debate continues regarding the ecological validity of 
measures and nature of the stimuli used.  In Corden, Chilvers and Skuse’s (2008) 
study of eye fixation patterns of Asperger’s adults, they suggest a hypothesis of 
avoidance of emotionally arousing stimuli in an attempt to reduce anxiety and 
over-arousal.   
Recent research in autism has also given credence to the dual explicit 
verbal/implicit nonverbal conceptualisation of mental state understanding.  
Senju, Southgate, White and Frith (2009) used an eye-tracking task replicating 
their earlier study with children (Southgate at al., 2007) to show that Asperger  
adults were not able to attribute mental states spontaneously and implicitly in a 
non-verbal task unlike typically developed adults, but showed no difference to 
controls in the ability to do so in explicit tasks.  The authors suggest these 
results point to a persistent impairment in early spontaneous mentalizing.  
However, their data also suggests that the early development of spontaneous 
mentalizing is not necessarily a precursor to the later ability of conceptually 
mentally attributing through explicit reasoning.  They suggest the former 
requires spontaneous encoding of socially relevant material and its automatic 
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computation, whereas the latter can be achieved by verbally mediated 
reasoning prompted by explicit instructions.  It is the implicit aspects of mental 
state understanding that are proposed by some to be especially important for 
social-cognitive functioning and that are generally lacking in autistic individuals 
(Frith & Frith, 2008; Tager-Flusberg, 2007). 
Further discussion relating to mentalizing deficits in autism, and 
specifically to eye-tracking methodology as a method of investigating social-
cognitive impairments can be found at section 3.3.9.2 below. 
 
3.3.7. Which social-cognitive and social-perceptive measures will be used in the study? 
 
Given the necessity to match mentalizing tasks to relevant aspects of study (Sprung, 
2010), a set of tasks has been chosen to explore certain elements of the understanding of, 
attribution of and reflection on mental states that are relevant to therapists acting in their 
therapeutic role.  The tasks are designed primarily to tap the conceptual and effortful 
aspects of mentalization. 
 
3.3.7.1. Social-perceptual measure: Eyes test 
With the development of the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test (“the 
Eyes Test”; Baron-Cohen, et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001), a measure 
now exists that allows subtle testing of mild deficits in social understanding.  
The test is sensitive to the implicit non-linguistic aspects of mental state 
understanding and was developed following research findings highlighting the 
importance of eye-gaze in emotion understanding.  For instance, when a 
person’s eyes are directed away from the viewer to the left or right upper 
quadrant in the absence of an object, we infer that someone is thinking. 
Similarly, many other cognitive mental states are observable in the face, and 
particularly the eyes (Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, & Walker, 
1995; Baron-Cohen & Cross, 1992; Baron-Cohen, Riviere, Cross, Fukushima, 
Bryant, Sotillo, et al., 1996).  Further, for complex mental states, the eyes but 
not the mouth provide as much information as the full face, a discovery true for 
faces of either gender (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). 
The Eyes test has proved able to distinguish very high functioning adults 
with autism or Asperger’s syndrome from controls (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; 
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Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Stone & Rutherford, 1999), and it correlates 
inversely with Baron-Cohen’s Autism Spectrum Quotient, a measure developed 
to quantify the extent of an individual’s autistic characteristics (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001).  It is one of the experimental 
measures used in this study to analyse potential group differences in one aspect 
of mentalizing, and has been chosen due to its sensitivity and status as a 
recognised objective measure of advanced mentalizing in adults.  It has also 
been shown to correlate with various other adult social cognition measures.   
 
3.3.7.2. Social cognitive measures: Perspective taking measures. 
 
In this study, a computer based version of the Keysar perspective taking 
task (Keysar et al., 2000; Keysar et al., 2003) will be used to test for group 
differences in the ability to take another’s perspective, in order to determine 
whether therapists have enhanced abilities in this area. It is a highly novel test 
of adult mentalizing, and was developed using elements of earlier referential 
communication games (e.g. Krauss & Glucksberg, 1977).  Due to its repeated 
trials (128 in total), it represents one of the new range of parametric measures 
for adults that avoid ceiling affects and simplistic pass/fail results (Samson & 
Apperly, 2010).  The task in its original form is described above in Section 3.3.3.2 
and it is used in this study due to its attractiveness as a sensitive measure of 
adult mentalizing, and because as a specific measure of perspective taking, it is 
particularly relevant for a study on therapists’ abilities to understand another’s 
viewpoint.   
 
The version of the task used in this study differs from the original in a 
few respects.  First, although detailed accuracy and reaction times were 
recorded, eye-tracking was not used specifically with this task.  Further, due to 
the constraints of laboratory time and space, rather than set up the grid in the 
laboratory and provide a “real life” director, a computerised version of the task 
was used in which the participants see the grid on a screen, hear verbal 
instructions of a “virtual” director, and use a mouse to move the objects.  The 
main benefits of this were: (i) 128 instruction trials could be completed in a 
reasonable time, and (ii) the director’s instructions, tone of voice and grid 
appearance were uniform for all participants.  In addition, although the 
participant was not given an opportunity to swap with the director to ensure 
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they understood the task (Keysar et al., 2000), a very detailed set of instructions 
was explained to the participant, including several references to the director’s 
perspective being different to that of the participant because of the occluded 
slots in the grid.  Examples of the task as experienced by participants can be 
found in the Method Section. 
 




One of the more recent and popular self-report measures for 
empathy is the IRI (Davis, 1980, 1983). This is an individual difference 
measure, based on a multidimensional approach.  Rather than 
considering empathy as a single construct, the IRI consists of four 
subscales: Perspective Taking (PT, assessing the tendency to adopt 
spontaneously the view of others and to interpret and understand their 
experiences cognitively), Fantasy (FS, evaluating the tendency to feel 
the affect and behavioural consequences of fictitious characters), 
Empathic Concern (EC, assessing “other-oriented” feelings of sympathy, 
warmth and concern for others), and Personal Distress (PD, measuring 
self-oriented feelings of personal anxiety and unease in emotional 
situations).  Each of the four subscales was designed to reflect 
components of empathy already identified in previous theory and 
research (e.g. Coke, Batson & McDavis, 1978; Stotland, Mathews, 
Sherman, Hansson & Richardson, 1978; both cited in Davis, 1983).   
 
In a study of construct validity, correlations between the 
subscales and with other empathy measures (Hogan Empathy Scale, 
Hogan, 1969; Emotional Empathy Scale, Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; 
both cited in Davis, 1983), Davis found clear evidence for the four 
separate constructs (Davis, 1983).  In particular, the PT scale displayed a 
pattern of association with relatively cognitive measures of empathy, 
and less emotionality, correlating with higher levels of social 
competence, higher self-esteem and lower levels of anxiety.  The EC 
scale displayed the opposite dynamic, i.e. a well-defined relationship 
with emotional reactivity and correlations with shyness, social anxiety 
and emotional vulnerability. Subsequent analysis showed that 
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emotional regulation (i.e. the ability to maintain emotional separation 
and distance) was positively associated with the PT subscale, and 
negatively with the PD subscale (Pulos, Elison & Lennon, 2004).  The IRI 
was used in this study as a self-report measure of empathy with 
particular focus on the two subscales arguably most closely related to 




A more recent measure of empathy, the EQ, (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004) has applications both as a self-report measure of 
empathy and clinically as a measure of autistic psychopathology.  In a 
study of EQ validity, reliability, and factor structure, Lawrence, Shaw, 
Baker, Baron-Cohen and David (2004) reported moderate correlations 
with the PT and EC subscales of the IRI (Davis, 1980), but only weak or 
no associations with the PD and FS scales.  Indeed the association with 
PD scale was negative which indicates that the two concepts may even 
be inversely related.  The lack of association with the IRI’s FS scale might 
suggest that this concept may not represent empathy per se (Baron-
Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). 
 
The EQ comprises three factors: Cognitive Empathy, Emotional 
Reactivity and Social Skills (Lawrence et al., 2004).  Cognitive Empathy 
measures the appreciation of affective states, perspective taking and 
desire-based states in another, consistent with a definition of ToM.  
However, relatively strong loadings of emotional state items in this 
factor versus perspective-taking or desire items may explain why no 
correlation was found with the PT scale of the IRI which is purely 
cognitive in nature and focusses on the others’ perspective.  The 
Emotional Reactivity subscale reflects the tendency to experience an 
emotional reaction in response to others’ mental states.  This factor was 
moderately correlated with EC and PT scales in the IRI.  The third scale, 
Social Skills, is thought to tap general social skills and understanding.  
This subscale demonstrated a positive relationship with the IRI PT scale.  
The three factor structure was  corroborated in a psychometric analysis 
of the EQ by Muncer and Ling (2006).  Subsequently, Allison, Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Stone and Muncer (2011) used Rasch analysis to 
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reconfirm that the EQ measures a single dimension of empathy in 
addition to the three subscales.  It will be used in this study as a second 
self-report measure of empathy.  
The IRI is well known, frequently employed and has been utilised in previous 
studies with therapists (e.g. Hall et al., 2000, see Section 3.4.2).  The aim in using 
the IRI, therefore, was to replicate previous findings of relevant research.  The 
EQ has been used in more recent research concerning empathy, and, as 
discussed, it challenges some previously advocated constructs (e.g. the FT scale 
of the IRI).  It was used here, therefore, to extend previous research about 
empathic abilities in therapists. For these reasons, and the somewhat variable 
correlations between subscales on the IRI and the EQ, both measures of 
empathy were used.  
3.3.8. Mental state talk as a marker for mentalizing 
In section 3.3.2.5 the potential influence of parenting on childhood mentalizing was 
explored.  In particular, the importance of mental state talk was noted.  Mental state talk 
is relevant to mentalizing in two important ways.  First, as discussed, exposure to mental 
state talk appears to have a profound effect on the child’s ability to mentalize.  Second, it 
has been argued that it can be used as a marker for mentalizing ability.  Whilst this has 
been explored in children, it has not so far been researched in adults, or in different 
groups of individuals. 
3.3.8.1. The influence of mothers’ mental state talk or mind-mindedness 
Meins et al., 1998 have pointed to a mother’s use of mental state 
language as a causal factor for facilitating their child’s mental state 
understanding.  In a comprehensive set of studies Meins and colleagues (Meins, 
Fernyhough, Wainwright, Clark-Carter, Das Gupta, Fradley, et al., 2003; Meins et 
al., 2002) have explored the concept of “mind-mindedness”, or the tendency to 
focus on and attribute mental states to one’s infant, as an important part of the 
maternal influence on mentalizing.  Mind-mindedness was measured by the 
appropriateness (also referred to as “attuning”) of mental state comments used 
while playing with the child.  Appropriateness was measured according to 
whether the mother accurately read the child’s mental state and whether her 
interactional comments were relevant and constructive.  Maternal mind-
mindedness was a significant predictor of false belief in the child, even over the 
child’s own language ability.  Meins et al. (2002, 2003) suggest the mother’s 
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appropriate mental state language allows children to make sense of their own 
behaviour by referencing the mental states behind that behaviour. 
In Ruffman et al.’s (2002) study, mothers were asked to describe a set of 
everyday pictures to their children.  The more mothers used cognitive and 
desire terms and “modulations of assertion” where uncertainty is expressed, 
the better the child’s performance was on later mentalizing tasks.  Importantly, 
Ruffman et al.’s (2002) results show that whilst mother’s mental state language 
predicted later false belief performance, neither the child’s false belief 
performance nor their own mental state talk predicted mother’s mental state 
talk.  This suggests that the mother’s talk is influential on the child’s false belief 
performance rather than the other way round.  Further work suggests that 
mothers appear to scaffold their children’s mental state understanding 
beginning at quite an early age (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006; Taumoepeau & 
Ruffman, 2008).  The suggestion is that mothers adjust their mental state talk to 
the child’s “zone of proximal development” (Vygotsky, 1978), beyond the child’s 
current level of understanding but which the child can manage with assistance.  
In effect, the co-operative task of conversation therefore enables the child to 
internalise ways of thinking about thinking with adult partners (Symons, 2004).  
Mental state talk and linguistic mental state reflection is therefore seen 
as a measure of mentalizing and several experimental interventions based on 
linguistic training have been shown to have had some success in enhancing 
children’s mentalization capabilities.  For example, Peskin and Astington (2004) 
administered a meta-cognitive language reading programme which was shown 
to increase the children’s production of meta-cognitive verbs. There have been 
several other similar studies aimed at improving children’s mentalizing skills 
(e.g. Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). 
In summary, in the context of childhood exposure to mental state talk, 
the primary carer’s ability to engage in appropriate mental state talk and mind-
minded behaviour has significant implications for the development of 
mentalizing capacities.  Although not a direct focus of this study, the corollary of 
this for adults is that mentalizing abilities may continue to be affected and 
enhanced by exposure to appropriate mental state language, with clear 




3.3.8.2. Children’s mental state talk as marker for mentalizing capacity 
It has been established that children’s own mental state language ability 
and use is an important independent correlate with mentalizing abilities 
(Bartsch & Wellman, 1995).  Children begin to use desire terms to talk about 
their own and others’ desires as well as use emotional language by 18 months 
(Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Dunn, Bretherton & Munn, 1987).  Later, by three 
years old, references to believing and knowing appear (Bartsch & Wellman 
1995; Shatz, Wellman & Silber, 1983). 
Mothers’ reports of child emotion vocabulary have been correlated with 
children’s performance on emotion recognition at 28 months (Bretherton & 
Beeghly, 1982) and children’s feeling-state talk has also been found to predict 
mentalizing performance at 40 months (Dunn et al., 1991).  Symons, Peterson, 
Slaughter, Roche and Doyle (2005) studied both parents’ and children’s mental 
state talk during story telling but focussed more on the child’s unprompted 
discourse rather than that led by parents.  They found that children’s mental 
and emotional language (specifically cognitive and desire states) were positively 
related to ToM performance even with age, language and social factors 
accounted for and suggest that it is children’s own mind-mindedness that is 
strongly associated with the development of a mentalizing capability.   
 
3.3.8.3. Mental state talk itself is therefore a measure of mentalizing 
The “production” of mental state talk is therefore arguably an 
alternative measure of conceptual mental state understanding to the 
comprehension which is demonstrated in a false belief task.  However, both can 
be considered as measures of a mentalizing capacity.  Alternatively, it is possible 
that mental state talk “production” might represent a proclivity to use a 
mentalizing capacity which may not be same as comprehension.  It seems hard 
to imagine an individual engaging his or her proclivity to use a mentalizing 
capacity without already possessing an understanding of mental states, but it is 
possible that an individual may well have a developed understanding of mental 
states whilst not employing a proclivity to use this capacity.   
In support of this, Meins et al. (2006) attempted to investigate the 
possible relationship between the possession of a mentalization capacity and 
the use of mental state language in older children aged seven to nine years old.  
They measured and coded for internal-state language in two different non-
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interactional tasks: wordless book narration and describing a friend (tasks were 
non-interactional in the sense that there was no other individual involved in the 
task).  Meins et al. (2006) found stability in the use of mental state language 
across the tasks, but no association between performance in mentalizing tasks 
and use of mental state language.  The results are inconsistent with previous 
results discussed above (e.g. Dunn et al., 1991) which find clear associations 
between children’s mental state talk and mentalizing abilities, albeit in younger 
children.  It is possible that this may be due to the measures used in the other 
studies being interactional, in contrast to the “off-line” descriptions used in the 
Meins et al. (2006) study and in others showing similar results (e.g. Charman & 
Shmueli-Goetz, 1998; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1995).   
These findings may support a theory that focusing on internal states 
taps into different abilities than does mentalizing performance i.e. having a 
mentalizing capacity is different from using it to describe and explain the 
behaviour of others.  One implication of this may be that the use or 
“production” of mental state language reflects a proclivity to use mentalization 
capacity, and this may be a more sensitive measure of mentalizing than 
traditional false belief measures. This is consistent with perspective taking 
research detailed above where evidence suggests that being able to use one’s 
mentalization capacity is as important in reasoning about mental states as 
understanding them (e.g. Keysar et al. 2000; Samson & Apperly, 2010).   
Measuring an individual’s use of mental state language, therefore, can 
be conceptualised either as an alternative measure of mental state 
understanding, or as measure of proclivity to use a mentalizing capacity.  In this 
study, mental state language “production” is measured as a way of tapping into 
alternative aspects of mental state understanding, but also acknowledging a 
possibility that it reflects a proclivity to use understanding in contrast to 
understanding per se. 
 
3.3.8.4. Which mental state talk measures will be used in this study? 
  
3.3.8.4.1. New methods for mentalizing research in adults 
 
Given the emerging importance of mental state talk in 
mentalizing research, alternative innovative methods for researching 
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adult mentalizing have recently been developed using participants’ 
verbal inferences about thoughts and feelings in mental state stories, 
videos and pictures as a measure of understanding (e.g., Happé, Winner 
& Brownwell, 1998; Ruffman et al., 2002; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004).   
Whilst requiring extensive coding and analysis of utterances they are an 
accurate measure of spontaneous expressive linguistic mentalizing skills 
(Sprung, 2010), and have been used extensively also in the study of 
maternal sensitivity in attachment studies (e.g. Meins et al., 2001). 
 
This study takes a novel approach by using a task based on the 
original study by Ruffman et al. (2002) of mother’s mental state 
utterances.  Individuals are asked to comment on and describe various 
pictures in which every day social interactions are taking place.  The 
pictures portray emotionally charged or mentalistic situations, for 
example, a mother carrying her baby across a high bridge, a father 
scolding his son.  They are designed to encourage the participant to 
utilise mental state language (Ruffman et al., 2002) and participants are 
asked to describe the picture to someone who cannot see it.  
Descriptive narratives of the pictures are then analysed and coded for 
the use and range of cognitive states, desires and emotion words.  The 
task assesses abilities to talk about mental states and measures an 
element of an individual’s mentalization “production” or “use”.     
 
The original coding schemes in mental state talk studies (e.g. 
Ruffman et al., 2002; Symons et al., 2005) counted the presence of 
mental state terms, e.g. “believe”, “ashamed”, or modulations of 
assertion (Ruffman et al., 2002), such as “definitely” or “maybe”, which 
were then summed to give a total score.  However, it is recently 
acknowledged that it is not necessarily what is said but how it is said 
that is influential.  For example, Ensor and Hughes (2008) evaluated the 
importance of “connectedness” during family interactions.  They 
defined connectedness as a conversational alignment, measured as the 
frequency with which each speaker’s utterances are semantically 
related to the other speaker’s prior utterance.  Findings showed that 
connectedness was a strong predictor of pre-schoolers’ performance on 
emotion understanding and ToM, the strength of the prediction being 




Others have concentrated especially on parents’ elaborative 
styles, i.e. richly embellished descriptions of events and causal or 
explanatory talk (e.g. Ontai & Thompson, 2002; Ontai & Thompson, 
2008; Ontai & Virmani, 2010).  This suggests that maternal 
conversational elaboration is a significant predictor of children’s 
mentalization performance, rather than simple maternal mental state 
references per se.  Elaboration involves a mother reflecting on her 
child’s perceptions of events, contrasting them with alternative 
perspectives, and enhancing understanding by providing information 
about feelings, desires and other mental states.  Elaborations may be 
explanatory, causal or contrastive in nature.  Examples include, “he is 
happy because his brother returned”, “she is excited to swim in the 
sea”, “they didn’t see so they don’t believe him”.   
 
Slaughter, Peterson and Mackintosh (2007) investigated false 
belief understanding in relation to what they termed mothers’ use of 
clarifying talk in a picture book reading task.  Clarifying talk was defined 
as explanatory, causal, and/or contrastive talk about cognition, 
perception and affect, which they contrasted with simple cognition, 
affect or perception talk.  Coding is very similar to that for elaborative 
talk and results again showed that performance on false belief tasks was 
significantly correlated with clarifying talk, but not with mothers’ simple 
mentions of cognition.  Discourse research has also examined the 
interrelations between discourse and attachment in the development of 
mentalization (e.g. Ontai & Thompson, 2008), secure dyads offering 
optimum conditions for an open and fluid communication style 
(Bretherton, 1990b).   
 
In this study, group differences in mental state talk as a 
measure of mental state understanding and production, and 
relationships with attachment were analysed.  Based on the above 
findings, a choice was made to code for the simple use of mental state 
words and modulations but also for more complex elaborative and 
clarifying language.  Because the mental state language narrative tasks 






This study also utilised the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale 
(LEAS; Lane et al., 1990) to assess group differences in emotional 
awareness, defined as the ability to identify, differentiate and 
communicate one’s own and others’ emotions from emotional cues. 
The LEAS is based on a model developed by Lane and Schwartz (1987) in 
which emotional awareness is a cognitive skill that undergoes a process 
structurally parallel to Piaget’s (1932) stages of cognitive development. 
It is based on the development of cognitive schemata reflecting past 
experience with the language and experience of emotion.   The five 
levels of emotional awareness are hierarchically arranged as follows: 
physical sensations, action tendencies, single emotions, blends of 
emotions, and combinations of blends of emotional experiences (see 
Lane & Schwartz, 1987).  The LEAS is comprised of a set of emotionally 
suggestive vignettes, each involving two people, followed by two 
questions: ‘‘How would you feel?’’ and ‘‘How would the other person 
feel?’’  The degree of differentiation and integration of emotional 
awareness is reflected through the verbal descriptions of the vignettes.  
They are presented in written form and provide an alternative stimulus 
to the everyday picture task detailed above.  Coding is undertaken 
according to the LEAS five level model structured scoring manual (Lane, 
1991).  
Women consistently score more highly on the LEAS than men 
by displaying more complexity and differentiation in their descriptions 
of experiences (Barrett, Lane, Sechrest, Schwartz, 2000).  LEAS scores 
are also positively associated with the ability to recognise emotional 
stimuli (Lane, Sechrest, Reidal, Weldon, Kasniak, & Scwartz, 1996) and 
negatively with alexithymia, a disruption in emotional and cognitive 
processing ability leading to pronounced lack of emotional 
differentiation (Parker, Prkachin & Prkachin, 2005).   
It was decided in this study to utilise the LEAS as a second 
measure of the production of mental state talk in addition to the mental 
state talk task within the mentalizing task battery.  The LEAS is 
specifically designed to code affective terms only but it does so in a way 
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that levels of emotional awareness are measured as well as the ability 
to differentiate complex affective states.  In addition, it allows 
differentiation between emotions ascribed to the self and to the other 
person, adding an additional layer of mentalizing information.  
 
3.3.9. Social orientation as mentalizing 
 
In its broadest sense mentalization has been conceptualised in terms of social 
orientation, i.e. as a subtle social cognition measured by focussing on orientation towards 
social stimuli (Klin, 2000; 1991).   As observed in Section 3.3.6.3, social perception 
impairments, particularly to do with gaze behaviour, are seen in many individuals with 
autism.  The possibility has been raised that the social disabilities seen in autism precede 
even the earliest precursors of mentalizing skills such as joint attention, leading to a 
suggestion that mentalizing deficits may result from even more basic and early emerging 
social disabilities (Klin, Volkmar & Sparrow, 1992).  Klin suggests that these skills may be 
important for social adaptation but are not captured in the current conceptualisation of 
mentalization.  He (Klin, 2000) argues that mastering mentalization in its more traditional 
form and as measured by current standardised experimental tasks is not necessarily 
sufficient to demonstrate social competence.  An ability to be sensitive to social salience 
may be a significant social cognitive skill in its own right, and may be better measured by 
tasks with a greater degree of ecological validity. The development of more naturalistic 
measures that reflect the relatively challenging nature of social scenarios should result in 
improved understanding of several aspects of research in this area: between group 
differences may be enhanced and more accurate and relevant individual measures of 
social competence should be evidenced. 
 
An example of social orientation as a measure of mentalizing may be the reduced 
preferential looking to social stimuli seen in autism.  This area of research has recently 
been greatly enriched using eye-tracking technology, a technique originally designed to 
investigate real-time comprehension processes (Eberhard, Spivey-Knowlton, Sedivey, & 
Tanenhaus, 1995; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995).    Normally 
developed adults show a specific gaze pattern when viewing faces, fixating mainly on eyes, 
but also nose and mouth (Luria & Strauss, 1978; Walker-Smith, Gale & Findlay, 1977). 
Conversely, autistic individuals tend to spend a smaller percentage of time examining 
these core facial areas, noticeably the eyes and the nose (Dalton, Nacewicz, Johnstone, 
Schaefer, Gernsbacher, Goldsmith et al., 2005; Pelphrey, Sasson, Reznick, Paul, Goldman & 
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Piven, 2002).  Researchers have also found the same tendency for autistic individuals 
looking at moving film clips rather than static photographs (Klin et al., 2002).   
 
Klin et al.’s (2002) eye-tracking study was the first to record gaze behaviour of autistic 
individuals while watching short film extracts.   Rather than fixating on socially salient 
social information (e.g. faces and body movements) as would typically developed 
individuals, participants with autism often looked at irrelevant inanimate details and the 
fixation of the mouth region appeared to be a strong predictor of social competence.  
Since Klin et al.’s (2002) original research, a number of further eye-tracking studies have 
been completed, often focussed on eye-region data.  There is a general consensus of 
decreased eye-region fixations (e.g. Pelphrey et al., 2002; Sasson, Tsuchiya, Hurley, 
Couture, Penn, Adolphs, et al., 2007), which may be more predominant when viewing 
moving rather than static images (Speer, Cook, McMahon, & Clark, 2007) and somewhat 
less pronounced with cartoon-like people (van der Geest, Kemner, Camfferman, Verbaten, 
& van Engeland, 2002).  However, in many studies, atypicalities remain with most stimuli 
even if ecological validity is reduced somewhat from moving real life pictures (Riby & 
Hancock, 2008; 2009).   
 
Importantly, Fletcher-Watson, Leekam, Benson, Frank and Findlay (2009) recently 
sought to replicate realistic social situations with an eye-tracking methodology and found 
that typically developed adults show a strong tendency to fixate a person-present scene 
(replicating Fletcher-Watson, Findlay, Leekam, & Benson, 2008).  These individuals identify 
human figures and faces in peripheral vision, move their eyes to that spot with no delay in 
processing times, and follow the gaze of the person in the scene to the area being fixated.   
These abilities appear to represent a foundation skill underpinning the development of 
social cognition from infancy.  However, there was a subtle difference in the ASD group: 
looking at social stimuli was consistently less marked at first fixation (as distinct from total 
dwell time), and further, the ASD group did not follow the gaze of the person on the 
screen.  The authors suggest that, although subtle, the consequences of these differences 
in social information processing could be highly significant. 
 
Eye-tracking technology thus allows the direct, objective and quantitative observation of 
looking behaviour (e.g. first fixation duration, total fixation time) indicating what 
information is available to the brain to process.  It allows the indirect measuring of subtle 
mentalizing behaviours.  As a technology, therefore, it has been successful in contributing 
towards the understanding of the differences between performance on standard 
mentalizing tests and everyday social ability of individuals with autism (Boraston & 
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Blakemore, 2007).  Taking the approach that social orientation represents a measure of 
mentalizing, an application of eye-tracking methodology was used in this study exploring 
eye fixation patterns during the Everyday Pictures task (Ruffman et al., 2002).  All the 
scenes contained both social stimuli and inanimate content and fixation data (both 
duration of first fix and total fixation time) was collected for fixation times on faces, hands, 
and non-socially orientated items.  The data was analysed for differences in social 
orientation between the therapists, and the control group.    
 
3.4. Therapists’ mentalizing abilities 
 
3.4.1. Why is this important? 
 
Research suggests that successful outcome in psychotherapy relies heavily on the 
quality of the relationship between client and counsellor (e.g. Krupnik et al., 1996; 
Orlinsky, Grawe & Parks, 1994) even in modalities less likely to have focussed on the 
therapeutic relationship (Keijsers et al., 2000).  Some have estimated that up to 30% of the 
variance in therapeutic outcome can be accounted for by the quality of the 
client/therapist relationship (Asay & Lambert, 1999).  Similarly, in traditional 
psychoanalytic theory, there is a shift away from a focus on inner processes towards 
greater emphasis on the relational (e.g. Beebe & Lachmann, 2003).  This might include 
moments of ‘genuine dialogue’ in a mutual relationship (Buber, 1947, p37), and 
experiences of real engagement and connection (Stern, 2004), but perhaps one of the 
simpler definitions of this connectedness is provided by Mearns and Cooper (2005, p. xii) 
who describe ‘A state of profound contact and engagement between two people, in which 
each person is fully real with the Other, and able to understand and value the Other’s 
experiences at a higher level.’  
 
It has been recognised for a while that the effectiveness of psychotherapy relies heavily 
on therapist’s relational characteristics.  In a study on the characteristics of “master 
therapists”, Jennings and Skovholt (1999) found that such practitioners appear to “be able 
to relate superbly with others” (p9) and clients’ perceptions of therapists’ characteristics 
are more significant than many other variables such as theoretical model (Beutler et al., 
1986).  The crucial role of empathic understanding of the client (Rogers, 1957) has been 
emphasised and clients often identify counsellors that listen and understand as those that 
best foster a successful relationship (Keijsers et al., 2000).  Clients’ perceptions that 
therapists understand their internal experiences and exhibit empathy relate clearly to 
therapeutic outcome (Burns & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1992; Greenberg et al., 2001; Lafferty, 
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Beutler & Crago, 1989; Luborsky, Crits-Cristoph, Mintz & Auerbach, 1988; Orlinsky & 
Howard, 1986).  Whilst other commentators have pointed out that the relationship 
between therapists’ interpersonal skills and outcome is more ambiguous than once 
thought (e.g. Patterson, 1984), on balance it seems that the ability of the therapist to 
engage and empathise with the client represents a quality that aids the therapeutic 
relationship significantly.  
Hall et al., (2000) subscribe to the motivational theory that individuals choose to pursue 
careers that are consonant with their personality characteristics (Holland, 1996).   Clinical 
work should consequently be more attractive to those high on empathic concern and 
therapists may have gravitated towards a career that provides them an opportunity to 
behave consistently with their empathic traits (Pines, 1982).  They point to a lack of 
correlation between post-training experience and empathic ability as evidence for earlier 
differences in empathic ability than that facilitated by training.  This may accord with 
previous research noting apparent equivocal evidence in terms of the difference in 
outcomes between experienced and inexperienced therapists (e.g. Burlingame, Fuhriman, 
Paul & Ogles, 1989; Stein & Lambert, 1984). 
 
3.4.2. What empirical research is there about therapists and what might be expected? 
 
3.4.2.1. Empathy in therapists 
 
Research has historically focussed on client reported perceptions of 
therapist empathy (e.g. Keijsers et al., 2000; Orlinsky & Howard, 1986; see 
section 3.4.1).  However, more recently, studies have explored therapists’ own 
self-reported levels of empathy.  For example Hall et al. (2000) administered the 
IRI to a group of psychologists and found that clinical psychologists and 
therapists scored lower on the Personal Distress dimension.  Hassenstab et al. 
(2007), also using the IRI, found therapists scored more highly on cognitive 
empathy when making inferences based on language but no differently on 
emotional empathic concern.  In line with Hall et al. (2000), therapists reported 
less personal distress in response to the distress of others.  From this they infer 
that therapists may possess advanced empathic abilities, but are better able to 
control their own emotions in emotional situations, possibly because of 





3.4.2.2. More complex mental state understanding in therapists 
There are fewer research findings applicable to therapists in either the 
assessment of other mentalizing abilities (other than self-reported empathy) or 
the tendency to use such abilities, although there appears to be a move towards 
trying to explore this more, and a realisation that therapist mentalizing abilities 
should be “one step ahead of the patient” (Diamond et al, 2003, p227).  
Machado, Beutler and Greenberg (1999) found therapists were more able to 
detect emotional information across videotaped and transcribed 
psychotherapeutic sessions.  However, the control group of undergraduate 
psychology students were not particularly well-matched in this case.  
Conversely, Hassenstab et al. (2007) found that therapists scored no differently 
to a well-matched control group on the cognitive aspects of empathy when 
observing facial expressions or in the Eyes Task (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001).  
Diamond et al. (2003) considered therapist mentalizing in the context of the 
therapeutic dyad and conceptualised both therapist and client mentalizing in 
therapy as a bidirectional process which was mutually and reciprocally 
influential, but made no conclusion as to therapists’ abilities per se. 
 Other than this, empirical research in therapist mentalizing abilities is 
hard to locate.  Nonetheless, there have been attempts to understand 
mentalizing in other groups that may arguably possess some similarities with 
therapists.  For example, Dziobeck et al., (2005) attempted to explore whether a 
group of psychics had superior abilities in mentalizing using the Eyes Test 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and the IRI (Davis, 1983).  They found superior 
abilities on only one scale (Fantasy) of the IRI, which did not support their 
hypothesis that psychics would show better mentalization abilities overall.  
Interestingly, they highlight that many psychics reported not having face-to-face 
contact with clients, which is clearly different to the experience of therapists.  
The authors suggest that similar research might be undertaken with 
psychologists, therapists or social workers as potential experts in mental state 
understanding.  
In other groups, an interesting study was undertaken that explored the 
tendency to mentalize (i.e. display mind-mindedness in talk) in describing 
children’s behaviour in a group of childcare practitioners (Degotardi & Sweller, 
2011).  Mentalization was found to be significantly related to practitioner 
sensitivity, with implications for the provision of developmentally supportive 
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experiences for children.  Finally, Goldstein and Winner (2012) recently tested a 
hypothesis that experience and training in acting, a perspective taking activity, 
leads to growth in empathy and ToM.  They found significant improvements in 
cognitive empathy measured by a self-report scale (Basic Empathy Scale, Jolliffe 
& Farrington, 2006) and in performance in the Eyes Task (Baron-Cohen et al. 
2001) following acting training and suggest that this demonstrates definite 
plasticity in empathic and mental state abilities in adulthood. 
This study aims to replicate and extend some of the above research by 
exploring specifically not only the empathic abilities but also the broader 
mentalizing capabilities of the therapists utilising the measures already 
explored, i.e. the IRI and the Eyes Test, but also several alterative measures of 
mental state understanding and production, such as mental state talk and social 
orientation.  So far, these aspects remain unexplored in therapists. 
 
4. The relationship between attachment and mentalizing 
 
Research on theoretical and empirical associations between attachment and mentalization has 
been influenced primarily by the work of three individuals: Elizabeth Meins, Arietta Slade and Peter 
Fonagy.  The capacity to take a psychological perspective on another has been variously termed as 
mind-mindedness, insightfulness and reflective function, and these overlapping attributes reframed 
in a psychotherapeutic literature appear fundamentally significant to both secure attachment and 
mentalization (Sharp, Fonagy, & Goodyer, 2006).    
 
4.1. Emotion processing 
 
As has been seen, children with secure attachment relationships appear to do better 
than those with insecure attachment relationships on tests of emotional understanding.  For 
example, Fonagy et al. (1997) showed that security of attachment in preschool children was a 
significant predictor of emotion understanding, even when verbal mental age, social maturity 
and chronological age are controlled for. Further, Fonagy, Steele, Steele and Holder (1997 – 
check ref) found that 82% of secure children passed a belief-desire reasoning task at five and a 







In the typically developed child, the relationship between mentalizing and attachment 
appears to be predictive, but it is unknown if this pertains in adults.  Similar patterns might be 
expected, but as yet, this area of adult mentalizing remains unexplored. 
4.2.1. Attachment and mind-mindedness 
 
As touched on previously, the concept of mind-mindedness has been explored both in 
terms of its potential effect on security (see section 2.1.3.2) and on the ability to mentalize 
(see section 3.3.8.1).  In a series of studies Elizabeth Meins and colleagues examined the 
mechanisms and associations between maternal mind-mindedness, security of infant 
attachment and mentalizing abilities.  Mind-mindedness is defined as a mother’s 
propensity to treat her individual child as a mind rather than as an infant with physical 
needs.  They propose that mothers’ mind-mindedness contributes to affect regulation and 
attachment security since mind related comments by mothers predicted attachment 
security at 12 months (Meins et al., 2001), mentalizing capacity at 45 and 48 months 
(Meins et al., 2003), and stream-of-consciousness performance at 55 months (Meins et al., 
2003).   They also found that the effect of mind-mindedness was independent of the 
contribution of maternal sensitivity to attachment security, although this has been 
challenged by a later study that found maternal sensitivity did mediate the relationship 
between mind-mindedness and infant attachment (Laranjo et al., 2008). 
 
Recently, Meins and colleagues also assessed alexithymia in adults and its association 
with attachment and mind-mindedness (Meins, Harris-Walker & Lloyd, 2008).  Alexithymic 
individuals have difficulty in identifying and describing emotions, although they show 
normal physiological responses to emotion, which suggests that alexithymia is a deficit in 
the cognitive processing of emotions (Luminet, Vermeulen, Demaret, Taylor, & Bagby, 
2006).  Whilst there is a growing body of evidence that secure attachment style is 
associated with lower levels of alexithymia (e.g. Hexel, 2003), the mechanisms remain 
obscure.   Meins et al. (2008) found that lower attachment avoidance was associated with 
greater mind-mindedness, and both high avoidance and higher anxiety with a greater 
degree of alexithymia.  Mind-mindedness mediated the relationship between attachment 







4.2.2. Attachment and reflective functioning from childhood into adulthood 
 
As introduced briefly above on the issue of maternal responsiveness (see section 
2.1.3.3), Fonagy and colleagues have conceptualised ‘reflective functioning’ as being 
intricately linked to attachment security.    Reflective function refers to the capacity to 
envision mental states in oneself and another, and to understand one’s own and another’s 
behaviour in terms of underlying mental states and intentions.  Fonagy et al. (2002) 
describe mentalization as a basic human capacity linked to affect regulation and 
productive social relationships.  The more a person can envision mental states in the self 
and others, the more the person is likely to engage in productive and intimate social 
relationships with others, to feel connected to but autonomous from others, and possess a 
secure attachment.  They see failure to engage with the minds of others or one’s own 
mental experience is a sign of insecure attachment.  Fonagy’s research demonstrates that 
adults who are able to reflect and mentalize about themselves and their parents when 
asked about their childhood relationships are more likely to be secure (Fonagy et al., 
1995).  Conversely, failures of mentalization have been linked with psychological disorders 
such as BPD and others in which patterns of insecure attachment are indicated (Fonagy et 
al., 2002; Fonagy et al., 2008). 
 
Reflective function is clearly related to mind-mindedness inasmuch as they both 
consider the mother’s or carer’s capacity to treat the other as a psychological agent.  They 
differ, however, in operationalization in that the measurement of mind-mindedness by 
Meins and colleagues has been in the evaluation of real-life interactions between parent-
child dyads, whereas the Reflective Function Scale (Fonagy et al., 1998) assesses responses 
to childhood attachment questions on the AAI that require reflection on or observation of 
complex mental states in the self and others.   
 
Fonagy’s related concept of mentalization-based therapy is rooted in the psychoanalytic 
understanding of emotional functioning.  The concept of an enhanced mentalizing capacity 
through mentalization-based therapy is considered by many to capture what actually shifts 
or changes in effective clinical work (Allen, 2006; Slade, 2008).  Mentalization-based 
therapy has become an empirically validated form of treatment for many clinical 
presentations and the Reflective Function Scale has become a successful tool as an 
outcome measure in many presentations (Fonagy et al., 1996; Fonagy et al., 2002).  
Mentalization-based research is designed to develop a capacity for mentalization, and 
reflection on mentalization, provoke thought about the mental states of others, and clarify 
and label emotions (Allen 2006; Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; Fearon, Target, Sargent, 
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Williams, McGregor, Bleiberg et al., 2006; Fonagy, 2006).  In the same way that a secure 
mother-child attachment relationship promotes mentalization, so a secure therapeutic 
dyad is believed to promote mentalizing in psychotherapy (Allen, 2006).  Whilst other 
therapies may well address similar affective issues, it is mentalization therapy that is 
focussed on the dynamics of attachment-related defences (Slade, 2008).  
 
In sum, in children, the relationship between mentalizing and attachment appears to be 
predictive, but it is less well-known how this relationship operates later in life.  Fonagy’s 
work has examined the association between secure attachment behaviours and 
mentalization capacities in adults and suggests that therapy can have a positive influence 
on the mentalizing capabilities of clients which in turn can lead to a more secure 
attachment orientation.  However, there remains a shortage of research concerning 
specifically the attachment/mentalizing relationship in therapists which, given that the 
therapist is crucial to mentalization in therapy and to a secure attachment dynamic in the 
therapeutic dyad, seems to be a particularly important area of psychotherapeutic 
research.   
 
4.2.3. The relationship in therapists 
Empirical quantitative research into associations between attachment and mentalizing 
in therapists does not exist.  Rizq and Target (2010a) have come closest to addressing this 
research vacuum by observing that a group of twelve Counselling Psychologists exhibited a 
broad range of Reflective Function scores, with higher scores tending to be related to 
more secure/earned secure AAI classifications.  However, whilst their study contributes to 
existing knowledge, Rizq and Target (2010a) made no claim as to generalizability, and the 
small sample size, qualitative analysis, and principal emphasis on personal therapy 
experiences means a fuller quantitative focussed analysis is overdue.  
Some studies have considered similar groups.  Padykula and Horwitz (2011) recently 
explored how social work training and attachment may be associated with two aspects of 
mentalization: reading non-verbal communication and reflective thinking.  They found that 
regardless of the amount of training undertaken, students with an insecure attachment 
orientation had significant deficits in non-verbal mentalizing abilities (as measured by the 
Eyes Test; Baron-Cohen et al. 2001).  Social work training also influenced the use of 
reflective thinking as measured by the Levels of Reflective Thinking Questionnaire 
(Kember, Leung, Jones, Loke, McKay, Sinclair at al., 2000).  Reflective thinking in this case 
was greater for insecurely attached students which the authors suggest reflects the need 
of the insecure student to overcome an internal working model associated with their 
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historical attachment style.  They point out the obvious implications of this in terms of the 
influences of previous attachment experiences on the educational practice objective of the 
development of empathic and other mentalization skills. 
 
5. Summary of Questions and Relevance 
 
Despite the fact that therapists are required to act as the “secure base” in the therapeutic 
relationship, previous research suggests that the percentage of securely attached therapists in any 
group resembles a value similar to the general population at 60-70% (Leiper & Casares, 2000; van 
Ijzendoorn & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 1996).  Whilst attachment security in therapists and control 
group members was not the major focus of this study per se, attachment styles of both were 
measured in order to explore the primary focus of this study, i.e. the effect of attachment on 
mentalizing.  It was not expected that the therapists as a whole would be more secure than non-
therapists and comparable profiles were expected in each group. 
It is known that previous research suggests that therapists think they are better at some aspects 
of mentalizing than other people, for example, in the understanding of emotions, and in the 
possession of a greater empathic ability (e.g. Hassenstab, et al., 2007) although this view is often 
arrived at via self-report measures (e.g. Hall, et al., 2000).  The expectation in this study was that the 
therapists would replicate previous studies and exhibit some aspects of mentalizing, such as 
empathic understanding, that were more advanced than the control group.   
The existing literature does not allow a highly informed assessment of what to expect in other 
areas of mentalizing, for example, more complex mental state understanding, perspective taking or 
in the production of mental state talk or the proclivity to use mental state terms.  This represents 
one of the key areas of research in this study.  However, given the enhanced self-reported abilities 
in empathy, and the extent of the training that therapists have undergone in the understanding of 
emotional states as presented by their clients, one might expect a better performance in all or at 
least some of the more complex and subtle aspects of both mental state comprehension and 
particularly in the proclivity to use mentalizing ability.  The battery of tasks aimed at understanding 
these different aspects of mentalizing, including eye-tracking technology to focus on the processing 
of socio-perceptual information should allow a far more considered exploration of these issues than 
has so far been possible.  
Finally, it is known that mentalizing abilities and attachment styles are significantly related in 
children, the more securely attached child being able to mentalize and pass false belief tasks earlier.  
In adulthood, less is known, but there is some evidence that a greater mentalizing capability is 
correlated with more secure attachment-related behaviours and lack of mentalizing ability is 
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correlated significantly with various maladaptive insecure behaviours and psychopathology (e.g. 
Fraley & Shaver, 2000; Fonagy et al., 2002; Fonagy et al., 2008; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). 
Therefore in this study, the control group might be expected to exhibit the types of behaviours 
associated with the general adult population, for  example, avoidantly attached individuals might 
shy away from emotionally charged stimuli, or anxiously attached individuals might ruminate on 
negative emotion.  What is less clear is whether therapists will exhibit the same, given that they 
spend much time habitually inhibiting their own emotional perspective in order to serve their clients 
well.  It is suggested that therapists may display a different profile, with one possibility being that 
the effect of attachment may perhaps not be quite so pronounced as that which would be expected 
in the general population. 
To recap this study’s question, does attachment affect mentalizing in therapists in the same way 
as those without their background and training?  Or are there inconsistencies in how attachment 
styles are managed and allowed to influence human interactions?   The answer to these 
comparatively new questions should hold significant interest for therapists concerned with the 
quality of their relational skills and their ability to connect with their clients.   First, any information 
that sheds light on how a therapist can improve his or her practice through awareness of the 
dynamic between therapist and client must be highly valuable in a professional and ethical context.  
Second, a more thorough understanding of therapist attachment issues and how these may affect 
the mentalizing abilities of therapists should be useful to institutions and organisations charged with 
training effective and conscientious therapists, and indeed professionals within other helping and 
caring spheres.  Third, mentalization research both in general terms, but also in the context of 
psychopathological interventions, can benefit from understanding much more about on-going 
mentalizing in adults, and whether enhancements to mentalizing can be experienced in a situation 





 The study employed an experimental and questionnaire design.  The experimental component 
included computer-based tasks, some of which also involved the use of eye-tracking and visual and 
verbal recording equipment.   Variables were analysed using correlational and between subjects 
analysis.  The key approach to the analysis was to have a range of mentalizing tasks.  Though in total this 
constituted quite a large number of tasks, the aim was to explore each domain of mentalizing separately 
through measures specifically designed for and targeted at each domain i.e. self-reported, behavioural, 
production and eye-tracking measures of mentalizing.  Thus, while this inevitably leads to a fairly large 
number of statistical comparisons, within each mentalizing domain the number of comparisons is more 
limited. 
Participants 
 There were two groups of participants: “Therapists” and “Non-Therapists”.  In the therapist 
group, there were 20 participants ranging in age from 28 to 60 years (mean age = 38.7 years; 13 women 
and 7 men).  One participant’s data was discarded due to his age being in excess of 60 years. 17 
participants were of White ethnic background, the remaining three being Chinese and Asian Indian. 
Participants were all practising and either possessed a counselling, counselling psychology or 
psychotherapeutic qualification at the level of Masters or Doctorate, or they were approaching the end 
of their professional training and had already amassed significantly over 500 hours of client contact.  
Appendix 1A shows the detailed qualifications and experience levels of the Therapist group.  In the non-
therapist group, there were 21 participants ranging in age from 37 to 51 years (mean age = 44.7 years; 
16 women and 5 men).  Ethnic background was again predominantly White or White European (17), 
with four Chinese, Asian or Black participants.  Participants possessed a range of post-
graduate/professional training qualifications as detailed in Appendix 1B.  Groups were therefore well-
matched for age, gender make up, ethnic background and education levels. 
Participants were recruited through a variety of methods.  For therapists, participants received 
either a recruitment mailshot sent out via the British Psychological Society, which approved the 
recruitment through its membership list, or a direct email approach from the researcher introducing the 
study with a request to consider participating. Non-therapists were targeted through recruitment 
posters and direct e-mails.  Participants were offered £20 in vouchers, which was approved as part of 
the study’s ethical approval and follows university guidelines on participant payment. Receipts for the 





The project was approved by Roehampton University’s Ethics Committee (ref no. PT 09/024, see 
Appendix 2) and adhered to the British Psychological Society’s Code of Ethics and Conduct guidelines 
(BPS, 2009).  Ethical considerations included ensuring participants read and signed an informed consent 
(see Appendix 3).  Confidentiality was ensured and maintained with use of participant identification 
numbers.  Raw data is securely stored in a locked cabinet in the Social Developmental Laboratory at 
Roehampton University.  Data will be kept for at least 10 years, according to university guidelines.  No 
identifying information is included in any process data file or the written report.  Participants were 
assured of their right to withdraw from the study at any time and were given an identification number 
to facilitate this if necessary. A written debrief (which differed slightly depending upon which group the 
participant was part of) was given at the end of the study.  These also appear at Appendix 3. 
Materials and procedure.  
Participants undertook the study individually in a suite of rooms in the Social Developmental 
Laboratory at Roehampton University.  After initial invitation, participants were introduced to the study 
using the consent form which was signed by the participants and which included a brief description of 
the research questions, tasks and ethical framework.  They were provided with verbal and written 
instructions by the researcher at the beginning of each task.  Data was collected using a task specific 
procedure and is detailed in each task description below.  Some tasks required written or verbal 
responses, and some were audio and visually recorded.  If the task was computer based, clear 
instructions were provided as to what technology was being used e.g. eye-tracking equipment or visual 
recording of the participant.  Participants were alerted at the point at which either visual or audio 
recordings began.  Participants were also given advice on how to position themselves comfortably at the 
screen during the computing tasks.  Stimuli and response sheets were provided where needed.   
The tasks (detailed further below) were completed in the following order:  
(i) Demographic Questionnaire. 
(ii) Eye-tracking tasks: Everyday Pictures (two different orders of pictures were used, 
counterbalanced), followed by Facial Emotion (two different orders of faces were used, 
counterbalanced also).  Whilst participants’ eye movements were tracked during the Facial 
Emotion task, this particular data was not used in this study due to the scope of the study 
and constraints on volume of data to be analysed, but the task was undertaken as part of 
the eye-tracking battery. 
(iii) Behavioural tasks: Perspective Taking task, followed by the Eyes Test/LEAS counterbalanced. 
(iv) Self-report tasks:  ECR/EQ/AQ/IRI counterbalanced.   
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The tasks and questionnaires took approximately 75 to 90 minutes to complete for each participant.  
The responses were then coded where necessary and scored according to the criteria outlined above.  
Coding for each of the Everyday Pictures and LEAS was checked for accuracy by a colleague. 
1. Demographic Questionnaire.   
A demographic questionnaire collected demographic information including age, gender, 
and family background including siblings’ ages, parents’ education and occupations. Details of 
qualifications were obtained together with preferred therapeutic model and approximate 
number of client hours for therapist participants.  Participants were also asked if English was 
their first language.  Following Ruffman et al. (2002), responses for mothers’ or fathers’ 
education were subsequently graded as follows; 0 = no formal qualifications, 1 = non-GCSE 
qualification, 2 = GCSEs, 3 = A levels, 4 = further qualification, non-degree, 5 = undergraduate 
degree, 6 = postgraduate qualification.  The mean of the educational level when was computed 
for both parents.  Occupation was graded according to the Standard Occupational Classification 
(Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 1991), as follows: 1 = professional, 2 = managerial, 3 
= skilled, manual or non-manual, 4 = semiskilled, 5 = unskilled.  If a parent was not working or at 
home with children or where a parent was retired or deceased, the most recent occupation was 
scored.  When all socio-economic categories had been scored, mothers’ and fathers’ education 
and occupation were then totalled and divided by four to give a mean socio-economic score.  
The full questionnaire is appended in Appendix 4. 
 
 BEHAVIOURAL MEASURES 
2. Everyday Pictures (Ruffman et al., 2002). 
This task was used as a measure of mental state talk.  It employs a number of everyday 
pictures modified from a set first used by Ruffman et al. (2002).  They are used to study the 
range of emotional and other mental state language used by participants.  The pictures consist 
of seven colour photographs showing emotional or mentalistic situations (e.g. a man trying to 
kiss a woman, a woman with a child struggling on a high bridge).    Two sets of the pictures were 
used, each set containing the same pictures but in a different order of presentation, and the 
sets were counterbalanced in the testing.  Examples can be seen in Appendix 5.  The pictures 
were presented sequentially on a computer screen, one on each screen.  Participants were 
instructed to describe verbally the contents of each photograph “as if describing it to someone 
who could not see it”.  Participants’ responses were recorded using an audio recorder and a 
webcam.  Participants’ eye movements when describing the pictures were recorded using the 
eye-tracker (see task description 3 below).  There was no time limit for describing the picture. 
Participants pressed a button on the keyboard to move onto the next picture when they had 
finished.  On average, participant recordings lasted approximately 7½ minutes (about 5 hours of 
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material in total) and ranged from two to 24 minutes long.  These were then transcribed in 
detail by the researcher.   
 
Transcriptions were initially coded for 5 different types of mental state language used: 
Cognitive (e.g., think, believe, curious), Desire (e.g., want, wish for), Emotion (e.g., terrified, 
happy, embarrassed), Physical Cues (e.g., grimacing, smiling) and Care (e.g., concerned for, 
comforting).  For repetition, where the participant repeated a mental state word over again 
pertaining to the same character and context, the word was scored once.  Where it appeared a 
second time either in a different context for the same person, or pertaining to another person in 
the situation, it was scored separately.  See Appendix 6 for a full list of mental state words 
coded in all transcripts.  Transcriptions were also separately coded for the range of mental state  
words used, taking into account repetition (for example, where a participant used “angry” three 
times and “sad” once, a score of only two would be recorded, but where four different mental 
state terms were utilised, the full score of four would be recorded.)  Modulations of assertion 
such as “probably”, “might” and “maybe” were also coded (again, see Appendix 6 for 
modulation words).  Finally, elaborative talk was also coded using a scheme similar to that 
employed by Slaughter et al. (2007) for clarifying talk.  Elaborative talk took several forms (with 
examples from the transcripts):  
(i) causal or explanatory talk explicitly making statements about an attributed 
cognitive, affective or perceptual mental state term e.g. “they are cross 
about the fact that…..”,  “her face is screwed up as if this is pretty grim”, or 
“they are happy that they’ve have got the bread”;  
(ii) explanations for the sources of knowledge, e.g. “it’s not clear whether she 
knows that the other girl is looking” or “they’re trying to work out how, 
what’s going on, why is this baby crying”. 
(iii) talk noting discrepancies between different characters mental states, 
contrastive mental states in one character, or discrepancies between mental 
states, perceptual realities and physical reality, e.g., “ She’s not wanting the 
kiss, but he looks quite happy about it”,  “can’t work out whether she’s 
teasing him or if she’s really actually repulsed”, “ the son is not interested but 
probably he’s listening anyway”, or “ it looks like nothing has happened’’. 
See Appendix 7 for an example of a finally coded and scored transcript including mental state 





3. Eye-tracking measures of social orientation (social stimuli).  
   The Everyday Pictures task was also used as the stimulus to measure differences in 
social orientation.  The eye-tracking data was collected at the same time as participants were 
undertaking the verbal description of the photographs in the above mental state language 
exercise, using a 120 Hz video-based infrared eye-tracking camera (Tobii T120, Tobii Systems).  
The eye-tracking camera is non-invasive, safe and unobtrusive, and allows the participant to 
move freely as there is no constraint to the head.  Participants are able to wear spectacles if 
they need to without compromising the effectiveness of the eye-tracker.  Stimulus material was 
presented on a 20" monitor, using Tobii Studio software, and the eye-tracking camera was 
placed underneath the monitor of the stimulus PC, and angled up at the participant at the 
correct angle to ensure maximum recording.  The seating arrangement and the angle of the eye-
tracker were moved if necessary to ensure the maximum efficiency in picking up the signal.   A 
calibration exercise was run for each participant and for each task to ensure sufficient and 
continued accuracy. The camera captured participants' eye movements through tracking the 
centre of the pupil and the corneal reflection, and the connected PC running Studio software 
digitally stored participants' gaze for further analysis.  On screen area was divided into face, 
hands and non-social stimuli and digital video tapes of the eye movements were coded for each 
area of these areas of interest for each participant.  Figure 1 below shows a picture with areas of 
interest for coding.  The total amount of recording time was approximately 5 hours.  Two main 
measures of looking time were recorded: total duration of looking time, and duration of first 
look, both in milliseconds. 


















4. Recognition of Facial Emotion Task (Emotion Understanding), (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; 1975). 
In this measure of emotion understanding, participants were presented with twenty 
four PowerPoint slides on a computer screen, each depicting a photograph of a male or female 
face, showing a version of one of six basic facial emotions each with a blank slide interspersed.  
The emotions were sadness, disgust, fear, anger, happiness and surprise. The photographs were 
presented in the middle of a computer screen with the six emotion words printed below it.  
Participants were required to choose the emotion word which best matched the emotion being 
shown on the face, and to say the word out loud at the same time as pressing a keyboard button 
to move onto the next screen.  There then followed a blank slide.  Participants were free to 
answer in their own time but were encouraged to be as fast and accurate as possible.  A further 
press of the key moved the screen onto the next photograph.  Two practice screens were 
presented before the main task started.  Participants’ responses were recorded manually by the 
researcher and also by the using the voice recorder and webcam.  Participants received one 
mark for each correct emotion identified, resulting in a maximum score of 24.  See Appendix 8 
for an example of the facial emotion stimuli. 
 
5. Perspective Taking Task (Keysar et al., 2000; Wu & Keysar, 2007).  
A computer based perspective taking task, modified from Keysar et al. (2000) by 
Apperley, Carroll, Samson, Qureshi, Humphreys, & Moffatt (2009) was used to measure both 
accuracy and speed of responding when taking another’s perspective.  The instructions to the 
participants explained that they would see a grid on the computer screen comprised of various 
slots in which there were objects.  They were told that a director was behind the grid, and a 
number of the slots are covered from his point of view such that he cannot see the objects in 
those slots.  Participants were shown a picture of the grid from their own perspective and also 
one of the same grid from the perspective of the director.  They were informed that the director 
would ask them to move objects around the grid by clicking on them with a mouse and dragging 
them to the appropriate slot.  They were asked to do this as quickly and as accurately as they 
could.  The participants are openly informed that the director cannot see some objects and that 
they should try to take his perspective into account. After listening to the experiment 
instructions, they are given four practice grids before the main task.  The main task comprises of 
128 trials (instructions) to move objects.  In 16 cases the director asks them to move one of a 
number of similar objects (e.g. football, tennis ball, golf ball), one of which is occluded from his 
perspective.  In this particular example, the director asks the participant to move the smallest 
ball down one slot.  To take the director’s perspective correctly the participant must choose to 
move the tennis ball, which is the smallest ball for the director, rather than the occluded golf 
ball, which is the smallest ball for the participant (see Figure 2 below).  The data records, 
through the mouse movements, whether the participant has attempted to move the object that 
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the director cannot see, or the one that they can both see and the time taken to make the 
decision.  The data recorded by the computer provided an accuracy score out of 16 and also a 
reaction time measure of the correct responses.   












6. The Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS, Lane et al. 1990) 
The LEAS is an open response measure that asks the participant to describe how they 
and another person would feel in each of 20 described interpersonal scenarios.  It has a 
structured scoring manual (Lane, 1991) which evaluates emotion differentiation and awareness 
of emotional complexity in the self and other through the number of emotional words used in 
the response.  Due to study time constraints, the LEAS-A scale was used, which reduces the 
number of scenarios to 10.  The 10 scenarios appear in Appendix 9.  The LEAS scenarios were 
presented in hard copy at the top of a page of A4, and participants were asked to give answers 
verbally which were recorded using an audio recorder.  The length of participant recordings 
ranged from 4 to 24 minutes each and on average lasted approximately 13 minutes (about 8½ 
hours of material in total).  These were then transcribed by the researcher and scored for 
language use.  
  
The written narratives to each scenario are scored between 0 and 5 corresponding to 
levels of emotional awareness separately for the self and other as follows: level 0 – only 
thoughts/actions described; level 1 – physiological cues are described e.g. tired; level 2 – 
undifferentiated emotion is described e.g. bad, good; level 3 – the recording of a differentiated 
emotion e.g. angry, elated; level 4 – two or more level 3 words are used that can be 
differentiated from each other; level 5 – where both self and other are rated as level 4.  The 
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higher of the two levels for self and other is scored as the total for the scenario, the scenario 
scores being summed for the total.  A maximum score of 50 is possible. 
 
7. The Revised “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).   
This test (“the Eyes Test”) assesses the ability to infer the mental state of a person solely 
from the information provided in a picture of the person’s eyes (i.e. it measures the social-
perceptual aspects mental state understanding).  It consists of 36 grey scale photographs of the 
eye region of male and female faces (in equal number) presented one at a time.  The eyes depict 
complex mental states such as “despondent”, “preoccupied”, “cautious”, or “regretful”. Each 
eyes picture is presented with four words (one target adjective and three foil adjectives) from 
which the participant is asked to pick the target word to match the expression portrayed in the 
eyes i.e. that best describes what the person is thinking or feeling.  A glossary of all the mental 
state terms used may be referred to by participants.  The subtlety in the test is provided by the 
similarity of the foil words to the target word, and there are no reported ceiling effects (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  The participants were given a ring binder with the 
36 Eyes Test photographs which they viewed one by one, noting their answers on a score sheet.  
Participants can receive one point for each correct answer with a maximum of 36.  Participants’ 
responses are classified as correct or incorrect according to an ideal response set established on 
the basis of judgement consensus in a pilot study conducted by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001).  
Examples may be seen in Appendix 10. 
  
 SELF REPORT MEASURES 
8. The Experiences in Close Relationships Scale (ECR; Brennan et al, 1998).  
   The ECR is a self-report measure which gives a score for two orthogonal dimensions of 
attachment: avoidance and anxiety.  The 36 item ECR was developed from the responses of 
undergraduate students to 300 items taken from frequently used attachment measures, for 
example, “I worry about being abandoned” or “I get frustrated if romantic partners are not 
available when I need them”.  Brennan et al. (1998) reported internal consistency reliabilities 
(Cronbach’s alpha) of 0.91 and 0.94 respectively for the two subscales.  Each subscale contains 
18 items which are rated using a seven point Likert scale ranging from disagree strongly to agree 
strongly and some items in both subscales are reversed. See Appendix 11 for the full measure.  
Responses are computed to give coefficients for each of the subscales which also allow 
assignment of each participant into one of four attachment groups: secure, fearful, preoccupied 
and dismissive (which were not used as the two dimensions of anxiety and avoidance were 
considered to be more appropriate for the measurement of group differences and interactions 
at group levels).  Two studies have reported significant retest reliability, first over three weeks 
(.70 for both scales reported by Brennan, Shaver & Clark, 2000) and subsequently over six 
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months (.68 for Anxiety and .71 for Avoidance reported by Lopez & Gormley, 2002).  In addition, 
results of Item Response Theory analysis have shown that a relatively good degree of 
measurement precision is afforded by the ECR in comparison with some other self-report 
inventories (Fraley et al., 2000).   
 
9. Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980).   
The IRI is a self-report questionnaire that measures individual differences in cognitive 
and affective components of empathy.  The 28 item measure includes four seven item 
subscales: Perspective Taking, PT, (cognitive), assessing the tendency to spontaneously shift 
perspective and adopt the viewpoint of another e.g. “I believe that there are two sides to every 
question and try to look at them both”, Empathic Concern, EC, (affective), assessing the 
respondents’ feelings of warmth and concern for others, e.g. “I often have tender, concerned 
feelings for people less fortunate then me”, Fantasy, FS, measuring the individual’s tendency to 
imaginatively transpose oneself into fictional situations, e.g. “I really get involved with the 
characters in a novel”, and Personal Distress, PD, assessing the respondent’s own feelings of 
fear and discomfort on witnessing negative experiences of others, e.g. “I sometimes feel 
helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation.”  The first two subscales were 
considered by Davis (1980) to represent the most advanced levels of empathy. The statements 
are rated on a five point Likert scale ranging from (0) does not describe me well to (4) does 
describe me well.  The original validation study for the IRI found internal consistency estimates 
ranging from 0.68 to 0.79 (Davis, 1980).  More recently, Christopher, Owens and Stecker (1993) 
found reliability estimates ranging from 0.73 to 0.76 for 3 of the 4 subscales (EC = 0.73, PD = 
0.73, PT = 0.76).  The full list of IRI items can be found at Appendix 12. 
 
10. Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004).  
The EQ, a self-report empathy measure, was designed to have a clinical application and 
to be sensitive to a lack of empathy as a feature of psychopathology.  It was validated on 197 
healthy controls and 90 people with either Asperger’s Syndrome or high-functioning autism, and 
was shown to distinguish well between the two.  It consists of 40 statements to which 
participants have to indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree.  There are four 
response options: “strongly agree”, “slightly agree”, “slightly disagree”, and “strongly disagree”.  
Answers are scored 1 or 2 for the extent of agreement with an empathic response.  Non-
empathic responses are scored at zero.  The maximum score is therefore 80.  The authors 
suggest that scores within the range 33-52 indicate “average” levels of empathy, scores lower 
than 33 represent low empaths, and scores above 52 represent high empaths.  Several studies 
have investigated the EQ’s validity and have reported high re-test reliability and moderate to 
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high correlations with other self-report and observable indicators of empathy (e.g. Lawrence et 
al., 2004). The full EQ appears at Appendix 13. 
 
11. A self-report measure of general social and cognitive ability (The Autism Quotient, AQ; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001).   
   The AQ is a self-report 50-item questionnaire designed to assess the degree to which 
adults of normal intelligence show five different traits associated with the autistic spectrum: 
social skill, attention shifting, attention to detail, communication, and imagination.  Higher 
scores on the subscales indicate more pronounced autistic traits in these areas.  It was 
administered in this study in order to identify any general social and cognitive differences 
between the groups and to ensure the groups were well matched.  Responses are made on a 
four point scale: definitely disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, and definitely agree.  
Scoring was undertaken according to two different protocols.  In the original scoring system 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) items are scored as 1 for a response in the “autistic” direction and 0 
for a “non-autistic” response with a maximum score of 50.  In the scoring system favoured by 
Austin (2005), scoring is undertaken treating the responses as a four-point Likert scale reverse 
keying where necessary so that each item is scored 1,2,3 or 4, with a maximum score of 200.  
This method allows the degree of endorsement of each item to yield discriminating information 
and is the system used in this study.  Internal consistencies at the time of development were 
reported as follows:  social skill, .77; attention shifting, .67; attention to detail, .63, 
communication, .65; imagination, .65.  Various evaluations of the factor structure of the AQ 
have been undertaken (e.g. Kloosterman, Keefer, Kelley, Summerfeldt & Parker, 2011; Stewart 
& Austin, 2009).  
 
As part of the completion of the above tasks, certain data was collected that is not analysed or referred 
to in this study.  Primarily this is because the scope of the study and the timing and word length 
constraints of a PsychD did not allow analysis of the additional data.  However, future studies may wish 
to consider this.  Examples of unused data available include eye-tracking data of participants’ eye 
movements and latency times during the Emotion Faces task, time to first emotion words used in 
Everyday Picture tasks and full transcripts which would allow coding for appropriate and inappropriate 






1. Preliminary Analysis and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics appear in Tables 1 to 7 below. 
Z-scores for each measure were analysed for outliers by highlighting standardised scores of ± 3.  
Total sample z scores showed that Participant 1 had scored very highly on Elaborative mental 
state talk, and Participant 31 had recorded a particularly low score on the facial emotion task.  
In addition, participants 14, 31 and 52 were outliers for cognitive and emotion mental state 
words respectively within the total mental state word score.  In each of these cases, scores were 
trimmed to one above or below the next highest or lowest score, following Wilcox’s (1992) 
recommendation to trim outlying data and distributions with heavy tails in order to safeguard 
power. 
Following this, the two groups were further checked for outliers within the groups.  Data for the 
therapist group showed no further outliers.  Data for the non-therapist group showed that the 
facial emotion score for Participant 31 was a marginal outlier (score of 14, z score of -3.1).  
However, because this score had already been subject to the trimming exercise for the whole 
data set, and represented only 1 correct answer less than the next highest score of 15, the 
decision was taken to keep this score at its original trimmed value. 
Distributions for the main variables of analysis following the trimming exercise were analysed by 
observing values for skewness and kurtosis.  Tests of skewness and kurtosis are often overly 
sensitive (Pallant, 2007) and skewness should not make a substantive difference in the statistical 
analysis providing sample size is adequate (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2007) therefore recommend inspecting the shape of the distributions using histograms so give 
a feel for whether undue levels of skewness or kurtosis exist.  Histograms for the main variables 
appear at Appendix 15.  An observation of the histograms suggests Avoidant Attachment and 
Perspective Taking Task accuracy scores required further normality analysis.   
Normality analysis was undertaken for the main variables using the Shapiro-Wilk Test of 
normality which is sensitive for a range of sample sizes, in particular for smaller sample sizes of 
around 20 participants (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965).  The normality test output appears at Appendix 
16.  Avoidant attachment did not produce a significant result so was accepted as a normal 
distribution.  All other main measures did not significantly differ from normality with the 
exception of the following.  The accuracy scores in the Perspective Taking task, Emotion Faces 
score, Total Eye Fix time on Social Information, and Elaborative Talk showed a potential violation 
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of normality (the latter very marginal).  Therefore, a correlation analysis was run using 
Spearman’s rho instead of Pearson’s r to explore the potential difference in results for the main 
variables.  No major difference in strength of correlation values or significance was seen.   
Skewness and kurtosis for Emotion Faces, Eye Fix time and Elaborative talk were satisfactory.  
Given all the above and the accepted normality of most variables, parametric tests were used 
on the data throughout the analysis.  For completeness, however, the Spearman’s analysis on 
the main variables can be seen at Appendix 17. 
1.1 Gender, English as a first language or age effects 
Chi square tests were undertaken to assess whether the proportion of male and female 
participants, or English as a first language differed between participant groups.  Table 1 shows 
the raw data. 
Table 1.  Gender and English as a First Language data. 
 Therapists Non-therapists Total 
Gender    
Male 7 5 12 
Female 13 16 29 
English first language    
Yes 17 21 38 
No 3 0 3 
 
The Pearson Chi-Square test for independence for gender (with Yates continuity correction for a 
2x2 table; Pallant, 2007) was not significant, χ² (1, n=41) = 0.20, p=0.66, phi=0.12., and therefore 
distribution of males and female was comparable.  Gender was therefore not considered further 
in the analysis.  A Pearson Chi-Square test for English as a first language also showed non-
significance, χ² (1, n=41) = 1.55, p=0.21, phi=-0.29.  However, for two cells the frequency was 
less than five.  Therefore to further check for potential effects, independent sample t-tests were 
carried out on the main variables for the two language groups. This appears at Appendix 18 but 
in summary no significant differences were seen with the exception of the first eye fix duration 
being significantly greater for participants for whom English was not their first language.  To test 
for the relevance of this, partial correlations were undertaken to control for English as a First 
language in correlations between first eye fix durations and other variables.  No material 
differences in the correlation coefficient profile were seen (see Appendix 19).  Given this, and 
the fact that all other main variables evidenced no significance for language difference, language 




2. Group Differences 
The descriptive statistics for each variable measured as part of this study appear in Tables 1 to 6 
on the following pages.  Tables also include independent sample t-test results to analyse for 
group differences between the therapists and the non-therapists. 
2.1 Demographic profiles 
Three group differences were seen in the demographic characteristics of the two groups (see 
Table 2).  First, there was a statistically significant difference between the ages of the two 
groups.  Therapists had a mean of 38.7 years, and non-therapists 44.8 years, t(24.24) = -2.55, 
p=0.018.  In the context of this particular study, it was felt that both means fell comfortably 
within the boundaries of an age group that could be described as cognitively mature adults, and 
that given the absolute ages concerned, a difference of 6 years in means should not have an 
undue effect.  Further, correlations of age with scores on the main variables did not yield any 
significant correlations (see Appendix 20), nor did partial correlations differ materially from 
bivariate after taking account of age (see Appendix 21 for partial correlations). Therefore age 
was not considered further in the study.  
The total number of siblings yielded significant group differences; t(31.18) = -2.53, p=0.017.  
Previous research (Ruffman et al., 1998) has suggested that the number of older siblings may 
have an impact on mentalizing ability, but in this case there was no difference between the 
groups in terms of number of older siblings, nor did number of older siblings correlate 
significantly with any of the measures, therefore it was decided that the difference between 
total number of siblings would not be considered material.   
The combined variable of socio-economic background showed no significant differences 
between groups; t(39)  = -0.47, p=0.64. 
Differences in self-reported general social and cognitive ability were then explored.  For this the 
five subscales of the AQ were examined, which gives measures of both general social abilities 
(social skill, communication and imagination) and cognitive ability (attention switching, 
attention to detail).  There was no overall difference (t(39) = -1.33, p=0.19), nor was there any 




Table 2.  Demographic characteristics of participants 
Measure 











Age (years) 38.70 9.97 28 – 60 44.76 3.82 37 – 51 41.80 7.99 28 – 60 t(24.24) = -2.55, p=0.02* 
No. siblings 1.50 0.51 1 – 2 2.10 0.94 0 – 3 1.80 0.81 0 – 3 t(31.18) = -2.53, p=0.02* 
No. older siblings 0.75 0.79 0 – 2 1.24 1.04 0 – 3 1.00 0.95 0 – 3 t(39) = -1.68, p=0.10 
No. younger siblings 0.55 0.67 0 – 2 0.76 0.83 0 – 3 0.66 0.76 0 – 3 t(39) = -0.89, p=0.38 
Socio-economic   
     background 
 
4.16 0.90 2.25-5.33 4.29 0.90 3.00-6.00 4.23 0.89 2.25-6.00 t(39) = -0.47, p=0.64 
General social and 
cognitive abilities (AQ, 
Austin scoring) 
Total score 
   Social skill 
   Attention switching 
   Attention to detail 
   Communication 





















































































t(39) = -1.33, p=0.19 
t(39) = -1.69, p=0.10 
t(33.4) = 0.54, p=0.59 
t(39) = -1.12, p=0.24 
t(39) = -1.56, p=0.13 
t(39) = -0.36, p=0.72 




In general terms, therefore, it was felt that the group of non-therapists represented a highly 
rigorous control group.  The two groups appeared to possess extremely similar demographic 
and background characteristics and the level of the postgraduate qualifications taken as the 
criterion for inclusion in the control group is relatively high, summarised as follows: 3 doctoral 
level, 10 masters level, 6 postgraduate diploma. Further, the content of the qualifications are 
broad and reflect occupations in many fields including a significant representation in social or 
helping-orientated arenas, for example education and medicine.  Indeed, due to the nature of 
the teaching profession, the group differences analysis was also run excluding the data from two 
control group members who are currently working as teachers in order to explore the effect this 
may have, but results were not significantly different from those reported below so these data 
were included.  Given this, and the similarities between groups in terms of both socio-economic 
background and general social and cognitive abilities, it was felt that the two groups were highly 
comparable. 
2.2 Attachment and other self-report measures 
No significant group differences were seen in ECR avoidant or anxious attachment coefficients 
suggesting the attachment orientations of the individuals within the two groups was similar 
(t(39) = -0.623, p=0.54, t(39) = 0.70, p=0.49 respectively, see table 4).  A Pearson Chi square test 
was also run to explore attachment difference by analysing the proportion of ECR attachment 
categories (secure, fearful, preoccupied, dismissive) within each of the therapist and non-
therapist groups.  This was not significant (χ² (3, n=41) = 3.27, p=0.35, phi=0.28), thus 
attachment profiles of each group were similar.  Results for the attachment categories of each 
group appear below at table 3. 
Table 3.  Attachment categories for each participant group. 
 Therapists Non-therapists 
 No. % No. % 
Secure 10 50 7 33 
Fearful 5 25 3 14 
Preoccupied 2 10 4 19 
Dismissing 3 15 7 33 
 
Significant differences in the expected direction were seen in both the measures used to assess 
empathy (see Table 4).  First, therapists scored significantly more highly on the Perspective 
Taking (PT, t(39) = 2.43, p=0.01), Empathic Concern (EC, t(39) = 2.09, p=0.02) and Fantasy 
subscales (FS, t(39) = 1.74, p=0.04) of the IRI using one-tailed tests.  Similarly, therapists scored 
more highly on both the Cognitive Empathy (t(39) = 2.42, p=0.01) and the Emotional Reactivity 
(t(35.75) = 2.71, p<0.01) subscales of the EQ, as well as total EQ total scores (t(39) = 2.67, 




Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics and Independent Sample t-tests for Self-report measures  
Measure 
Therapists Non-therapists All Participants  
Mean Standard  
deviation 
Range Mean Standard  
deviation 




































t(39) = -0.623, p=0.54 




















































t(39) = 2.43, p=0.01* 
t(39) = 1.74, p=0.04* 
t(39) = 2.09, p=0.02* 
t(39) = 1.11, p=0.14 
           
EQ 
Total score 
    Cognitive empathy 
    Emotional reactivity 















































t(39) = 2.67, p=0.01** 
t(39) = 2.42, p=0.01* 
t(35.75) = 2.71, p=0.01** 
t(33.98) = 1.23, p=0.11 







2.3 Mentalizing comprehension and behavioural measures 
No significant differences exist between the groups in terms of socio-perceptual mentalizing 
(the Eyes Test), the Facial Emotion test overall, or the Perspective Taking task (see Table 5).  
However, there were trends in the expected direction of therapists scoring more highly in these 
measures; one tailed independent sample t-tests trended towards significance for total score on 
the Facial Emotion task (t(39) = 1.52, p=0.07) and accuracy on the experimental correct answers 
in the Perspective Taking task (t(33.53) = 1.41, p=0.08), but overall, no significant relationships 
were found.  A 2x6 between-within subjects ANOVA for the types of emotion in the facial 
emotion task showed that there was no significant interaction between the groups and emotion 
understanding (F (2,38)  = 0.25, p=.94).   There was a significant main effect of emotion (F (2,38) 
= 9.53, p=.000), with angry faces being seen significantly less frequently by both groups.  The 
between groups effect showed a marginal effect one tailed, (F(1,39) = 2.30, p=.07) 
corresponding with the total facial emotion score t-test. 
2.4 Mentalizing production measures 
Significant group differences were seen in some aspects of the ability to produce mental state 
language (see Table 6).  Therapists talked for longer, t(39) = 1.80, p=0.04.  In the number of 
mental state words and the range of mental state words, no group differences existed although 
total scores were in the expected direction.  A 2x6 between-within subjects ANOVA was run to 
analyse types of emotion word and modulation.  There was no interaction between group and 
mental state word use (F (2,38) = .930, p=.47).  There was a large main effect for types of words 
used (F(2,38) = 55.4, p=.000) with desire and care words being used less than others by both 
groups.  There was also no main effect for type of participant (F (1,39) = .31, p=.58) 
However, in mental state elaboration, i.e. the ability to reflect on cause of mental states in 
others using causal or descriptive language, a significant group difference was seen with 
therapists scoring much more highly, t(39) = 2.07, p=0.02, one-tailed.  In addition the LEAS 
scores which test levels of emotional awareness, higher scores also being reflective of greater 
emotional elaboration on each of the scenarios, showed a significant difference between groups 
in the expected direction, with therapists scoring more highly, t(39) = 1.73, p=0.046, one-tailed.  
A marginal, although non-significant trend was also seen in the LEAS score for other, in which 




Table 5. Descriptive Statistics, Independent Sample t-tests for Mentalization comprehension/behavioural measures 
Measure 
Therapists Non-therapists All Participants 
t-test Mean Standard  
deviation 
Range Mean Standard  
deviation 
























t(39) = 0.65, p=0.26 
 
Facial Emotion Understanding 
Total score 
    Happy 
    Sad 
    Surprised 
    Angry 
    Fearful 





















































































t(39) = 1.52, p=0.07 
 
see text for ANOVA F 
values 
Perspective Taking task           
Controls and fillers 
     Control reaction times  
     Filler reaction times 
     Control accuracy 
     Filler accuracy 
Experimental trials 
     Correct reaction times 










































































t(39) = -0.28, p=0.39 
t(39) = -0.09, p=046 
t(39) = -0.30, p=0.38 
t(39) = -1.28, p=0.11 
 
t(39) = -0.14, p=0.45 
t(33.53) = 1.41, p=0.08  
 
Times in ms 
          
           






Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics and independent sample t-tests for mentalization production measures 
Measure 
Therapists Non-therapists All Participants 
t-test Mean Standard  
deviation 
Range Mean Standard  
deviation 




Mental State language length 





















t(39) = 1.80, p=0.04* 
Mental State Language 
Total mental state words 
   Cognitive words 
   Desire words 
   Emotion words 
   Physical emotion words 
   Care words 



















































































t(39) = 0.55, p=0.29 
 
see text for ANOVA F 
values 






10-45 t(39) = 0.42, p=0.34 
Mental State elaboration 
 
6.90 3.14 2-14 4.90 3.02 1-11 5.88 3.20 1-14 t(39) = 2.07, p=0.02* 
LEAS 
Total 
Score for self 







































t(39) = 1.73, p=0.05* 
t(39) = 0.92, p=0.18 
t(39) = 1.39, p=0.09 
 





In summary, whilst there was no clear significant difference between therapists and non-
therapists in mental state understanding per se, there were significant differences both in the 
way therapists self-reported enhanced abilities in perspective taking and empathy, and in the 
production of enhanced mental state language and talk.  These differences existed despite no 
difference in the attachment profiles of both groups. 
2.5 Eye-tracking data 
The results for the eye-tracking task have been collated in two ways: (i) including taking into 
account “zero fixes” (“zeros”) within the timings, that is times during the experiment when the 
participant was momentarily not looking at the screen, and (ii) not taking into account zeros 
within the fix times.  For the purposes of the results section here, results include zero fixes (see 
Table 7), which might be considered to have marginally more ecological validity and takes a 
potentially more conservative position.  In practice, however, there are no material differences 
between the two sets of results in terms of significance of group differences or significance of 
correlations with other variables. The full results without taking into account zeros are included 
at Appendix 22. 
In addition, data was collected for the average time to the first fix.  However, there were few 
significant relationships within this data, and in many respects the range and standard 
deviations seen, particularly in, for example, time to first hand fix, suggested that analysing this 
aspect of the eye-tracking data may produce spurious conclusions.  One of the reasons this data 
may have been spurious was because it was arbitrary whether the participant would have been 
looking at the areas of interest by chance during the preceding slide blank and continued this as 
the slide flipped onto the picture.  Thus, time to first fix is not analysed here.  A fixation point on 
the blank slide in future studies may help address this point. 










Table 7.  Descriptive Statistics for Eye-tracking data (all data in seconds, all including zero values) 
Eye-tracking Measure 
Therapists Non-therapists 
Mean Standard  
deviation 
Range Mean Standard  
deviation 
Range 
       
Sum of average fix for faces 
and hands  
9.39 5.34 2.40-23.33 7.71 5.53 1.30-21.76 
     Average fixation faces  8.13 4.76 1.83-21.14 6.90 5.08 1.18-20.65 
     Average fixation hands  1.26 0.71 0.12-2.62 0.82 0.71 0.05-3.09 
       
Sum of faces and hands 
duration of first fix  
0.58 0.15 0.30-0.83 0.49 0.17 0.21-0.82 
     Av. duration first face fix  0.35 0.09 0.21-0.49 0.32 0.10 0.17-0.52 
     Av. duration first hand fix  0.23 0.10 0.04-0.43 0.16 0.09 0.04-0.32 
 
Data was also collected for the sum of the total amount of time spent looking at faces and 
hands together (mean over 7 pictures) as a measure of social orientation.  Whilst therapists 
clearly looked longer than non-therapists, the difference was not significant, t(39) = 0.98, 
p=0.17, one-tailed. 
Data was also collected for average time spent looking at faces and hands separately.  For faces, 
although therapists did spend longer on average looking at faces, the difference was not found 
to be significant in an Independent Samples t-test.  However, significant difference did exist in 
the length of time spent looking at hands, with therapists looking longer, (t(39)=1.96, p=0.03, 
one-tailed).  There was no significance in the difference between the groups in the differences in 
the length of time looking at faces or hands (i.e. length of time looking at faces less the length of 
time looking at hands). 
Data was analysed for the average duration of the first fix of faces and hands together, the 
average duration of first fix for faces, and the average duration of first fix for hands.  Again, 
therapists’ first face fixes were longer, but not significantly so.  However, for the first hand 
fixation, therapists looked significantly longer (t(39) = 2.23, p=0.016, one-tailed).  The sum of 
first fix on faces and hands did show a significant difference between therapists and non-
therapists: t(39) = 1.86, p=0.035, one-tailed. 
Thus, therapists appear to be orientating towards the pictures for longer in terms of first 
fixations on aspects of the images that may be used in social cognition or could be considered 
targets for the gathering of social information.  This trend is also seen in total look time, 




3 The relationships between attachment and mental state understanding in each group 
Given research that suggests mental state decoding can be affected by states of mind including 
depression and anxiety (Lee, Harkness, Sabbagh & Jacobson, 2005), before the correlations for 
each group were analysed, a partial correlation was undertaken for the full data set to partial 
out both anxiety coefficients and general social and cognitive ability results in order to show 
there was no effect of either variable on correlations.  The analysis appears at Appendix 23.  The 
large majority of correlational relationships stay the same for these two partial correlations, 
with one exception, that of Avoidant Attachment and EQ controlling for general social and 
cognitive ability, which moves from highly significant to marginally significant.  Given the general 
pattern, no further analysis was done on the effect of anxiety or general social and cognitive 
ability. 
 Correlation tables for each group appear below at Tables 8 and 9.  
3.1 Correlation relationships for therapists and differences with non-therapists 
3.1.1 Attachment 
Pearson correlational relationships were seen between certain of the main measures and both 
avoidant and anxious attachment.  As expected, a number of these were represented by 
correlations between the two coefficients and empathy measures.  For therapists, strong 
negative correlations were seen between EQ and Avoidance (r=-.58, p=.004).  This relationship 
also pertained in the Cognitive Empathy and Emotional Reactivity subscales of the EQ.  The EQ 
and Avoidance correlations were replicated in the non-therapist group although interestingly 
the coefficients were slightly larger for non-therapists (r=-.61, p<.001). 
There were two main significant correlations seen for therapist attachment.  First, Avoidance 
was significantly negatively correlated with scores in the IRI Perspective Taking (PT) subscale (r=-
.45, p=.023).  A marginally significant negative correlation was also seen between Avoidance and 
the IRI Empathic Concern (EC) subscale (r=.38, p=.051). Second, Avoidance levels showed a 
significant negative correlation with Mental State Elaboration scores (r=-.48, p=.016).  Neither of 
these significant relationships was seen in the control group, which evidence coefficients close 
to zero for both.  In addition, no other significant relationships with Avoidant attachment were 
seen in the control group. 
For therapist anxious attachment, significant correlations were again seen in EQ scores (in the 
reverse direction, r=-.52, p=.01) which was not replicated in the control group with correlations 
between anxious attachment and EQ at or near zero.   
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There were no other significant correlations for therapists’ anxious attachment although the 
relationship with the number of correct perspective taking answers approached significance 
(r=.38, p=0.06). This relationship was not replicated for non-therapists who evidenced a 
significantly negatively correlated relationship between the number of correct perspective 
taking answers and attachment anxiety.  This therefore represents a difference between the 
groups.  One more notable area of difference was evidenced between the groups in that non-
therapists exhibited a significant positive relationship between anxious attachment and LEAS 
scores, but data for therapists showed no significant relationship between these two variables. 
3.1.2 Other self-report measures 
The two subscales of the IRI that were of interest for this analysis were the Perspective Taking 
subscale (PT) and the Empathic Concern subscale (EC).  As expected for therapists there was a 
highly significant positive correlation between the two (r=.49, p=.014), and also between each 
subscale and the EQ (r=.51, p=.01 and r=.65, p=.002 respectively).  This pattern was evidenced 
also in non-therapists.  In therapists there was also a significant relationship between EC and 
mentalizing production measure LEAS (r=.43, p=.031) which was not seen in the control group.  
Other than already discussed, EQ scores for therapists did not correlate significantly  with any 
other measures with the exception of the EQ ER subscale and LEAS (r=.44, p=.027).  This in turn 
was not replicated in the control group, which did, however experience a positive significant 
correlation between EQ and EQ ER scores and the Eyes test (r=.44, p=.022 and r=.43, p=.026). 
3.1.3 Comprehension, behavioural and production measures 
For therapists the Eyes test and the Facial Emotion test showed a strongly significant positive 
correlation (r=.59, p=.003) and while the relationship was not significant in non-therapists 
trended in the same direction (r=.33, p=.07).  Finally, for therapists, the eyes test and mental 
state elaboration was perhaps surprisingly significantly negatively correlated with mental state 
elaboration talk (r=-.41, p=.038), though it was in the expected direction for the non-therapists. 
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Table 8.  Correlation relationships between the main measures for Therapists. 



































- .34 -.45* -.38ͫ ͫ -.58** -.48* -.48* .21 -.12 .16 -.10 -.48* -.10 




  - .49* .51* .50* .20 .02 .20 .31 .26 .26 .22 
IRI Empathic 
concern 
   - .65** .63** .58** .36 ͫ .31 .04 -.12 -.08 .43* 
EQ Total     - .86** .75** -.04 .21 -.07 -.04 .08 .38 ͫ 
EQ Cognitive 
Empathy 
     - .53** .07 .34 .00 -.06 -.18 .16 
EQ Emotional 
Reactivity 
      - .29 .17 -.20 -.15 -.01 .44* 
Eyes Test        - .59** .18 .00 -.41* .16 
Facial 
Emotion 




         - .19 .26 .10 
Mental State 
language 
          - .58** .16 
Mental state 
elaboration 
           - .29 
LEAS             - 






Table 9.  Correlation relationships between the main measures for non-therapists. 




































- .30 .00 -.20 -.61** -.59** -.57** -.19 .00 -.25 -.31 -.15 -.08 




  - .61** .40* .10 .39* .10 -.20 .07 .02 -.17 -.24 
IRI Empathic 
concern 
   - .50** .35 ͫ .50* .03 .04 -.33 .01 -.10 .20 
EQ Total     - .82** .90** .44* .14 -.05 .33 .25 -.04 
EQ Cognitive 
Empathy 
     - .65** .28 .34 -.04 .36 ͫ .28 .03 
EQ Emotional 
Reactivity 
      - .43* .09 -.19 .29 .28 -.13 
Eyes Test        - .33 .13 .07 .17 .17 
Facial 
Emotion 
        - -.06 -.26 -.29 .23 
Perspective 
accuracy 
         - -.07 -.07 -.15 
Mental State  
language 
          - .77** .17 
Mental state    
elaboration 
           - .01 
LEAS             - 




3.1.4 Eye-tracking data – correlations with attachment coefficients 
Since the primary focus of this study is the analysis of relationships with attachment, the table 
below shows Pearson correlation coefficients between the attachment measures and the eye-
tracking data for the mental state talk task.   
Table 10. Pearson correlations between attachment coefficient and eye-tracking measures. 
Pearson’s r Therapists Non-therapists 
 Avoidant Anxious Avoidant Anxious 
     
Sum faces and hands average  -.06 -.03 -.29 -.42* 
      Average fixation faces  -.10 -.05 -.26 -.39* 
Average fixation hands  .24 .11 -.43* -.48* 
     
Sum faces and hands first fix  .15 .16 -.55** -.35 
      Average duration of first face fix  -.03 .14 -.37* -.30 








*p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed tests 
The correlation analysis above shows quite a different set of relationships for each of the 
therapist and control groups.  There were no significant relationships for therapists in with 
either anxiety or avoidant coefficients and two-tailed Pearson’s r in most cases, particularly for 
faces, was low.  
The picture for the control group, however, is very different.  For average fixation on either face 
or hands, there are strong negative correlations between fixation length and anxiety, i.e. the 
higher the anxiety coefficient the less time overall is spent fixating on faces (r=-.39, p=.04) or 
hands (r=-.483, p=.01).  The trend is similar for average fixation times and avoidance, although 
none are significant with the exception of the fixation on hands.  In addition for non-therapists, 
the average durations of first fixes shows a significantly negative relationship between 
avoidance and duration of first fixes, for  both faces (r=-.372, p<.05) and particularly for hands 
(r=-.641, p=.001).  The direction of relationship is similar for the anxiety coefficient although 
none of these are significant.   
Tables 11 and 12 below show the Pearson correlation coefficients for the eye-tracking data and 




Table 11.  Eye-tracking Pearson correlation coefficients, with zeros, therapists 
 




























Total fixes            
   Average fixation faces .14  .03 .10 -.01 -.02 .17 .22 .80** .43* .29 
   Average fixation hands .08 -.15 -.15 .04 -.22 .08 .22 .21 .71** .05 .10 
   Sum faces and hands average .14 -.11 .01 .09 -.04 -.00 .18 .22 .81** .39* .28 
First fixes            
   Average duration first face fix -.42* -.17 -.04 -.10 -.03 -.37 ͫ -.12 -.08 -.18 .08 .28 
   Average durat. first hand fix .05 -.32 -.19 .06 -.35 ͫ -.13 .13 .38 ͫ .47* .02 .02 
   Sum faces and hands first fix -.23 -.32 -.15 -.02 -.25 -.31 -.01 .20 .20 .06 .19 










*p<0.05, **p<0.01, one-tailed tests 
Table 12.  Eye-tracking Pearson correlation coefficients, with zeros, non-therapists 
 




























Total fixes            
   Average fixation faces .01 -15 .16 .13 .09 .12 -.53** .00 .55** .59** .22 
   Average fixation hands .27 .05 .45* .37* .41* .30 -.19 .34 ͫ .57** .22 .10 
   Sum faces and hands average .04 -.13 .21 .17 .14 .15 -.51** .05 .58** .57** .21 
First Fixes            
   Average duration first face fix .17 .06 .39* .23 .33 .02 -.21 -.12 .05 .15 -.10 
   Average durat. first hand fix .09 .00 .57** .49* .54** .27 .02 .31 .24 .04 .12 
   Sum faces and hands first fix .14 .03 .52** .38* .47* .15 -.11 .09 .15 .10 .00 
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Correlation patterns for therapists and differences with non-therapists 
Patterns of relationships between measures differed between the two groups.  In many 
situations the non-therapist group showed correlational relationships that may have been 
expected from previous research.  For self-report measures, EQ scores and dwell times of first 
fixes were significantly positively correlated, both in EQ total scores and also Cognitive empathy 
and Emotional Reactivity. No significant relationships were seen with IRI scales.  
For correlations with mental state understanding, no significant relationships were seen with 
the Eyes test, but negative positive relationships were seen between average total fixation times 
and Facial Emotion scores, the less time being spent fixating on a picture, the higher the Facial 
Emotion scores.  For ToM production, total dwell time correlated highly significantly with 
mental state language production and mental state language elaboration, but this was not the 
case for first fixation durations, which showed no correlation with mental state talk.  LEAS 
scores were not correlated with fixation times. 
For therapists the position was very different in both self-report and ToM understanding tasks. 
There were no significant correlations between fixation durations and IRI or EQ scores, with the 
exception of one instance:  the EQ ER scale correlated positively with the average duration of 
first hand fix. 
For ToM understanding, Eyes tests score was marginally significantly negatively correlated with 
measures of duration of first fix, i.e. the higher the Eyes score, the less time was spent on first 
fixes.  No commensurate relationship was seen with Facial emotion or the perspective taking 
task. 
For mental state talk, the pattern was similar for therapists and non-therapists; Significant 
positive correlations were experienced between average total fixation times and mental state 
language use, and between elaborative talk and total fixation times, although somewhat less 
strong than the control group. First face fix durations, however, showed no significant 
relationships with the exception of mental state language use and first hand fix which showed a 
positive relationship.  As with non-therapists, no relationships with LEAS were seen. 
As no clear relationships between attachment and behavioural, production or eye-tracking 
measures of mentalizing were found in either group of participants, it was decided not to 






1. Original Aims of the Study 
 
This study aimed to contribute towards existing knowledge concerning two aspects of 
therapist relational characteristics, namely attachment orientation and mentalization abilities.  
Importantly, the main point of interest was the relationship between the two, and how this 
relationship might differ in comparison to the general population.  In summary, it was found 
that therapists exhibited a greater proclivity to use elaborative mental state language in 
describing emotional situations and focussed more on social cues in a visual assessment of the 
same situations.  Therapists also demonstrated a self-reported higher level of affective and 
cognitive empathic ability than non-therapists.  Therapist attachment styles had limited and 
very specific effects on mentalising behaviours.  These findings are considered particularly 
relevant at a time when the psychotherapeutic world has become highly focussed on the nature 
of the relationship between client and therapist, and on what attributes of the therapist might 
contribute towards the quality of this therapeutic relationship.   
 
Whilst it is already acknowledged in the psychotherapeutic literature that both therapist 
attachment and ability to mentalize are highly relevant therapist characteristics (e.g. Slade, 
2000, Rizq & Target, 2010a), there has been only a small amount of existing research that has 
considered the mentalizing abilities of therapists (e.g. Hassenstab et al., 2007; Hall et al., 2000) 
and an equally modest amount which has explored the therapist attachment style (e.g. Dozier et 
al., 1994).  No study to date has explicitly contemplated how attachment might directly affect 
therapists’ mentalizing abilities (which clearly has consequences for the therapeutic 
relationship).  This study therefore aimed to evaluate this fully by comparing the relationship 
between mentalizing and attachment in therapists with that exhibited in a well-matched non-
therapist control group.  Given that therapists are highly experienced in mentalizing, and may 
well have addressed their personal attachment related experiences more fully due to the 
requirements of training, personal therapy and clinical practice, the expectation underlying this 
study was that therapists may exhibit different characteristics in the relationship between 
attachment orientation and mentalizing in comparison with the general population. 
 
2. Differences between therapists and non-therapists 
 
2.1. Attachment 
Given that the limited research in attachment in therapists (e.g. Leiper & Casares, 2000) 
has not indicated marked differences in attachment orientation, it was not expected that levels 
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of attachment would differ between the two groups.  This was borne out and there was no 
significant difference in attachment orientations as measured by the difference in mean levels 
of anxiety and avoidance.  Furthermore, though the focus of the main analysis was not on 
attachment categories, interestingly 50% of the therapist group were categorised as secure 
(similar to that found by Rizq & Target, 2010a).   
 
2.2. Self-reported abilities in mentalizing(empathy) 
 
As may have been expected, given previous research on self-reported abilities in 
empathy (e.g. Hall at el., 2000) the therapist group self-reported significantly greater abilities in 
empathic ability than the non-therapist group.  First, for the IRI measure, therapists scored 
more highly in the Perspective Taking (PT), Empathic Concern (EC) and Fantasy (FS) subscales.  
The PT subscale attempts to measure the tendency to adopt the psychological views of others, 
and the EC subscale to assess feelings oriented towards the other of sympathy and concern 
(Davis, 1983).  Higher scores in both subscales appear to reflect enhanced abilities in both 
cognitive and emotional empathy which might be expected from the therapists given the 
obvious professional requirements for such abilities and the knowledge that clients rate 
therapists more highly if they display empathic responses and appear to understand their 
experiences (e.g. Greenberg et al., 2001).  However, unlike in Hall et al.’s (2000) slightly larger 
sample of practitioner psychologists or Hassenstab et al.’s (2007) comparable sample of 
psychotherapists, there was no evidence of therapists scoring lower on the PD subscale of the 
IRI suggesting that in this group and in these experimental conditions at least, there is no 
evidence of greater moderation or regulation of distress within the therapist group compared 
to controls.  
According to Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004), the IRI represented the best 
measure of empathy developed to date, because three of the four factors are directly relevant 
to accepted concepts of empathy.  However, the IRI may measure concepts broader than 
empathy in the FS subscale or the PD subscale which may assess imagination or emotional self-
control, and although these factors may be correlated with empathy, it arguable that they 
represent something broader than empathy itself.  The above findings on the IRI have therefore 
been extended using another measure of empathy, the EQ, to focus purely on the cognitive and 
affective aspects of empathy.  Therapists also reported significantly higher scores on the EQ, 
particularly in the Cognitive Empathy (CE) and Emotional Reactivity (ER) subscales.  According 
to Lawrence et al. (2004), Cognitive Empathy (CE) measures the cognitive appreciation of 
affective states in others, whilst Emotional Reactivity (ER) reflects the tendency to experience 
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an affective reaction in response to others’ mental states.  This finding is consistent with 
previous research suggesting that the strongest relationships between the IRI and total EQ 
scores are with the PT and EC scales of the IRI (Lawrence et al., 2004).  The higher scores in the 
CE and EC components of the EQ therefore reinforce that this group of therapists self-report 
enhanced abilities in both cognitive and affective components of empathy when compared 
with controls.  This data taken together therefore replicates and extends previous research 
suggesting that therapists consider themselves good empathisers and capable of taking 
another’s perspective.   
 
2.3. Mental state comprehension and behavioural measures 
In contrast to the self-report measures, there were no differences between the two 
groups on measures of behavioural understanding of mentalization measured either for 
emotion understanding i.e. facial emotion task (where therapists did score more highly but not 
significantly so), or the social-perceptual measure of mental state understanding (Eyes task). 
This replicates Hassenstab et al. (2007) who found that a group of 19 therapists scored no 
differently to a same-size control group when looking at emotional faces or on the Eyes task.  
The inference from these results is that therapists do not necessarily possess an enhanced 
ability to mentalize as defined by mental state understanding and as measured by behavioural 
abilities in recognising facial displays of emotion.  This holds despite the fact that the therapists 
concerned represent a relatively well-qualified and experienced group of practitioners with a 
significant number of client hours between them.   
An additional behavioural measure of mentalizing ability, unused in previous studies, 
was the perspective taking task (Keysar et al., 2000), which measures the socio-cognitive aspect 
of mental state understanding. Here, although there was a trend towards therapists scoring 
more highly (and slightly faster) than non-therapists in the ability to accurately and 
spontaneously take another’s perspective, the difference was not significant.  Thus, it cannot 
be claimed in this participant group that therapists possess significantly enhanced capabilities 
in perspective taking.  This is perhaps surprising given Wu and Keysar’s (2007) finding that 
those who have experienced a cultural pattern of focussing on the other tend to do better on 
these tasks, arguably because they possess a greater proclivity to use their mental state 
understanding abilities.  It may have been expected that experienced therapists may have 
shown a similar tendency, but although it seems that they exhibit a greater degree of accuracy 
in this sample, the difference was not significant.  This finding therefore extends the finding of 
no difference between behavioural measures of mentalizing between therapists and non-
therapists but with using a novel measure of social-cognitive perspective taking. 
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2.4. The “production” of mentalization 
While much research on mentalizing has focussed on self-report or behavioural 
measures, an alternative concept of mentalization utilised in this study was the “production” of 
mental state language, used as a measure of the proclivity to use mentalization abilities 
(Ruffman, et al., 2002; Meins et al., 2006).  In the task involving the description of everyday 
social pictures, whilst therapists used a greater range and number of mental state words and 
modulating language in their narrative, the two groups did not differ in this respect 
significantly.  Notwithstanding this, there was a significant difference in one area of mental 
state language production, that of mental state elaborative language, with therapists scoring 
significantly more highly.  Examples of the elaborative talk used more frequently by therapists 
included causal or explanatory talk about emotion e.g. “she felt frightened about being on the 
bridge” or “they’re both amused that the boy is throwing water”, as well as examples of 
contrastive talk to explain differences in emotion, e.g. “Looks sad but not making much of a 
noise”.  Thus it appears that therapists are more inclined to attach meaning, cause, or 
explanation to mental states in others.  This is an important finding because the use of 
elaborative talk is seen by some as a more accurate measure of spontaneous production of 
mental state understanding than the use of simple mental state terms (e.g. Ontai & Thompson, 
2002; Ontai & Thompson, 2008; Ontai & Virmani, 2010; Slaughter et al., 2007).  
 A mother’s use of an open and elaborative discourse about mental states is intricately 
linked to security of attachment in the child (Bretherton, 1990b; Ontai & Thompson, 2008), and 
in adulthood, research demonstrates that adults who are able to reflect and metalize about 
themselves are more likely to be secure (Fonagy et al., 1995).  It is worth speculating therefore 
that it is possible that not only are therapists displaying a more secure attachment profile in 
their use of elaborative mentalizing language, they may also be more capable of facilitating 
increased mentalization in their therapeutic work with clients, with possible implications for 
changes in client attachment organisation. Nonetheless, the finding of increased proclivity to 
use mentalizing skills in therapists is novel and worth exploring more in future research. 
The second measure of mental state production used was the LEAS (Lane et al. 1990), 
an instrument which concentrates entirely on the identification and differentiation of affect 
and disregards almost completely any cognitive states.  It is centred on the interaction of the 
self and other and requires participants to imagine themselves in the scenarios, unlike the 
Everyday Pictures exercise which is focussed primarily on a third party situation.  It is therefore 
subtly different in terms of which aspects of mental state production it measures, although it 
does not measure anything more complex than the use of simple affective words.  Although 
there was a strong trend seen towards therapists using more emotion words, the difference 
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was not significant.  Given the similar result in the simple use of mental state terms in the 
Everyday Picture exercise, this result for the LEAS is perhaps not surprising, and because the 
more intricate concepts of elaboration or explanation are not assessed in the LEAS, no 
replication of the enhanced elaborative talk scores for therapists was possible. 
In terms of the production of mentalization, therefore, the above results suggest that in 
the use of simple mental state terms, talk of cognitions, desires and emotions, therapists and 
non-therapists do not differ significantly.  However, in the more complex and perhaps more 
deeply processed areas of elaborative mental state language, therapists score more highly.  
Therapists therefore appear to be processing emotional input more thoroughly in order 
perhaps to understand emotionally related experience more fully.  It is also suggested that this 
result evidences that therapists may be exhibiting a greater proclivity or ability to use their 
mentalizing abilities in the use of elaborative mental state language.  Given the suggested links 
between the use of mental state language including elaborative language and security of 
attachment, it was interesting in particular to evaluate this relationship quantitatively and to 
establish what if any differences existed between the therapists and non-therapists in this 
respect.  This is discussed below in section 3.3. 
 
2.5. Eye tracking and social orientation findings  
 
2.5.1. Total dwell times 
The between groups eye-tracking data yielded some interesting results.  There was a 
marginally significant difference in the overall amount of time that participants looked at 
the photos, with therapists looking longer.  Within this, therapists showed a tendency to 
look longer at both faces and hands, i.e. social information (although this seemed to be 
driven by hand fixations).  This may suggest that therapists are attempting to process all 
social information as much as possible, instead of concentrating solely on the facial region 
of individuals. This may simply be a result of training, during which therapists are 
encouraged to assess body language and other social information as well as the spoken 
word (e.g. Parrott, 2006).  However, in line with Klin’s view on social orientation as a 
measure of mentalizing (Klin, 1991, 2000), it may represent something deeper and relate 
to a more subtle social cognition manifest through the processing of complex social cues 
and orientation towards social stimuli.  This important finding suggests that this social-
stimuli foundation skill of social cognition development (Fletcher Watson et al., 2008) 
appears to be more developed in therapists than the general population. 
118 
 
2.5.2. First fix durations 
Consistent with total dwell times, therapists showed significantly longer first fixes for 
faces and hands together, and for first fixes on hands only.  Although the trend was also 
towards significance in faces only, the results were not significant.  However, the 
indication again is that therapists are immediately attempting to use all possible 
information available to them in their assessment of another’s’ mental state; more so than 
non-therapists.  This finding expands on work by Fletcher-Watson, et al. (2009) who noted 
a particular disadvantage in first fixation (as distinct from total dwell time) data in autistic 
individuals and who concluded that this may represent a highly significant, although 
relatively subtle, measure of “real-time” mentalization, the effects of which could be 
profound in day-to-day social interactions.  In that respect therefore, again, the therapist 
group appears to demonstrate an enhanced ability to orientate towards social information 
in emotional interactions, in other words, to mentalize.  This, again, is a novel finding in 
this study. 
2.6. Summary of differences between therapists and non-therapists 
In summary, therefore, therapists appear to exhibit a greater tendency to process more 
thoroughly certain aspects of social and emotional information.  This is evidenced by a greater 
proclivity to use elaborative mental state language in describing emotional situations and by a 
greater focus on social cues in a visual assessment of the same situations.  Therapists also 
demonstrate a self-reported higher level of affective and cognitive empathic ability than non-
therapists.  However, in behavioural terms, although there are trends in the expected direction, 
therapists do not evidence a significantly enhanced ability in Theory of Mind tasks, emotion 
understanding, or visual perspective taking tasks.  Thus, although therapists may be better at 
using their mentalizing abilities in terms of a greater breadth and depth of processing, there is 
no evidence that they possess greater mental state understanding abilities per se.   
This is an interesting finding in its own right.  It suggests that whilst there may be trends 
to explore in future research with larger samples, in this particular study the possession of 
mentalizing skills is at similar levels for both therapists and non-therapists.  Therapists are, 
however, significantly better at using those skills.  This may explain why therapists think they 
possess enhanced levels of empathic ability: in practice, better “production” of mentalizing 
abilities may well be experienced by the self and others as a more developed ability to 
empathise and take another’s perspective.   
The discovery that therapists are generally better at some aspects of mentalizing but 
not others was only made possible in this study because of the breadth of known mentalizing 
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measures used.  Data from the more traditional adult tests of mentalizing abilities such as the 
Eyes test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) yielded no significant differences, but data from the more 
novel, and arguably more subtle, measures such as eye-tracking in social/non-social stimuli 
tasks (Fletcher Watson et al., 2009) or the mental state language task (Ruffman et al., 2002; 
Slaughter et al., 2007) were able to distinguish group differences between therapists and the 
control group.   
3. The relationship between mentalizing and attachment 
The study delivered a somewhat complex set of relationships between attachment and 
mentalizing abilities, which were in some cases subtly and in other cases appreciably different 
between the two groups. 
3.1. Attachment and self-reported empathic abilities 
Although therapists generally reported enhanced empathic skills, the relationship with 
attachment was complex.  In simple terms, the more avoidantly attached a therapist self-
reports themselves, the lower their self-report empathic abilities on both the EQ and the IRI 
scales (both cognitive and affective subscales).  This relationship is similar for non-therapists 
when measured with the EQ and appears stronger in effect indicating perhaps that attachment 
avoidance has less of an influence on mentalization in therapists than in non-therapists.  An 
explanation of this may arguably indicate an ability amongst therapists to either consciously or 
unconsciously “dampen” the deactivation effect of an underlying avoidant attachment when 
processing emotional information requiring an empathic response (Crittenden 1997, Mikulincer 
& Shaver, 2003).  Conversely anxious attachment styles in therapists are also associated with 
lower empathy scores on the EQ, although not on the IRI, and this contrasts with no anxious 
attachment/empathy relationship in non-therapists as measured by either scale.  For whatever 
reason, therefore, anxiously attached therapists (but not non-therapists) report a less 
developed empathic ability. 
In sum, both avoidantly and anxiously attached therapists self-report significantly 
reduced levels of empathy, which might be expected from previous research predicting a 
better therapeutic bond and a more responsive therapist style if therapists evidence more 
secure attachment behaviours (e.g. Black et al., 2005; Dozier et al., 1994; Dunkle & Friedlander, 
1996; Rubino et al., 2000).  
3.2. Attachment and mental state comprehension behavioural measures 
Somewhat surprisingly there were no significant relationships between either avoidance 
or anxiety and mental state understanding measures (i.e. the Eyes test, facial emotion task, or 
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perspective taking task) in therapists.  A marginally positive relationship existed between 
therapist attachment anxiety scores and the ability to accurately take another’s perspective, 
but it was not significant.  Thus, therapist attachment styles do not appear to be meaningfully 
influencing mentalizing as evidenced by any of the more traditional behavioural measures of 
mental state understanding.    
The main point of difference between the groups in these measures lies in two areas.  
First, non-therapists exhibited a significantly positive relationship between attachment anxiety 
and the ability to identify facial emotion, the more anxiously attached the individual the greater 
the ability to identify facial emotion.  Thus, the control group evidences behaviour that may not 
be expected from previous literature which suggests that the greater the attachment anxiety, 
the less accurate individuals are in identifying emotional cues, despite a general heightened 
vigilance (e.g. Fraley et al., 2006).  Notwithstanding this specific effect of attachment anxiety in 
the control group, however, a similar effect was not observed in therapists, suggesting that 
despite some therapists recording relatively high attachment anxiety, any effect of this on 
mentalizing, either positive or negative, as measured by facial emotion understanding is 
somehow negated. 
The second main between-group difference again concerned attachment anxiety.  
Unlike therapists, non-therapist attachment anxiety is significantly negatively related to the 
number of accurate perspective taking answers, i.e. the more anxiously attached they are, the 
less able they seem to be able to take another’s perspective.  Fraley and Shaver’s (2000) 
suggestion that attachment-related cognitive processes play a significant role in the monitoring 
of the environment for cues may be relevant here. The net reaction times of non-therapists 
show a negative relationship with anxiety, such that the more anxiously attached an individual 
is, the faster their reaction times in making judgements.  It seems that anxiously attached non-
therapists therefore may have slightly rushed their decision making at the expense of accuracy.  
This would correspond with Fraley et al.’s (2006) finding that anxiously attached participants 
judged the onset and offset of stimuli more quickly than less anxious individuals reflecting a 
vigilance in processing social cues at a basic perceptual level.  Again, no such effect of 
attachment anxiety is seen in therapists.   
In summary, neither of the attachment related relationships evidenced by the control 
group, nor any other significant attachment relationships with behavioural mental state 
understanding tasks were seen in the therapist group.  Given the previous literature pointing 
towards the potential influence of attachment on emotion processing (e.g. Dewitte, 2011; 
Fraley et al., 2006; Niedenthal, et al., 2002), these results were somewhat surprising, 
particularly in the context of some highly significant results in the control group.  Again, a 
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potential explanation of this may centre on the ability of therapists to somehow suppress or 
overcome their attachment related mentalizing behaviours (Crittenden 1997, Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2003), allowing them to respond more objectively to the information they are 
receiving.  This could either be through some learned mechanism related to experience or 
training, or due to some aspect of earned security status (Pearson et al., 1994).  Given the lack 
of detailed knowledge concerning the pathways to earned security and its relatively recent 
emergence as a mainstream concept for exploration (Hesse, 2008), it is outside the scope of 
this study to propose a detailed explanation of the processes by which therapists may be able 
to experience relatively secure attachment behaviours whilst their underlying attachment 
organisations remain insecure.  Nonetheless, the finding that therapists seem to experience the 
effect of attachment on some aspects of mentalization less acutely than control group 
members is interesting and requires further exploration.   
3.3. Attachment and the “production” of mentalization. 
With respect to the “production” of mentalization, patterns for the relationship 
between attachment and mentalization as measured by the use of mental state language 
differed between the groups.  In the Everyday Pictures task, there was just one significant 
relationship in the therapist group, a negative association between attachment avoidance and 
the use of mental state elaborative talk, i.e. avoidant therapists were far less likely to use 
causal, or explanatory language when describing everyday social scenes.  This relationship with 
avoidance was not the case for any of the other measures of mental state word use on this 
task.  Furthermore, there were no significant relationships between mental state language and 
anxiety coefficients in the therapist group.  There is therefore something about elaborative talk 
that is compromised in therapists with higher attachment avoidance that is not mirrored in the 
same therapists when using simple mental state or emotional words.    
This study suggests that this may be related in some way to a difference in processing 
associated with the production of mental state language.  Two tentative explanations can be 
offered.  First, although avoidant therapists can overcome their attachment styles in using an 
appropriate amount of simple mental state language when describing emotional scenes, they 
are not able to overcome automatically the effects of an avoidant attachment style in 
processing more detailed elaborative and causal inferences about emotional stimuli, possibly 
because such causal talk requires a deeper level of cognitive processing which is more likely to 
evoke attachment related behaviours than more simple language.  Alternatively, or possibly in 
combination, elaborative or clarifying talk can be seen as a more sensitive measure of the 
“proclivity to use” ones mentalization abilities, requiring a greater cognitive effort.  It seems 
possible that avoidant therapists may find it more difficult to utilise their mentalizing 
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capabilities to elaborate more than at a possibly superficial level in terms of the description of 
emotion stimuli.  
This effect of avoidance on elaborative talk was not evidenced in the non-therapist 
group but it is difficult to draw conclusions about this or make a comparison with the therapist 
group partly because the levels of elaborative talk used by non-therapists were relatively low.  
The non-therapist group also displayed a strong positive correlation between anxiety and LEAS 
scores, which was not mirrored by therapists.  Thus, whilst anxiously attached control group 
members may be hyperactivating (Mikulincer& Shaver, 2007) and therefore dwelling 
extensively on the affective experiences elucidated in the LEAS scenarios, anxiously attached 
therapists are again evidencing a relatively controlled response to these scenarios, in a similar 
manner perhaps to that suggested above for mental state understanding measures. 
3.4. Attachment and social orientation eye-tracking data 
In this area of social orientation as a measure of mentalizing, there were marked 
differences between the therapist group and the control group.  Therapists displayed no 
influence of attachment orientation on fixation times on the social stimuli contained therein.  
They also displayed no attachment influence on times of first fixes on social information.  The 
only association evidenced was that of a negative relationship between levels of attachment 
avoidance and duration of first fix anywhere on the picture. This association may be expected 
from hyperactivation/deactivation attachment theories (e.g. Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, 
2007a), but with the exception of this finding (which does not distinguish social versus non-
social stimuli), there is a stark lack of association between therapists’ attachment orientations 
and either total or first fix looking times at social information.   
The position with respect to the non-therapists was entirely different, however.  In this 
group, the more avoidantly attached the individuals were, the lower the time spent on first 
fixes of social stimuli.  Such an association might be expected from previous first fix looking-
time research (e.g. Fletcher-Watson, 2009) and was highly significant.  This eye-tracking result 
therefore is consistent with and represents a novel extension to Fletcher Watson et al.’s work.  
Similarly, the more anxious the individual in the control group, the lower the overall total time 
spent on the stimuli.  The striking finding here is that whilst non-therapists were behaving in a 
manner which may be expected from previous research related to social orientation and 
mentalizing, therapists showed no attachment related relationships in respect of social stimuli 





4. Summary of findings   
Therapists demonstrated an enhanced performance, compared to control group participants, in 
several aspects of mentalizing as measured by the battery of tasks.  First, this was seen in the use of 
more complex mental state language thus arguably exhibiting an increased proclivity (or ability) to 
use their mentalization skills.  Second, therapists showed a greater orientation towards social stimuli 
as evidenced by eye-tracking technology, evidencing an underlying advantage in this fundamental 
aspect of social cognition.  Third, as expected they self-report a greater degree of empathic ability.  
Their performance in the perspective taking task also trended towards a significant association but 
ultimately fell short of a statistical difference with controls.  They did not, however, evidence 
enhanced capabilities in some of the more traditional behavioural mental state understanding 
measures such as facial emotion recognition.  This suggests that, as assumed in the design of the 
study, the significant number of mentalizing tasks employed measure subtly different aspects of 
mentalizing capabilities. 
The influence of attachment orientation on the mentalizing skills of both the therapist and the 
non-therapist group was complex and the differences in this relationship between the two groups 
provide some interesting results.  The results highlight the benefit of having recruited a well-
matched control group of sufficient size and being able to compare non-therapists’ and therapists’ 
behaviours.  In summary, overall therefore non-therapists tend to behave more according to the 
expectations of previous attachment related research (e.g. Dewitte, 2011; Fraley et al., 2006; 
Niedenthal, et al., 2002) than do therapists.  For example, attachment anxiety in non-therapists 
appeared to lead participants to be poorer at taking someone’s perspective in terms of accuracy but 
to be more likely to focus on (be preoccupied with) and use mental state words when describing 
every day social scenes.  With respect to avoidant attachment, its effect can be seen in the eye 
tracking experiment, in which levels of avoidant attachment in non-therapists correlated with a 
significant reduction in the first fix looking time at social information, a novel eye-tracking finding in 
itself.  All these findings suggest that on the whole the control group participants evidence the 
relationships between attachment style and mentalizing abilities that may either have been 
expected or inferred.  These findings replicate previous work outlined above but also extend it by 
using novels tasks such as a perspective taking experiment and eye-tracking technology.   
It is striking however that, with the exception of two significant associations between therapists’ 
attachment style and mentalization behaviours, no other significant influences of attachment on 
therapist mentalization appear to exist. 
It is argued here that the apparent reduced impact of attachment as an influence on mentalizing 
in therapists may be a result of several particular issues affecting this group of individuals.  
Therapists have usually undertaken significant levels of personal therapy, and have substantial 
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experience in reflecting on their own and others mental states.  Internal working models of 
attachment are fluid structures that should be sensitive to changes in social and attachment related 
environments and change over a period in response to the accumulation of experience (e.g. Lewis, 
Feiring & Rosenthal, 2000). Similarly, it is highly plausible that therapists may have experienced a 
shift from an insecure attachment towards an “earned secure” orientation (Pearson et al., 1994) 
over a period of time.  Thus, it is probable that some form of alteration of therapists’ attachment 
organisation in many of the participants may have taken place.  Research does not yet inform us 
sufficiently about some of the mechanisms of change, for example, whether some behaviours might 
change and some might remain, even if attachment style per se has changed, or whether behaviours 
have a conscious and an un-conscious element to them.  What seems evident in this data, however, 
is that therapists reporting insecure attachment behave as though they are more secure. 
Furthermore, therapist training actively encourages the suppression of inappropriate 
attachment related behaviours in the therapeutic relationship, so reflective therapists will be highly 
experienced in identifying but consciously down playing their attachment related responses when 
attachment systems are activated.  It is possible, given the amount of emotional information 
contained in many of the tasks, that therapists relied on a habitual way of being, and produced 
responses to the stimuli not according to their underlying attachment orientation, but concurrent 
with a professional persona.  This is particularly possible given that the participants may have been 
primed to behave as they would when in client therapy, i.e. they knew they were there because of 
their profession and were participating in the study as a therapist. 
Finally, the extensive battery of mentalizing tasks employed allows us to make some 
observations about the particular aspects of mentalization abilities that were the exceptions to the 
general picture of limited attachment influence.  As has been noted, mental state understanding 
measures did not typically yield significant evidences of the effect of therapist attachment on 
mentalizing.  The one area that suggested a significant influence of attachment was in mental state 
language elaboration (measuring the production of or proclivity to use mentalizing ability).  This 
represents a particularly subtle measure of mentalizing.  The results suggest that it is in the area of 
“proclivity to use” mental state understanding abilities that avoidant therapists in particular find 
difficult.  This association between less proclivity to use mentalizing skill and avoidance may be a 
very subtle difficulty that more avoidant therapists are unaware of, possibly because of their success 
in overcoming the effects of their avoidance in more mainstream mental state tasks, but 
nonetheless, one that could have significant impact for their role in facilitating mentalization during 





5. Clinical implications of this research 
There are clear clinical implications of these findings for therapists both in practice and in 
training.  For therapists in practice, on the one hand, the data suggests that the extensive training 
associated with becoming a therapist, including self-reflection, generally fosters an ability to 
overcome one’s attachment related biases sufficiently such that any response to emotional or 
attachment related information is appropriate for the client in the context of therapy.  This is clearly 
a good thing, as one of the basic tenets of good therapeutic practice is the ability to manage one’s 
own emotional reactions to clients (Slade, 2008).  However, if the therapists’ attachment style is 
avoidant, he or she should be aware that there are elements of avoidant attachment behaviours 
which are not so easily lost, for example a difficulty with elaborative talk, and that may pertain even 
if at a surface level, those behaviours are identified and dealt with. For training programmes, this 
data suggests that therapist trainees would do well to consider in some detail their individual 
attachment styles and reflect on how they may hold the potential to influence their clinical practice, 
particularly if the therapist tends towards an avoidant attachment style.   
A second implication of therapists’ apparent generally enhanced ability to produce causal, 
explanatory and clarifying talk about emotional scenes concerns the need for therapists to use this 
skill appropriately.  Provocatively expressing feelings relating to what the client presents in sessions 
is not often the appropriate use of the therapists’ emotional response, neither would it serve the 
therapist well to be internally rehearsing causes and explanations for client material at the expense 
of listening to the spoken word.  Again, trainees might want to consider when they express their 
emotional response to clients and when they do not. 
As far as the author is aware, there is no requirement in professional training programmes to 
undertake a self-analysis with specific respect to attachment patterns, or for that matter to 
undertake any sort of exploration of aptitude to train as a therapist.  Whilst not wishing to suggest 
that quantitative analysis can or should differentiate which candidates may make good or bad 
therapists, there may well be some merit in advising therapist trainees to work on these aspects of 
themselves through self-reflection.  An obvious way of doing this is by means of personal therapy 
which Farrell (1996) has highlighted as an excellent way to reduce hindrances to therapeutic work 
resulting from personal blind spots, and which Rizq and Target (2008b) see as a vehicle to aid the 
establishing of real relationships with clients and emotional robustness in practice.  The mandatory 
requirement for the amount of personal therapy that trainee therapists must undertake is relatively 
easily satisfied, for example the BPS requires trainee Counselling Psychologists to undertake 40 
hours.  It is suggested that training programmes would do well to consider directing trainees to 










One of the major issues facing any study concerned with attachment is the appropriate 
measurement of attachment.  In this study the ECR was chosen as the appropriate 
measure for a number of reasons.  It focuses on the two dimensions that appear to be 
universally supported as the most appropriate components of attachment (Crittenden, 
1997; Fraley & Waller, 1998; Mikulincer et al., 2003) rather than grouping individuals into 
broad classifications, is targeted at measuring adult attachment in close relationships (i.e. 
appropriate for assessing attachment related behaviours of adults in a close one to one 
interaction), and is designed to measure dispositional or trait-like patterns rather than 
idiosyncratic temporary states that might be partner or circumstance specific.  In 
comparison with alternative self-report measures it appears to be well-supported in the 
literature in terms of measurement precision, reliability and construct validity (Fraley et 
al., 2000).  It was chosen in preference to the alternative AAI in this study for these 
reasons and because of its practical advantages in terms of ease of administration to large 
participant groups, the straightforward but versatile nature of the data produced (i.e. 
dimension led rather than categorical) and the study’s budgetary constraints relating to 
time and money.   
However, it is acknowledged that the ECR is not itself a perfect measurement of 
attachment for the purposes of this study.  Ideally, a second measure of attachment could 
have been included to corroborate the ECR data.  In addition, administering the ECR as a 
one-off measurement of an individual’s attachment orientation does not address fully the 
debate in the literature concerning the stability of underlying attachment patterns over 
time.  Fraley et al. (2000) have identified that those high in trait characteristics will tend to 
response consistently over time, but those lower will be less reliable due to the probability 
in endorsing any one particular item.  Thus, in an ideal world, a study on attachment 
orientations would provide a longitudinal measure of attachment across a certain period 
in order to assess and be more confident in the attachment data used.  Such data would 
allow a more informed assessment of how attachment orientation might be related to 
evidence of mentalization capabilities.  It might also allow an assessment of whether 
therapists’ attachment styles change with experience in counselling, and whether their 
ability to mentalize changes over the same period as well. 
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In addition on the subject of stability of attachment representations over time, as 
highlighted again recently by Fraley, Vicary, Brumbaugh & Roisman (2011), although there 
is a stable factor in attachment working models, there may be significant temporary 
variations in attachment style.  Researchers do not really know whether prototype-like 
models (a prototype of attachment is developed early in childhood which influences 
dynamics significantly throughout the life course) or revisionist models (assuming working 
models are far less inherently stable) better explain patterns of stability or change in adult 
attachment.  This represents a significant gap in the understanding of attachment 
processes, despite attempts to undertake longitudinal studies in attachment stability (e.g. 
Fraley, 2002).  In the case of the above suggestion that therapists might be tested for their 
attachment orientation at either end of a length of time, the pattern of retest correlations 
tells us only about attachment orientation at those two specific times and not about 
variations in between or about the underlying stability of attachment style.  Furthermore, 
Fraley et al. (2011) found a differential stability of attachment according to whether the 
close relationship being measured was romantic (less stable) or parental (more stable).  
This suggests that future research would do well to consider the development of measures 
associated with specific close relationships.  The relevance of this debate for this study lies 
in the question of whether therapists attachment behaviours for example with their 
clients are influenced by a different set of contextual influences than those in their general 
attachment relationships, and by definition therefore result in a different way of being in 
close relationships in the therapeutic setting. 
6.1.2. Valence 
 
This study has not attempted to analyse the effects of attachment on mentalizing with 
reference to the valence of stimuli.  For example, the Everyday Pictures task might be 
extended to incorporate photographs specifically exhibiting for instance anger, sadness, 
joy, and an analysis undertaken to assess whether attachment styles might influence 
which emotions or mental states are being identified and talked about, and which are not, 
whether these differ between the groups, and whether there is a relationship with anxiety 
or avoidant attachment coefficients.  This may offer data consistent with the view that 
anxiously attached individuals will have greater emotional response specifically to negative 
stimuli due to increased hyperactivity of the attachment system, or that avoidant 
individuals experience a dampening down of the attachment system activity in similar 
circumstances and, for example, defensively exclude negative emotions from conversation 
(e.g. Bretherton, 1990b, 1991; Bretherton & Munholland, 1999; Zilber, Goldstein & 




6.1.3. Ecological validity of stimuli 
It is mentioned above that the literature concerning orientation to social stimuli, 
specifically in the context of autism research, is beginning to focus on the ecological 
validity of the stimuli presented to participants in eye-tracking studies and other social 
cognition tests (reviewed in Boraston & Blakemore, 2007).  For example, the choice of 
social situation stimuli can include still photographs, cartoon drawings, moving video 
images, interactive vignettes and many more.  One recent study developed a sensitive 
video-based test for the evaluation of subtle mindreading difficulties: the Movie for the 
Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC; Dziobek, Fleck, Kalbe, Rogers, Hassenstab, Brand et 
al., 2006), which involves watching a short film and answering questions referring to the 
actors’ mental states. It has been used in one study relevant to therapists’ mental state 
understanding (Hassenstab et al., 2007). In this study, due to the constraints of 
practicality, and to the fact that the eye-tracking task doubled as the mental state 
language task (and therefore required participants to have an unlimited time to narrate 
their responses to one shot photographs), still photographs were used.  Whilst this 
arguably has less ecological validity that a moving image, the photographs were carefully 
chosen to ensure that they contained sufficient emotional and attachment content to 
remain as valid stimuli.  However, future research concerned with similar questions might 
explore the possibility that eye-tracking related to social versus non-social  stimuli could be 
measured using moving images as in the MASC (Dziobek et al., 2006), or even videos of 
counselling sessions.   
 
6.1.4. Mental state talk measures 
 
Given the ultimate importance of mental state talk in this study in terms of the findings 
relating to elaboration, additional research should consider aspects of this that have not 
been able to be included here.  For example, researchers have pointed to the importance 
of connectedness, appropriateness and non-attuned comments in mental state talk.  
Connectedness, defined as a conversational alignment based around semantically related 
utterances, has been found to be a strong predictor of mentalizing performance, the 
strength of the prediction being strongest for mental state references within connected 
turns (Ensor & Hughes 2008).  Also, appropriateness in mental state talk has been seen as 
hugely important to the construct of maternal responsiveness (Laranjo et al., 2008; Meins, 
Fernyhough, de Rosnay, Arnott, Leekam, & Turner, 2011) and includes observations such 
as the independent coder agreeing with the mother’s reading of her infant’s internal state, 
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or that the mother voiced (using the first person) what the infant might say if he/she could 
speak. Most recently Meins et al. (2011) have also explored the influence of inappropriate 
(recently referred to as non-attuned) mental state comments including the 
misinterpretation of mental states or the intentions of the other, and observed lower 
scores for non-attuned mind-related comments distinguished mothers of secure infants 
from mothers of insecure infants.  Connectedness, appropriateness, and conversely non-
attuned comments seem particularly important for therapists in clinical practice and to the 
therapeutic relationship as a whole and present an area of more detailed investigation 
concerning attachment and mental state talk.  
 
6.1.5. Other measures 
 
The battery of tasks presented to the participants took on average approximately 90 
minutes to complete and this was considered at the top end of what was appropriate both 
from the standpoint of the amount of time being given up by the participant and in terms 
of the concentration levels needed to complete the tasks adequately.  However, there are 
several measures that would have been chosen to be included if it were possible to spend 
unlimited time testing participants.  These would include measures to control for the 
effect of executive function and language abilities.  
 
 However, the most interesting additional measure would clearly be an assessment of 
therapeutic outcome.  This study is predicated on the assumption that enhanced 
mentalization skills contribute to (mediate) the therapeutic outcome, and that therapist 
attachment is important in its own right as an influence on the therapeutic relationship 
but particularly in terms of its influence on therapist mentalizing ability.  If it were possible 
to undertake the study as a longitudinal analysis, with an assessment of therapeutic 
outcome (and perhaps satisfaction with the therapeutic relationship as reported by 
clients), it would shed significant light on some of the issues raised here.  These additional 
elements of research were beyond the scope of a PsychD thesis because of timing 
constraints. 
 
6.2. Experimental Design 
 
This study was subject to a finite time period for completion.  As such, whilst the largest 
sample group possible was desirable, there were also practical constraints on the recruitment of 
a significant number of practising therapists and control group participants.  Thus, a decision 
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was taken to include a minimum of 20 in each group to ensure statistical relevance, but also to 
complete the project within the required timescale.  Repetition or extension of this research 
should involve a larger sample size to add power to statistical inferences and make conclusions 
more robust. 
 
Lastly, in some recent research it has been argued that enhanced attachment effects are 
seen when attachment schemata are activated through the use of priming stimuli (e.g. Rowe & 
Carnelley, 2003; Carnelley & Rowe, 2007; Carnelley & Rowe, 2010).  Examples of priming 
techniques might include asking participants to write about memories of feeling supported by 
an attachment figure or subliminally exposing participants to words or pictures related to secure 
attachment.  Such priming results in more positive mood, views of the self, relationship 
expectations and greater felt security.  It also tends to enhance expected patterns of 
attachment.  In this study, the effects of secure priming would likely result in an enhancement 
of the differences between therapists and non-therapists; therapists would arguably tend 
towards the “dampening” of attachment behaviours seen above, but non-therapists might 
exhibit even greater magnitude in their observed attachment behaviours.  Future research 




This study has found that therapists appear to exhibit a greater tendency to process more 
thoroughly certain aspects of social and emotional information compared to non-therapists.  This is 
evidenced by a greater proclivity to use elaborative mental state language in describing emotional 
situations and by a greater focus on social cues in a visual assessment of the same situations.  
Therapists also demonstrate a self-reported higher level of affective and cognitive empathic ability 
than non-therapists.  However, in behavioural terms, therapists do not evidence a significantly 
enhanced ability in traditional Theory of Mind tasks, emotion understanding, or visual perspective 
taking tasks.  This suggests that, whilst in this particular study the possession of mentalizing skills is 
at similar levels for both therapists and non-therapists, therapists are significantly better at using 
those skills.  The discovery that therapists are generally better at some aspects of mentalizing but 
not others was made possible in this study because of the breadth of known mentalizing measures 
used since data from the more novel, and arguably more subtle, measures such as eye-tracking in 
social/non-social stimuli tasks (Fletcher Watson et al., 2009) or the mental state language task 
(Ruffman et al., 2002; Slaughter et al., 2007) were able to distinguish group differences between 
therapists and non-therapists.  Notwithstanding that the study has added substantially to the 
existing knowledge concerning therapist mentalizing and attachment, there are many questions of 
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interest and scope for future research that have arisen as a result of the study’s findings and its 
acknowledged limitations. 
The implications of these findings are relevant for both practice and training.  The data suggests 
that extensive training, including self-reflection, generally fosters an ability to overcome one’s 
attachment related biases sufficiently such that any response to emotional or attachment related 
information is appropriate in the context of therapy.  However, if the therapists’ attachment style is 
avoidant, he or she should be aware that there are elements of avoidant attachment behaviours 
which are not so easily overcome and that may pertain even if at a surface level those behaviours 
are identified and dealt with. For training programmes, this data suggests that therapist trainees 
would do well to consider their individual attachment styles, particularly an avoidant style, and 
reflect on how they may influence their clinical practice.  An obvious way of doing this is by means 
of personal therapy and it is suggested that training programmes would do well to consider 
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Gender Age Ethnicity Qualification 
1 F 31 White British PsychD, Counselling Psychology 
2 F 60 White British MSc, Counselling Psychology 
4 M 56 Chinese MSc, Advanced Counselling Psychology 
5 F 30 White British PsychD, Counselling Psychology 
6 F 50 White British PsychD, Counselling Psychology 
7 F 29 
Asian Indian/ 
Asian British Indian 
PsychD, Counselling Psychology 
8 F 31 White other/European PsychD, Counselling Psychology 
9 M 33 White other/European PsychD, Counselling Psychology 
10 F 28 White British PsychD, Counselling Psychology 
11 F 37 White British 
Certified Professional Counselling and 
Coaching (non-British award) 
12 F 29 White British PsychD, Counselling Psychology 
13 F 34 White British PsychD, Counselling Psychology 
14 M 37 White British MSc, Integrative Psychotherapy 
15 M 32 White British PsychD, Counselling Psychology 
16 M 34 White other/European MSc, Integrative Psychotherapy 
17 M 46 White British MSc, Counselling Psychology 
18 M 34 White British MSc, Counselling Psychology 
19 F 51 Other black background PsychD, Counselling Psychology 
37 F 51 White British PsychD, Counselling Psychology 
47 F 41 White other/European 








Gender Age Ethnicity Qualification 
31 M 42 White British Dphil 
32 F 46 White British LGSM (Guildhall) 
33 F 41 White British Mphil 
34 M 49 
Asian Indian/ 
Asian British Indian 
MA Law 
35 F 45 White British MA Medical Science 
36 M 51 White British MBA 
38 F 51 White British MBA 
39 F 46 White British Master of Wine (MW) 
40 F 49 White British PGCE 




42 M 46 Chinese MBA 
43 F 48 White British DipBA 
44 F 45 White British MRSCP Physiotherapy 
45 F 38 White British Unspecified Masters level degree 
46 M 47 White British PGCert Property Finance 
48 F 46 Chinese MBA 
49 F 41 White British MA 
50 F 37 White British ACA 
51 F 42 White British ACA 
52 F 43 White British DipBA 
















PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
 
Title of research project: Counsellor Attachment Orientation and its Relationship with Empathy, Mental State 
Understanding and Perspective Taking. 
Brief description of research project: 
The aim of the research is to shed further light on arguably the most important aspect in the relational model of 
counselling, that is, the relationship between client and counsellor.  Drawing on the underlying theory that 
successful therapy relies on the ability of the therapist to act as a secure base for exploration, the research will 
investigate the relationship between therapist attachment styles and other relational attributes that therapists 
may possess and utilise in order to engage with clients, for example, empathic ability, mental state understanding 
and perspective taking.  In so doing, the aim will be to evaluate how the therapist attachment style may be 
influencing his or her connection with the client through such relational experiences. 
During this research you will be given a number of experimental tasks measuring mental state understanding, 
emotion understanding and perspective taking. You will also be given four questionnaires.  The individual tasks and 
questionnaires are quite short in duration and, overall, your participation will take approximately one hour and 20 
minutes.  There are nine tasks or questionnaires in total. 
The first questionnaire will ask you basic details about your age, gender, and mother’s educational background etc. 
The second questionnaire will ask you about more detailed accounts of your relationships i.e. ‘how you are’ or 
‘how you would be’ in an intimate relationship with someone. The third, fourth and fifth will ask you to comment 
in response to a range of social situations.  
The experimental tasks involve different procedures. The first task will show a series of everyday pictures and you 
will be asked to describe (verbally) what you see in the picture shown.  The second task will be a series of pictures 
showing four emotional faces with a word in the middle and you will be asked to match the word to one of the 
faces.  The third task will involve undertaking various actions with respect to certain objects.  The fourth task asks 
you to look at a series of images of eyes, surrounded by four words. You will be asked to match a word to the pair 
of eyes shown. The tasks will not necessarily follow in this order.  In some of these tasks, your eye gaze will be 
tracked using a safe, non-invasive and unobtrusive eyetracking camera.  In addition, your responses on some of 
the tasks may be audio-recorded.   
You need not answer any or all of the questions if you feel uncomfortable with them. You will be given an 
identification number and all the information taken in this research will be anonymous as no names will be linked 
to the task answer-sheets.  The signature on this sheet will be kept separate from the task papers. You will be 
debriefed at the end of all the tasks.  You will be reimbursed up to £20 for your time and expenses.   
You may withdraw from this study at any time, without any explanation.  If you wish to withdraw your data will be 
removed from the data file, although the research data will continue to be held in aggregate form. 
You may ask the researcher for feedback on your scores on the questionnaire that measures attachment styles.   
Should you wish to do this, further details will be given to you after the tests have taken place during debriefing. 
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Investigator Contact Details:  Mary Hill 
     School of Human and Life Sciences 
     Roehampton University 
Whitelands College 
     Holybourne Avenue 
     London 
     SW15 4JD 
     Email: hillma@roehampton.ac.uk 




I agree to take part in this research, and am aware that I am free to withdraw at any point. I understand that the 
information I provide will be treated in confidence by the investigator and that my identity will be protected in the 











Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other queries please raise this 
with the investigator. However if you would like to contact an independent party please contact the Dean of 
School (or if the researcher is a student you can also contact the Director of Studies.) 
 
Director of Studies Contact Details:    Dean of School Contact Details: 
Dr. Gella Richards     Michael Barham 
School of Human and Life Sciences    School of Human and Life Sciences 
Roehampton University     Roehampton University 
Whitelands College     Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue     Holybourne Avenue 
London       London 
SW15 4JD      SW15 4JD 
Email: g.richards@roehampton.ac.uk   Email:m.barham@roehampton.ac.uk 
Tel: 020 8392 3609     Tel: 020 8392 3617 
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Appendix 3 continued 
DEBRIEF FOR COUNSELLORS – TO BE TAKEN AWAY BY PARTICIPANT 
Title of research project: Counsellor Attachment Orientation and its Relationship with Empathy, Mental State 
Understanding and Perspective Taking. 
Brief description of research project: 
Thank you for completing the tasks in this research.  The aim of the research is to shed further light on arguably 
the most important aspect in the relational model of counselling, that is, the relationship between client and 
counsellor.  Drawing on the underlying theory that successful therapy relies on the ability of the therapist to act as 
a secure base for exploration, the research will investigate the relationship between therapist attachment styles 
and other relational attributes that therapists may possess and utilise in order to engage with clients, for example, 
empathic ability, mental state understanding and perspective taking.  In so doing, the aim will be to evaluate how 
the therapist attachment style may be influencing his or her connection with the client through such relational 
experiences. 
Participant ID number:  _________ 
Investigator Contact Details:  Mary Hill 
     School of Human and Life Sciences 
     Roehampton University 
     Whitelands College 
     Holybourne Avenue 
     London 
     SW15 4JD 
     Email: hillma@roehampton.ac.uk 
     Tel: 07769 972716 
It may be that our interview has brought up some difficult feelings or memories for you.  I am unable to offer a 
counselling session, but should any issue have arisen for which you may need more specialist support than I am 
able to offer, I would recommend that you take this to your personal therapist or supervisor where appropriate.  
You may also find the following contacts useful: 
British Psychological Society (BPS) 
Web: http://www.bps.org.uk/bps/e-services/find-a-psychologist/directory.cfm 
Tel: 0116 254 9568 
 
British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP) 
Web: http://www.bacp.co.uk/wam/SeekTherapist.exe?NEWSEARCH 
Tel: 0870 443 5252 or 01455 883300 
 
United Kingdom Council of Psychotherapists (UKCP) 
Web: http://www.psychotherapy.org.uk/find_a_therapist.html 
Tel: 020 7014 9955 
 
Should you wish to receive feedback on your attachment orientation, please email Mary Hill on the above address, 
stating your ID number given above.  If you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other 
queries please raise this with the investigator. However if you would like to contact an independent party please 
contact the individuals named below: 
Director of Studies Contact Details:    Dean of School Contact Details: 
Dr. Gella Richards     Michael Barham 
Roehampton University     Roehampton University 
Whitelands College     Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue     Holybourne Avenue 
London       London 
SW15 4JD      SW15 4JD 
Email: g.richards@roehampton.ac.uk   Email:m.barham@roehampton.ac.uk 
Tel: 020 8392 3609     Tel: 020 8392 3617 
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          Appendix 3 continued 
DEBRIEF TO BE TAKEN AWAY BY PARTICIPANT 
Title of research project: Counsellor Attachment Orientation and its Relationship with Empathy, Mental State 
Understanding and Perspective Taking. 
Thank you for completing the tasks in this research.  The aim of the research is to shed further light on arguably 
the most important aspect in the relational model of counselling, that is, the relationship between client and 
counsellor.  Drawing on the underlying theory that successful therapy relies on the ability of the therapist to act as 
a secure base for exploration, the research will investigate the relationship between therapist attachment styles 
and other relational attributes that therapists may possess and utilise in order to engage with clients, for example, 
empathic ability, mental state understanding and perspective taking.  In so doing, the aim will be to evaluate how 
the therapist attachment style may be influencing his or her connection with the client through such relational 
experiences.  A control group of similarly educated non-counsellors (of which you are one) will also be tested to 
potentially highlight any differences between therapists’ attributes and those of the more general population. 
Participant ID number:  _________ 
Investigator Contact Details:  Mary Hill 
     School of Human and Life Sciences 
     Roehampton University 
     Whitelands College 
     Holybourne Avenue 
     London 
     SW15 4JD 
     Email: hillma@roehampton.ac.uk 
     Tel: 07769 972716 
 
It may be that our interview has brought up some difficult feelings or memories for you.  I am unable to offer a 
counselling session, but should any issue have arisen for which you may need more specialist support than I am 
able to offer, I would recommend that you take this to your personal therapist or supervisor where appropriate.  
You may also find the following contacts useful: 
British Psychological Society (BPS) 
Web: http://www.bps.org.uk/bps/e-services/find-a-psychologist/directory.cfm 
Tel: 0116 254 9568 
 
British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP) 
Web: http://www.bacp.co.uk/wam/SeekTherapist.exe?NEWSEARCH 
Tel: 0870 443 5252 or 01455 883300 
 
United Kingdom Council of Psychotherapists (UKCP) 
Web: http://www.psychotherapy.org.uk/find_a_therapist.html 
Tel: 020 7014 9955 
 
Should you wish to receive feedback on your attachment orientation, please email Mary Hill on the above address, 
stating your ID number given above.  If you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other 
queries please raise this with the investigator. However if you would like to contact an independent party please 
contact the individuals named below: 
Director of Studies Contact Details:    Dean of School Contact Details: 
Dr. Gella Richards     Michael Barham 
School of Human and Life Sciences    School of Human and Life Sciences 
Roehampton University     Roehampton University 
Whitelands College     Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue     Holybourne Avenue 
London       London 
SW15 4JD      SW15 4JD 
Email: g.richards@roehampton.ac.uk   Email:m.barham@roehampton.ac.uk 
Tel : 020 8392 3609     Tel : 020 8392 3617 
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Appendix 4 
Demographic Questionnaire        
Yourself 
Gender:   M / F     Age: _______   I.D. no.________  Is English your first language?  Y / N 
Ethnicity: ________________________________________________________________ 
Date and title of qualification: ______________________________________________ 
Preferred therapeutic model (if applicable): _________________________________ 
Approximate no. of client hours (if applicable): _________________________________ 
 
Family 
Age of mother when you were born:  _________      Number of siblings: _________ 
Date of Birth & Gender of Each:    Sibling 1. DOB/Age:  __________________ M / F 
(Starting with the oldest)    Sibling 2. DOB/Age:  __________________ M / F 
   Sibling 3.    DOB/Age:  __________________ M / F 
   Sibling 4.    DOB/Age:  __________________ M / F 
       
Growing up (0 – 11 years) 
Parental marital status:  _____________________________________________________ 
Mother’s occupation:  _______________________________________________________ 
Mother’s education (eg. Completed GCSE’s, A’ Levels, College, University, Post-grad): 
Father’s occupation:  ________________________________________________________ 
Father’s education:  _________________________________________________________ 
Did the marital status of your parents change during this period?   Yes / No 
If yes, how did it change and how old were you? __________________________________  
Adolescence (12 – 18years) 
Parental marital status:  ______________________________________________________ 
Mother’s occupation:  _______________________________________________________ 
Mother’s education:_________________________________________________________ 
Father’s occupation:  ________________________________________________________ 
Father’s education:  _________________________________________________________ 
Did the marital status of your parents change during this period?   Yes / No 
If yes, how did it change and how old were you? __________________________________  
Now 
Parental marital status:  ______________________________________________________ 
Mother’s occupation:  _______________________________________________________ 
Mother’s education:  ________________________________________________________ 
Father’s occupation:  ________________________________________________________ 
Father’s education:  _________________________________________________________ 
Has the marital status of your parents change during this period?   Yes / No 
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  Scrunched 
Flexing neck 

















Making a fuss/ 


























  muscles 






  baby  
Clutching baby 
Concerned about 
Hand wrapped round 
Help 
Holding child/ 

























ExampleTranscription for Everyday Pictures Task 
 
Participant number:  10  
Recording number:  A174 check (3m 48s) 
Which set of pictures?   
Transcription 
1. Er, it’s a group of five children, one is in the background, um, it’s a little toddler crying on the 
floor with a bib around his neck, um, three of the children seem quite interested in the little 
baby, um, whether they’re concerned or not I don’t know, but they’re looking at him.  One is 
looking at the floor sort of next to the baby so he doesn’t look so interested.  I think they’re in 
some sort of classroom or something with little chairs and tables, um, wearing dungarees and 
cute little things, um…that’s about it I think. 
 
2. Um, this one’s of two little girls, must be about 7, I imagine, not sure, but they’re wearing their 
school uniform, both got little pig tails.  One is looking like she’s cheating on a test and looking 
over the girls shoulder next to her, um, and writing on her own page, so I think they’re in some 
sort of exam environment. 
 
 
3. This one is of an old couple by the looks of it, under some mistletoe, um, the woman is 
grimacing because the man is trying to kiss her, um, but she looks like she’s quite enjoying it as 
well, like a bit of a joke, so and there, there’s just a flowery background.  Looks like quite a nice 
atmosphere I suppose. 
 
 
4. Er, this one is er a lady with her baby crossing some sort of valley or something on a bridge.  She 
looks quite frightened and the baby is sort of clinging to her, um…she’s holding one of the 
handrails and she looks like she’s trying to cross this valley of the bridge but struggling to do so.  
Looks like quite a warm place, she’s not wearing that much, um, there’s some people behind her 
following her, she looks like she’s struggling. 
 
 
5. And this is of two girls, they look Vietnamese or Chinese or something, um, they’re holding little 
loaves of bread and smiling at the photographer, um, one of them’s hiding behind the other, 
which, and she looks a bit older, um the one in front’s a bit older, um and they look like they’re 




6. This one looks like a picture that’s been sort of false taken or done on purpose because there’s a 
little boy pouring a bucket of water over a man’s head on the beach and he’s laughing and his 
wife or whoever it is is laughing as well.  There’s the three of them in the photo, parasol behind 
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them.  Couple of people in the background walking on the beach.  Um, it looks like it’s a bit 
staged, like a holiday pic or something. 
 
 
7. Um, this one is of two people sitting on a couch.  It looks like father and son or daughter, can’t 
really tell, um, the father looks like he’s reading his paper but he’s starting to have a go at 
whoever it is, son or daughter, and the other person is just looking down onto whatever they’ve 

















    Must  
Sure 
3 





  Frightened Clinging 
Struggling 
  
5 Hiding  Happy Smiling   
6    Laughing (2)   
7   Tense    
Total 7 0 5 8 0 3 
 
Mental state language range 
Cheating, clinging, concerned, crying, enjoying, frightened, grimacing, happy, interested, hiding, know, 













































1) A neighbour asks you to repair a piece of furniture.  As the neighbour looks on, you begin 
hammering the nail but then miss the nail and hit your finger.  How would you feel?  How would the 
neighbour feel? 
 
2) A loved one gives you a back rub after you return from a hard day’s work.  How would you feel?  




3) As you drive over a suspension bridge you see a person standing on the other side of the guardrail, 
looking down at the water.  How would you feel?  How would the person feel? 
 
 
4) Your boss tells you that your work has been unacceptable and needs to be improved.  How would 




5) You are standing in line at the bank.  The person in front of you steps up to the window and begins a 
very complicated transaction.  How would you feel?  How would the person in front of you feel? 
 
 
6) You have been working hard on a project for several months.  Several days after submitting it, your 




7) Your dentist has told you that you have several cavities and schedules you for a return visit.  How 
would you feel?  How would the dentist feel? 
 
 
8) Your doctor told you to avoid fatty foods.  A new colleague at work calls to say that she/he is going 
out for pizza and invites you to go along.  How would you feel?  How would your colleague feel? 
 
 
9) You and a friend agree to invest money together to begin a new business venture.  Several days 
later you call the friend back only to learn that she/he changed her/his mind.  How would you feel?  
How would your friend feel? 
 
10) You fall in love with someone who is both attractive and intelligent.  Although this person is not well 
off financially, this doesn’t matter to you – your income is adequate.  When you begin to discuss 
marriage, you learn that she/he is actually from an extremely wealthy family.  She/he did not want 
that known for fear that people would only be interested in her/him for her/his money.  How would 




Examples of the “Eyes Test” stimuli (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), with correct answers  
a) playful 
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The following statements concern how you feel in romantic relationships. We are interested in how you 
generally experience relationships, not just in what is happening in a current relationship. Respond to each 
statement by indicating how much you agree or disagree with it. Circle one of the numbers provided for 





  Disagree Neutral / Agree 
Strongly Mixed Strongly 
1. I prefer not to show a partner how I feel deep down. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I worry about being abandoned. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I am very comfortable being close to romantic partners. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I worry a lot about my relationships. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Just when my partner starts to get close to me I find myself pulling away. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I worry that romantic partners won’t care about me as much as I care about them. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I get uncomfortable when a romantic partner wants to be very close. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I worry a fair amount about losing my partner. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I don’t feel comfortable opening up to romantic partners. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I often wish that my partner’s feelings for me were as strong as my feelings for him/her. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. I want to get close to my partner, but I keep pulling back. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. I often want to merge completely with romantic partners, and this sometimes scares 
them away. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. I am nervous when partners get too close to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. I worry about being alone. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. I feel comfortable sharing my private thoughts and feelings with my partner. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. My desire to be very close sometimes scares people away. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. I try to avoid getting too close to my partner. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. I need a lot of reassurance that I am loved by my partner. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. I find it relatively easy to get close to my partner. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. Sometimes I feel that I force my partners to show more feeling, more commitment. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. I find it difficult to allow myself to depend on romantic partners. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. I do not often worry about being abandoned. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. I prefer not to be too close to romantic partners. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24. If I can’t get my partner to show interest in me, I get upset or angry. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25. I tell my partner just about anything. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26. I find that my partner(s) don’t want to get as close to me as I would like. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27. I usually discuss my problems and concerns with my partner. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28. When I’m not involved in a relationship, I feel somewhat anxious and insecure. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29. I feel comfortable depending on romantic partners. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30. I get frustrated when my partner is not around as much as I would like. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
31. I don’t mind asking romantic partners for comfort, advice, or help. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
32. I get frustrated if romantic partners are not available when I need them. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
33. It helps to turn to my romantic partners in times of need. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
34. When romantic partners disapprove of me, I feel really bad about myself. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
35. I turn to my partner for many things, including comfort and reassurance. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




IRI items (answered on a 5 point Likert scale) 
1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me. 
2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. 
3. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the “other guy’s” point of view. 
4. Sometimes I don’t feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. 
5. I really get involved with the feelings of characters in a novel.  
6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. 
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or a play, and I don’t often get completely caught 
up.  
8. I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision. 
9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.  
10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation. 
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends by imagining how things look from their perspective. 
12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me. 
13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. 
14. Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.   
15. If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste time listening to other people’s arguments. 
16. After seeing a play or a movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters.  
17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. 
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometime don’t feel very much pity for them. 
19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies.  
20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.  
21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.  
22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. 
23. When I watch a good movie, I can easily put myself in the place of a leading character.  
24. I tend to lose control during emergencies.  
25. When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to “put myself in his shoes” for a while.  
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the events in the 
story were happening to me.  
27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces.  
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2. I find it difficult to explain to others things that I understand 

























5. People often tell me that I went too far in driving my point 

















7. Friendships and relationships are just too difficult, so I tend 

















9. In a conversation, I tend to focus on my own thoughts 























































15. I am quick to spot when someone in a group is feeling 









16. If I say something that someone else is offended by, I think 









17. If anyone asked me if I liked their haircut, I would reply 









18. I can’t always see why someone should have felt offended 

















20. I am very blunt, which some people take to be rudeness, Strongly Slightly Slightly Strongly 
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even though this is unintentional. 
 
agree agree disagree disagree 








22. Other people tell me I am good at understanding how they 









23. When I talk to people, I tend to talk about their experiences 



























26. I can easily tell if someone else is interested or bored with 

















28. Friends usually talk to me about their problems as they say 









29. I can sense if I am intruding, even if the other person 



















31. Other people often say that I am insensitive, though I don’t 









32. If I see a stranger in a group, I think that it is up to them to 





































































40. I can usually appreciate the other person’s viewpoint, even 
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3. If I try to imagine something, I find it very easy to create a 









4. I frequently get so strongly absorbed in one thing that I lose 



























7. Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve said is 









8. When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine what the 



































































16. I tend to have very strong interests which I get upset about if 
























































































26. I frequently find that I don’t know how to keep a Definitely slightly slightly definitely 
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conversation going. agree agree disagree disagree 
27. I find it easy to “read between the lines” when someone is 









28. I usually concentrate more on the whole picture, rather than 







































































36. I find it easy to work out what someone is thinking or feeling 









37. If there is an interruption, I can switch back to what I was 



























40. When I was young, I used to enjoy playing games involving 









41. I like to collect information about categories of things (e.g. 



























































































































Statistic df Sig. 
Mental state words .970 41 .342 
Elaboration  .945 41 .046 
Total LEAS score .979 41 .620 
Avoidant Attachment .958 41 .132 
Anxious Attachment .950 41 .067 
Eyes Test .949 41 .065 
Emotional Faces .897 41 .001 
IRI Perspective Taking .952 41 .081 
IRI Empathic Concern .968 41 .292 
EQ .966 41 .260 
Perspective taking correct answers .923 40 .010 
Face and hands total fix duration .909 41 .003 




































 Mental state 
words 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .744
**
 .140 -.168 -.072 -.013 -.036 .053 -.147 .158 .111 .592
**
 .207 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .382 .293 .655 .937 .824 .742 .360 .324 .495 .000 .194 
N 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 41 
Elaboration  Correlation Coefficient .744
**
 1.000 .229 -.287 .052 .040 .050 .111 -.012 .271 .083 .404
**
 .109 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .150 .069 .745 .803 .758 .489 .942 .087 .611 .009 .499 
N 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 41 
LEAS score Correlation Coefficient .140 .229 1.000 -.124 .223 .176 .204 .080 .382
*
 .263 .084 .189 .105 
Sig. (2-tailed) .382 .150 . .439 .161 .271 .200 .618 .014 .096 .606 .237 .514 
N 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 41 
Avoidant 
Attachment 
Correlation Coefficient -.168 -.287 -.124 1.000 .311
*
 -.014 -.110 -.293 -.287 -.569
**
 -.024 -.142 -.204 
Sig. (2-tailed) .293 .069 .439 . .048 .930 .492 .063 .068 .000 .885 .377 .201 
N 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 41 
Anxious 
Attachment 
Correlation Coefficient -.072 .052 .223 .311
*
 1.000 -.121 .180 -.196 .010 -.247 .052 -.075 -.008 
Sig. (2-tailed) .655 .745 .161 .048 . .450 .259 .220 .948 .119 .751 .642 .959 
N 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 41 
Eyes Correlation Coefficient -.013 .040 .176 -.014 -.121 1.000 .361
*
 .131 .206 .247 .226 .058 -.078 
Sig. (2-tailed) .937 .803 .271 .930 .450 . .020 .414 .197 .119 .161 .719 .627 
N 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 41 
Face emotion Correlation Coefficient -.036 .050 .204 -.110 .180 .361
*
 1.000 .115 .187 .216 .096 .014 -.002 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  .824 .758 .200 .492 .259 .020 . .472 .242 .175 .557 .933 .993 
N 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 41 
IRI Persp 
taking 




 .251 .141 .084 
Sig. (2-tailed) .742 .489 .618 .063 .220 .414 .472 . .000 .000 .118 .378 .600 
N 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 41 
IRI Empathic 
conc 
Correlation Coefficient -.147 -.012 .382
*




 -.037 -.086 -.038 
Sig. (2-tailed) .360 .942 .014 .068 .948 .197 .242 .000 . .000 .820 .595 .815 
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N 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 41 
EQ Correlation Coefficient .158 .271 .263 -.569
**




 1.000 .054 .147 .309
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .324 .087 .096 .000 .119 .119 .175 .000 .000 . .743 .358 .049 
N 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 41 
Persp taking 
accuracy 
Correlation Coefficient .111 .083 .084 -.024 .052 .226 .096 .251 -.037 .054 1.000 .215 .190 
Sig. (2-tailed) .495 .611 .606 .885 .751 .161 .557 .118 .820 .743 . .182 .239 
N 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 






 .189 -.142 -.075 .058 .014 .141 -.086 .147 .215 1.000 .711
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .009 .237 .377 .642 .719 .933 .378 .595 .358 .182 . .000 
N 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 41 
First fix social 
info 





Sig. (2-tailed) .194 .499 .514 .201 .959 .627 .993 .600 .815 .049 .239 .000 . 
N 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 41 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 














Analysis of English as first language 
 
 
EngFirstLAng N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Mental state words Yes 38 39.55 16.334 2.650 
No 3 35.67 12.662 7.311 
Elaboration  Yes 38 5.89 3.286 .533 
No 3 5.67 2.309 1.333 
LEAS score Yes 38 38.24 4.929 .800 
No 3 42.67 3.786 2.186 
Avoidant Attachment Yes 38 2.7763 1.10882 .17987 
No 3 4.0556 .96225 .55556 
Anxious Attachment Yes 38 3.2030 1.12543 .18257 
No 3 3.6296 .61195 .35331 
Eyes Yes 38 27.84 3.421 .555 
No 3 28.00 1.000 .577 
Faces Emotion Yes 38 21.21 2.384 .387 
No 3 20.33 1.155 .667 
IRI Perspective taking Yes 38 19.92 5.196 .843 
No 3 19.67 3.055 1.764 
IRI Empathic concern Yes 38 20.32 4.557 .739 
No 3 20.00 5.292 3.055 
EQ Yes 38 48.87 13.201 2.142 
No 3 45.67 11.372 6.566 
Perspective Taking accuracy Yes 37 10.00 3.629 .597 
No 3 11.33 3.786 2.186 
Total fix social info Yes 38 8.3948 5.61279 .91052 
No 3 10.2782 1.79873 1.03850 
First fix social info Yes 38 .5192 .15669 .02542 
No 3 .7500 .07792 .04499 
 
 
Levene’s Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 









2.481 .123 -2.505 39 .017 -.23084 
Equal variances not 
assumed 







Partial Correlation Analysis of First Fix Eye durations controlling for English as a first language 
 
First Fix on Social 
Information 
Controlling for English as a 
first language 
First Fix on Social 
Information 
 
 Mental state words Correlation .233 .191 
Significance (2-tailed) .154 .230 
df 37 41 
Elaboration  Correlation .196 .166 
Significance (2-tailed) .232 .299 
df 37 41 
Total LEAS score Correlation .064 .150 
Significance (2-tailed) .697 .349 
df 37 41 
Avoidant 
Attachment 
Correlation -.336* -.203 
Significance (2-tailed) .037 .202 
df 37 41 
Anxious Attachment Correlation -.129 -.075 
Significance (2-tailed) .435 .642 
df 37 41 
Eyes Correlation -.006 .010 
Significance (2-tailed) .969 .951 
df 37 41 
Facial Emotion Correlation .056 .008 
Significance (2-tailed) .733 .963 
df 37 41 
IRI Persp taking Correlation .132 .116 
Significance (2-tailed) .424 .471 
df 37 41 
IRI Empathic conc Correlation -.025 -.019 
Significance (2-tailed) .881 .904 
df 37 41 
EQ Correlation .387* .341
*
 
Significance (2-tailed) .015 .029 
df 37 41 
Perspective Taking 
Accuracy 
Correlation .181 .204 
Significance (2-tailed) .270 .207 
df 37 40 





Significance (2-tailed) .000 .000 
df 37 41 
First fix on social 
information 
Correlation 1.000 1 
Significance (2-tailed) .  









Consideration of age between groups – correlations between age and main variables 
Pearson Correlations 
 age 
Mental state words Pearson Correlation .251 
Sig. (2-tailed) .113 
N 41 
Elaboration  Pearson Correlation -.171 
Sig. (2-tailed) .286 
N 41 
Total LEAS score Pearson Correlation -.168 
Sig. (2-tailed) .293 
N 41 
Avoidant Attachment Pearson Correlation .271 
Sig. (2-tailed) .086 
N 41 
Anxious Attachment Pearson Correlation -.163 
Sig. (2-tailed) .309 
N 41 
Eyes Pearson Correlation -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .995 
N 41 
Facial Emotion Pearson Correlation .108 
Sig. (2-tailed) .501 
N 41 
IRI Persp taking Pearson Correlation -.157 
Sig. (2-tailed) .328 
N 41 
IRI Empathic conc Pearson Correlation -.277 
Sig. (2-tailed) .079 
N 41 
EQ Pearson Correlation -.277 




Pearson Correlation -.062 
Sig. (2-tailed) .706 
N 40 
Total eye fix social info Pearson Correlation .024 
Sig. (2-tailed) .880 
N 41 
First eye fix social info Pearson Correlation -.108 


































age Mental state 
words 
Correlation 1.000 .770 .238 -.283 -.090 .041 -.090 .191 .054 .292 .172 .702 .217 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
. .000 .145 .081 .587 .803 .586 .245 .745 .071 .295 .000 .184 
df 0 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Elaboration  Correlation .770 1.000 .186 -.333 .002 -.019 -.141 .083 -.034 .245 .063 .555 .167 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.000 . .257 .038 .990 .910 .393 .614 .836 .133 .705 .000 .308 
df 37 0 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
LEAS score Correlation .238 .186 1.000 -.070 .128 .192 .253 -.001 .330 .180 .110 .288 .137 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.145 .257 . .673 .438 .242 .120 .996 .040 .274 .504 .075 .406 
df 37 37 0 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Avoidant 
Attachment 
Correlation -.283 -.333 -.070 1.000 .367 -.004 -.125 -.189 -.252 -.536 -.020 -.173 -.173 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.081 .038 .673 . .021 .982 .450 .250 .121 .000 .902 .293 .293 
df 37 37 37 0 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Anxious 
Attachment 
Correlation -.090 .002 .128 .367 1.000 -.110 .104 -.229 -.036 -.318 .008 -.207 -.093 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.587 .990 .438 .021 . .504 .529 .160 .829 .048 .960 .206 .575 
df 37 37 37 37 0 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Eyes Correlation .041 -.019 .192 -.004 -.110 1.000 .448 .116 .190 .309 .172 .085 -.001 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.803 .910 .242 .982 .504 . .004 .484 .247 .056 .295 .606 .997 
df 37 37 37 37 37 0 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
195 
 
Facial Emotion Correlation -.090 -.141 .253 -.125 .104 .448 1.000 .070 .280 .284 .193 -.115 .022 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.586 .393 .120 .450 .529 .004 . .674 .084 .079 .238 .485 .895 
df 37 37 37 37 37 37 0 37 37 37 37 37 37 
IRI Persp taking Correlation .191 .083 -.001 -.189 -.229 .116 .070 1.000 .592 .497 .226 .147 .109 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.245 .614 .996 .250 .160 .484 .674 . .000 .001 .166 .371 .509 
df 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 0 37 37 37 37 37 
IRI Empathic conc Correlation .054 -.034 .330 -.252 -.036 .190 .280 .592 1.000 .583 -.066 -.055 -.049 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.745 .836 .040 .121 .829 .247 .084 .000 . .000 .689 .740 .765 
df 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 0 37 37 37 37 
EQ Correlation .292 .245 .180 -.536 -.318 .309 .284 .497 .583 1.000 .029 .192 .329 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.071 .133 .274 .000 .048 .056 .079 .001 .000 . .862 .242 .041 
df 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 0 37 37 37 
Perspective 
Taking Accuracy 
Correlation .172 .063 .110 -.020 .008 .172 .193 .226 -.066 .029 1.000 .183 .201 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.295 .705 .504 .902 .960 .295 .238 .166 .689 .862 . .265 .220 
df 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 0 37 37 
Total eye fix Correlation .702 .555 .288 -.173 -.207 .085 -.115 .147 -.055 .192 .183 1.000 .601 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .075 .293 .206 .606 .485 .371 .740 .242 .265 . .000 
df 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 0 37 
First eye fix Correlation .217 .167 .137 -.173 -.093 -.001 .022 .109 -.049 .329 .201 .601 1.000 
Significance (2-
tailed) 
.184 .308 .406 .293 .575 .997 .895 .509 .765 .041 .220 .000 . 






Eyetracking data for the Pictures task without zero values (data with zeros is included in the main text) 
Descriptive statistics and independent sample t-tests 
Measure 
Therapists Non-therapists All Participants 
t-test 
(one-tailed) 
Mean Standard  
deviation 
Range Mean Standard  
deviation 
Range Mean Standard  
deviation 
Range 
Average picture fixation 50.52 37.65 14.19-172.39 35.89 24.04 7.55-101.99 43.03 31.89 7.55-172.39 t(39) = 1.49, p=0.07 ͫ 
Average fixation faces (no 
zeros) 
8.28 4.78 1.94-21.14 6.96 5.06 1.25-20.65 7.61 4.91 1.25-21.14 t(39) = 0.86, p=0.20 
Average fixation hands (no 
zeros) 
1.66 0.72 0.35-2.91 1.21 0.79 0.16-3.25 1.43 0.78 0.16-3.25 t(39) = 1.91, p=0.03* 
Sum of average fix for faces 
and hands (no zeros) 
9.94 5.33 2.65-23.57 8.17 5.67 1.56-23.12 9.03 5.52 1.56-23.57 t(39) = 1.03, p=0.16 
           
Average duration of first fix 0.18 0.07 0.08-0.38 0.18 0.05 0.07-0.26 0.18 0.06 0.07-0.38 t(39) = 0.22, p=0.41 
Average duration of first face 
fix (no zeros) 
0.36 0.10 0.21-0.52 0.33 0.10 0.17-0.52 0.35 0.10 0.17-0.52 t(39) = 1.00, p=0.16 
Average duration of first hand 
fix (no zeros) 
0.31 0.09 0.12-0.48 0.26 0.10 0.13-0.45 0.29 0.10 0.12-0.48 t(39) = 1.72, p=0.047* 
Sum of faces and hands 
duration of first fix (no zeros) 
 
0.68 0.17 0.38-0.94 0.59 0.19 0.30-0.97 0.63 0.18 0.30-0.97 t(39) = 1.50, p=0.07 ͫ 
Average time to first fix 0.24 0.51 0.00-2.22 0.28 0.51 0.00-2.14 0.26 0.51 0.00-2.22 t(39) =-0.24, p=0.41 
Average time to first face fix 1.12 1.66 0.18-5.77 1.01 0.99 0.19-3.27 1.06 1.34 0.18-5.77 t(39) = 0.28, p=0.39 
Average time to first hand fix 11.89 5.76 4.76-28.07 11.19 6.98 2.64-29.16 11.54 6.34 2.64-29.16 t(39) = 0.35, p=0.37 
Average time to first fix 0.24 0.51 0.00-2.22 0.28 0.51 0.00-2.14 0.26 0.51 0.00-2.22 t(39) =-0.24, p=0.41 
           





Eyetracking data for the Pictures task without zero values (data with zeros is included in the main text)    Appendix 22 continued  
Pearson correlations between attachment coefficient and eye-tracking measures. 
Pearson’s r Therapists Non-therapists 
 Avoidant Anxious Avoidant Anxious 
Average picture fixation .096 .044 -.334 -.428* 
Average fixation faces (no zeros) -.121 -.049 -.274 -.390* 
Average fixation hands (no zeros) .287 .113 -.344 -.538** 










Average fixation faces (with zeros) -.099 -.051 -.257 -.391* 
Average fixation hands (with zeros) .240 .108 -.431* -.483* 















Average duration of first fix -.437* .207 .161 -.212 

































































Average time to first fix -.284  -.034 .152 .180 
Average time to first face fix -.027 .117 .042 .280 
Average time to first hand fix -.219 -.006 -.071 .183 
Two tailed, *significant at 0.05 level,  **significant at 0.01 level 
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One-tailed tests, * correlation significant at the .01 level, **correlation significant at the .05 level 
 
Eye-tracking data including “without zeros”. Pearson correlation coefficients for the eye-tracking data and other measures – therapists.                    Appendix 22 continued. 
 































Average picture fixation .246 -.033 -.109 -.014 .139 -.269 -.008 .206 .206 -.177 .780** .202 .057 
Average fixation faces (no 
zeros) 
.160 -.078 -.189 .056 .130 .007 -.025 .196 .205 -.087 .789** .413* .286 
Average fixation hands (no 
zeros) 
-.042 -.200 -.003 -.219 -.060 -.265 -.002 .141 .097 -.320 .636** .055 .176 
Sum faces and hands average 
(no zeros) 
.138 -.097 -.170 .020 .108 -.030 -.023 .195 .197 -.122 .793** .377 ͫ .280 
Average fixation faces (with 
zeros) 
.142 -.097 -.168 .030 .095 -.010 -.016 .168 .219 -.075 .803** .430* .294 
Average fixation hands (with 
zeros) 
.079 -.151 -.022 -.153 .044 -.221 .083 .217 .213 -.314 .708** .049 .095 
Sum faces and hands average 
(with zeros) 
.137 -.107 -.153 .007 .091 -.039 -.003 .179 .224 -.109 .811** .390* .275 
Average duration of first fix -.219 -.281 .043 -.048 -.258 -.053 -.630** -.346 ͫ -.250 .305 -.158 .436* -.200 
Average duration of first face 
fix (no zeros) 
-.360 ͫ -.099 -.167 .036 .008 .001 -.383* -.083 -.135 .199 -.218 .015 .223 
Average duration of first 
hand fix (no zeros) 
-.113 -.377 ͫ .052 -.245 -.039 -.415* -.307 .024 .250 -.195 .261 .025 .050 
Sum faces and hands first fix 
(no zeros) 
-.275 -.271 -.069 -.117 -.017 -.234 -.398* -.035 .060 .010 .020 .023 .159 
Average duration of first face 
fix (with zeros) 
-.423* -.174 -.104 -.035 -.097 -.033 -.366 ͫ -.166 -.083 .225 -.179 .081 .277 
Average duration of first 
hand fix (with zeros) 
.048 -.316 .038 -.191 .060 -.350 ͫ -.127 .134 .377 ͫ -.275 .470* .019 .021 
Sum faces and hands first fix 
(with zeros) 
-.229 -.319 -.039 -.149 -.020 -.254 -.311 -.013 .201 -.042 .204 .063 .185 
Average time to first fix .332 .361 ͫ -.048 .266 .181 .151 .142 .137 .205 -.323 .091 .255 -.135 
Average time to first face fix .486* .047 .075 .094 .195 -.272 .012 .188 .377 ͫ -.346 .283 .163 -.259 
Average time to first hand fix .390* .189 .008 .251 .180 .096 .008 -.007 .173 -.312 .468* .378 ͫ -.125 
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Eye-tracking data including “without zeros”. Table [ ] Pearson correlation coefficients for the eye-tracking data and other measures – Non-therapists.               Appendix 22 continued 
    































Average picture fixation .067 -.057 -.352 ͫ .321 .239 .254 .270 -.392* .134 .042 .633** .546** .283 
Average fixation faces (no 
zeros) 
.006 -.140 -.212 .169 .137 .100 .124 -.526** -.002 .004 .542** .585** .225 
Average fixation hands (no 
zeros) 
.330 .002 -.366 ͫ .361 ͫ .260 .367 ͫ .239 -.333 .180 .025 .514** .302 -.002 
Sum faces and hands average 
(no zeros) 
.052 -.124 -.240 .201 .158 .140 .144 -.515** .023 .000 .555** .564** .201 
Average fixation faces (with 
zeros) 
.006 -150 -.204 .160 .128 .089 .120 -.527** .003 -.001 .551** .590** .219 
Average fixation hands (with 
zeros) 
.268 .052 -.402* .449* .372* .413* .301 -.188 .343 ͫ -.014 .571** .217 .104 
Sum faces and hands average 
(with zeros) 
.040 -.131 -.239 .205 .166 .135 .149 -.508** .047 -.002 .580** .570** .214 
Average duration of first fix .358 ͫ -.076 -.154 -.004 -.078 -.058 -.009 -.172 -.125 -.089 -.171 .002 -.228 
Average duration of first face 
fix (no zeros) 
.166 .118 -.381* .418* .258 .364 ͫ .029 -.196 -.155 -.303 -.008 .101 -.070 
Average duration of first 
hand fix (no zeros) 
.192 .057 -.407* .515** .389* .545* .216 .052 -.018 -.176 .012 .013 .015 
Sum faces and hands first fix 
(no zeros) 
.191 .092 -.419* .496* .345 ͫ .484* .132 -.074 -.091 -.253 .002 .059 -.029 
Average duration of first face 
fix (with zeros) 
.167 .057 -.372* .387* .228 .330 .017 -.213 -.116 -.279 .051 .145 -.102 
Average duration of first 
hand fix (with zeros) 
.092 .001 -.511** .573** .488* .547** .266 .017 .306 -.155 .235 .037 .118 
Sum faces and hands first fix 
(with zeros) 
.144 .033 -.479* .520** .384* .473* .148 -.114 .092 -.241 .152 .102 .003 
Average time to first fix .072 .081 -.078 .296 .220 .328 .092 .206 -.402* -.208 .210 .369 ͫ -.228 
Average time to first face fix -.065 .176 -.158 .183 .200 .332 -.149 .217 -.314 -.180 .303 .290 -.112 
Average time to first hand fix .020 .134 -.250 .123 .142 .023 -.104 .192 .064 -.213 .352 ͫ .289 .234 










































































































































































































































































































































































            - 
- 
- 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
